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Abstract 
 
In the context of growing concerns for climate change, the objective of this dissertation is to 
bring some insights on two environmental issues. The first one deals with the question of 
whether environmental policies are efficient enough to significantly decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions and energy consumption and the second one concerns the way households’ well-
being is affected by environmental changes. 
 
France committed to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and energy consumption in 
residential sector. In a first time, we study the determinants of residential energy 
consumption. An in-depth understanding of energy consumption is needed to design adequate 
energy policies and achieve a low-carbon society. We show that to improve buildings' energy 
efficiency, the challenge is to induce households to undertake renovations and to adopt 
energy-saving equipments. This is the objective of public policies, such as tax credit or 
subsidies. We evaluate the impact of these measures, using a simulation model. We conclude 
that environmental policies are efficient because they allow decreasing energy consumption 
and greenhouse gas emissions. However, we point out that they are not sufficient to reach 
government objectives. Finally, we focus on the impact of the tax credit on households’ 
behavior. The tax credit provides little incentive to undertake energy-saving renovations. The 
impact of the measure is very low compared to its cost and this is partially due to free riding.  
 
Emerging countries are more exposed to climate disasters than developed ones. Therefore, the 
most important concern in emerging countries is to find a way to limit the consequences of 
climate change. In this context, our objective is to understand how deforestation affects 
population and how agents adapt to environmental degradations. More precisely, we study 
how deforestation, that increases fuel scarcity, affects women living in rural India. We show 
that fuel scarcity increases the probability for women to be involved in natural resource 
collection. Through this, it has a negative effect on the labor force participation, especially on 
family business and wage activities. 
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Introduction  
 
 
Energy consumption and greenhouse gases emissions become key concerns following 
increasingly alarming observations on climate change. In September 2013, the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) met in Stockholm to present its results, 
that harden its previous findings. Global warming is accelerating. The land and ocean surface 
temperature has been increasing by 0.85°C in average since 1880 and the IPCC forecasts an 
increase in temperature from 0.3°C to 4.8°C for this century depending on the scenario. Such 
an increase would have a non-negligible impact on the number of extreme climatic events. 
For example, 2012 was among the 10 warmest years on record. This caused several startling 
climatic events, such as the lowest recorded levels of Artic sea ice (97% of the Greenland ice 
sheet showed some forms of melt (Blunden et al., 2013)), Hurricane Sandy in United States, 
the heavy rain in northern Europe and eastern Australia.  
 
First, natural disasters caused a number of human fatalities, counted in 2012 at approximately 
8,800. This represents the fewest number of victims related to climatic events since at least 
2002. Second, besides human fatalities, damages related to natural disasters represent a very 
high cost. Events that occurred in 2012 represent an economic loss of $200 billion and an 
insured loss for the population of $72 billion (AON Benfield, 2013). Hurricane Sandy was the 
costliest event of the year and accounts with the drought in U.S. for the half of economic 
losses. This is not an exceptional cost: 2012 was the fifth costliest year in term of economic 
losses since 2002. Third, all consequences of these climatic changes are not observable today. 
The level of sea will continue to increase following the rise of temperature, and this would 
increase the frequency and worsen the intensity of events such as storm and flooding. As we 
can observe on map 1, emerging countries are more exposed to climate disasters than 
developed ones. The 2011 UNDP report stresses the fact that the environmental degradations 
or habitat destruction could jeopardize development and increase poverty in emerging 
countries. In this report, the impact of climatic events on HDI is estimated, taking into 
account several scenarios. The ‘environmental challenge’ scenario captures the adverse 
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effects of global warming on agricultural production, on the access to clean water and 
improved sanitation, and on pollution. The ‘environmental disaster’ scenario features vast 
deforestation and land degradation, dramatic declines in biodiversity and accelerated extreme 
weather events. Simulations suggest that the global HDI would be 8% lower by 2050 in the 
‘environmental challenge’ scenario than in the baseline, and even 12% lower for south Asia. 
The ‘environmental disaster’ predicts a global HDI 15% below the baseline. Several 
mechanisms play a role. The same report shows that climatic events, as the droughts in Africa 
and the sea level rise in low-lying countries like Bangladesh, could lead to an increase of the 
world food price from 30 to 50%, affecting first the poorest countries.  
 
Considering these dramatic consequences, it seems important to focus on the causes of these 
events. Even if there are natural climate fluctuations, the last IPCC report (2013) confirms the 
impact of human activities on climate change (with a 95% confidence level). Moreover, 18 
research groups recently studied the causes of 12 events of exceptional intensity that occurred 
in 2012. They stress that human influences have an impact on some extreme weather and 
climate events (Peterson et al. 2013). For example in the United States, they argue that 
human-caused climate change plays an important role in the warm wave in the east during 
spring 2012. In the same way, they show that the extremely low Artic sea ice extent during 
summer 2012 cannot be explained by natural variability alone. Human activity increases the 
concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere principally as a result of fossil-fuel 
combustion and deforestation (American Meteorological Society, 2012). In 2010, the total 
greenhouse gases emissions reached 47 billion tons CO2 equivalent, which represents 32.3% 
more than in 1990 (source: CAIT).  
 
Environmental damages have irreversible consequences and raise the issue of responsibilities 
toward the most affected countries and toward future generations. These concerns are not 
recent. The 1987 Brundtland report (World Commission on Environment and Development, 
1987) came which a global awareness about global warming challenges. One year later, the 
IPCC was established to assess climate change and the associated risks. Their alarming 
findings underline the necessity to adopt an international response strategy, which leads to the 
Kyoto protocol (1997). For the first time, some developed countries committed to decrease 
the total emissions of several greenhouse gases by 5.2% in average compared to 1990 level by 
2012. However, the largest greenhouse gases emitters had not ratified the treaty. United 
States, whose emissions accounted for almost one-fifth of global CO2 emissions in 2008 
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(source: United States Environmental Protection Agency) have withdrawn from Kyoto 
Protocol. They justify their decision by arguing that emerging countries are not involved in 
the protocol, whereas their greenhouse gases emissions are growing with their economic 
development. Indeed, almost 30% of global CO2 emissions in 2008 came from China and 
India (source: United States Environmental Protection Agency). However, European Union 
pledged to cut its greenhouses gases emissions by 8% by 2012, and committed on new 
objectives, namely to cut emissions by 20% by 2020 compared with the 1990 level. To reach 
this, they have to take measures to control for their energy consumption and greenhouse gases 
emissions. Several environmental public policies have been introduced these last years in 
France and some other countries. However, challenges for emerging countries are still 
unclear. They have to find a way to mitigate the negative effects of global warming or to 
adapt to environmental changes. Even if they are the most vulnerable to climate change and 
projections are not optimistic, impacts for populations remain little known and environmental 
policies may be costly for them and therefore delay their development.  
 
These observations lead us to wonder about the efficiency of environmental policies and 
about the economic impacts of climate change on emerging countries. First, stylized facts and 
examples presented above show that it is important to fight against global warming. 
Nevertheless, public measures are efficient only if individuals are sensitive to it and they 
represent high public cost. Active environmental policies have been introduced these last ten 
years and few evaluations examine their impact. Second, the impact of environmental 
degradations on population living in emerging countries will become a growing concern and 
economic consequences need to be studied. In this dissertation, we explore these issues, using 
data for France and India.  
 
 
Environmental policies efficiency in developed countries: Evidence from 
France 
 
The challenges 
France is committed by international agreement to cut greenhouse gases emissions by 20% by 
2020 and divide it by 4 by 2050 compared with 1990 level. This leads to Grenelle Act, which 
sets more specific objectives as reducing energy consumption in the building sector by 38% 
and developing renewable energies up to 23% of final energy consumption by 2020. It 
 Introduction 
 
 4 
focuses on the building sector first because it is the primary energy consumer (figure 1) and 
its energy consumption increases by 18% between 1990 and 2010. Even if it is not the 
primary greenhouse gases emitter, the increase (of 13%) of emissions in this sector is the 
most important with transport between 1990 and 2010, whereas industry and agriculture have 
been able to reduce their emissions (figure 2). Second, the greatest energy-saving potential 
lies in buildings due to the improvements in efficiency of insulation or appliances (European 
Commission, 2011 Energy Efficiency Plan). However, huge efforts are required to achieve 
the objectives. In 2010, energy consumption in residential-tertiary was 68 million tons of oil 
equivalent and we have committed to reach 41.88 in 2020. Moreover, renewable energy only 
represented 6% of energy consumption in 2010 (figure 3). 
 
 
Figure 1. Weight of each sector in French energy consumption 
 
Source: INSEE 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Evolution of the GHG emissions (in MtCO2e) 
 
Source: INSEE 
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Figure 3. The weight of renewable energy in French energy consumption in 2010 
 
Source: INSEE 
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We focus on residential sector, which accounts for two-third of energy consumption in the 
building sector or for approximately one-quarter of the total energy-consumption (Odyssee, 
2013). Both the growth of the population, which has led to an increase in the number and in 
the size of homes and the increase in electronic equipment, tend to raise energy needs. The 
number of housings has increased by more than one million between 2006 and 2010. New 
constructions are associated with low energy consumption due to insulation improvement. 
However the building renewal rate is lower than 1% per year (DGEMP, 2007), and this is not 
sufficient to significantly cut energy demand.  
Consequently, it is crucial to understand the main factors driving household energy 
consumption to significantly decrease energy consumption in residential sector. This is the 
purpose of the first chapter of this dissertation. More precisely, our objective is to identify the 
main determinants of households energy consumption. Literature identifies several potential 
determinants but do not pay much attention to households’ characteristics, except the income. 
We (1) investigate the relative ability of household sociodemographic characteristics, 
technical properties of the dwelling, and climatic specificities of the surrounding area to 
explain energy consumption per square meter; (2) identify some of the main sources of 
energy conservation in the French housing sector; and (3) propose an estimation of the price 
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provides utility indirectly through the use of various appliances. Therefore, energy 
consumption must be studied conditional on a household’s stock of appliances. We use a 
discrete-continuous decision framework, estimating first the heating system choice and then 
energy consumption conditional on the first choice. Results show that the intensity of energy 
used per square meter is almost completely determined by the technical properties of the 
dwelling and by the climate. The role of sociodemographic variables is particularly weak. In 
the short run, without large investments in insulation and new types of energy-efficient 
appliances, changes in energy consumption will be weak. The challenge for environmental 
policies is thus to induce households to undertake energy saving renovations in their housing.  
 
Adoption of energy-saving equipment, energy paradox and policy response 
Given the results of the first chapter, it seems important to understand the behavior of 
households facing adoption of energy-saving equipment or renovations. Taking into account 
only energy-saving improvements, 8.8% of residential housings have been renovated in 2010, 
and this represents a decrease compared to 2006 (Source: OPEN, 2011). The number of 
energy-saving renovations is still insufficient to have a significant impact on the level of 
energy consumption in the residential sector. This can be explained by the energy paradox: 
agents pass up very attractive opportunities to invest in highly efficient equipment that would 
result in significant energy savings in the future. The literature identifies several barriers to 
energy saving investments.  
 
• Market failures 
Market failures are one of these barriers. One may think of lack of information, of energy 
saving renovation supply saturation or split incentives (Golove and Eto, 1996; Brown, 2001; 
Boulanger, 2007).  
First, individuals are often misinformed about technology, opportunities and about the return 
on the investment. Information can be difficult and expensive to obtain. This is for example 
the case as far as the energy saving following a renovation (Beillan et al. 2011; Francfort, 
2009). Indeed, agents and dwellings are heterogeneous; consequently the return is specific to 
the investor. The return of energy saving equipment depends for example on the quality of the 
building: It is expected to be higher for old and very inefficient houses (Hasset and Metcalf, 
1993).  
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Second, energy saving renovation requires special knowledge, and suppliers may not be able 
to meet the demand. We observe indeed a saturation of the supply in the energy saving 
renovation market in France (Moussaoui, 2008).  
 
Third, there exist split incentives between owners and occupants of residential housings 
(Gillingham et al., 2011; Charlier, 2013). Split incentives result from bill-paying 
arrangements. Households that do not directly pay for their heat but have instead these costs 
included in their rent or condo fees opt for a higher thermal comfort and thus a higher energy-
consumption. This is also the case in France when households live in collective apartment 
buildings, where energy consumption can be assimilated to a public good because all owners 
share the energy bills. In these situations, tenants have little incentive to efficiently use energy 
and are less prone to adopt energy efficient equipments (Maruejols and Young, 2011; 
Levinson and Niemann, 2004). Moreover, dwellings occupied by the owners have a higher 
degree of insulation and conversely (Gillingham et al., 2011). When the housing is rented, 
owners have less incentive to renovate because they do not benefit from energy saving 
following the investment (tenants do).  
 
To overcome market imperfections, information failures in particular, several measures have 
been implemented. For example, the Espaces Info-Energie have been created. There are 
places where households can find all the information they need about energy consumption, 
renewable energies, and energy-saving renovations. It has been initiated in 2001 to alert and 
inform households. It now exists about 250 such places in France. Moreover, appliances are 
associated with an energy label, from A+ for those that consume the least amount of energy to 
C for the largest energy consumers (from 1999, on appliances belonging to higher energy 
consumer labels are no longer authorized for sale). This allows identifying the less energy 
consumer appliance. There are the equivalent of “Power Smart” in Canada, “Energy Star” in 
United States or “E2000” in Switzerland. The energy labels have been compulsory for fridge 
and freezers since 1995 in all European Union, and they have first been extended to other 
appliances and then later on houses or apartments for sale or for rent.  
 
• Economic barriers 
It exists also economic barriers such as the liquidity constraint and the restricted access to 
capital (Boulanger, 2007). For example, low-income households often do not have collaterals 
and credit institutions are reluctant to grant them loans. They faced liquidity constraint for 
 Introduction 
 
 8 
investment in energy saving technologies whereas energy expenditures often represent a large 
share of their budget. It is estimated at 15%-20% in France by Cayla et al. (2011).  
For this reason, several financial measures have been introduced in France. In 2009, a zero 
rate bank loan can be used to fund a series of energy saving renovations. Also, subsidies are 
available for households (as for example subsidies from ANAH or from the regions) to reduce 
the cost of the investment and thus make it more affordable. In addition, a tax credit has the 
objective since 2005 to induce households (owners or tenants) to undertake energy-efficient 
renovations (e.g., insulation, changes in heating equipments) and to adopt renewable energy 
systems in their main housing. In the same way, the introduction of a reduced VAT for energy 
saving renovations with a 5.5% rate instead of 19.6% has the objective to decrease the 
investment cost.  
 
• Uncertainty, irreversibility and high discount rates 
By contrast, Hassett and Metcalf (1993) argue that the so-called energy paradox is in reality a 
optimal response to first, uncertainty about the return on investment (i.e. the energy savings 
following the adoption of equipment), and second, the irreversibility of the investment (as 
insulation for example). Indeed, the uncertainty on the evolution of energy prices leads to an 
uncertainty on energy-savings that will be realized following the investment. Agents have to 
forecast future energy prices to appraise the profitability of the investment. Moreover, once 
the investment is undertaken, it cannot be sold if the energy prices fall and the investment 
becomes unprofitable. Therefore, it is prudent for an agent to wait to get information about 
energy price trends.  
Given uncertainty and irreversibility, agents use high implicit discount rates for energy-saving 
investment, i.e. the present value of future energy savings is low. A literature review that 
empirically estimates the implicit discount rates used for energy saving investment show that 
they substantially exceed the maximum discount rate that consumer would be expected to 
apply (using the rate of return available on investments of similar risk) (Sanstad et al., 1995). 
Hassett and Metcalf (1993) find that the discount rate used for energy saving investment 
exceeds the conventional estimate by a factor of four. Therefore, agents require a largely 
higher return on investment for energy saving equipment than for other kinds of investment to 
undertake the project.  
In terms of policy implication, this finding stresses the fact that providing more information 
about benefits of energy saving investments is not sufficient to induce investment. Hasset and 
Metcalf (1993) show that increased benefits of an investment are also likely to only have a 
 Introduction 
 
 9 
small effect. They simulate the impact of 15% tax credit for energy saving investments and 
show that the effect of such a policy is dramatically attenuated because of uncertainty. Given 
these observations, it seems that standards could be efficient to decrease energy consumption 
because they have no link with the agents’ perception of future energy savings following an 
investment. Thermal regulations for new constructions and then for renovations have been 
introduced in France for the first time respectively in 1974 and 2008. 
 
Public policy efficiency vs. green paradox, free riding and rebound effect 
The energy paradox leads to under-investment in energy saving equipment. Public policy 
intervention is then necessary to induce renovations. Public policy can lower some of these 
barriers and help agents to undertake energy-saving investments, in order to finally 
significantly reduce energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In recent years, 
several measures have been implemented in France, (1) informative measures, with for 
example the presence of eco-label on appliances or bulb-light to inform consumers on the 
energy efficiency level of the equipment, or information campaigns to rise households 
sensitivity about energy-savings; (2) financial measures to induce households to adopt 
renewable energies or improve the housing quality; it can be zero rate bank loans, subsidies or 
tax credits, or reduced rate VAT; (3) and regulatory measures, such as the thermal regulation 
on new constructions or renovations, labels, or the requirement to indicate the energy quality 
of housing when it is sold or offered for rent.  
One of the most famous measures is the tax credit. It allows part of the expenses of energy 
saving renovations to be deducted from income taxes. From 2005 to 2008, 4.2 million French 
households received a tax credit (Clerc and Mauroux, 2010) and this represents a significant 
cost: public cost reached €7.8 billion during this period and €4.2 billion during 2009–2010. 
However, several behaviors can undermine the effect of environmental policies.  
 
• Free riding and spillover effects 
Financial measures have to be implemented carefully, because of potential free riding. Free 
riders are households that obtain for example a subsidy to undertake a renovation that would 
have made even in the absence of public policy. Recent literature estimates the extent of the 
free-riding effect from 50% to 92%. Grösche and Vance (2009) use a cross-section of data 
from the 2005 German Residential Energy Consumption Survey to evaluate this effect. They 
define free riding as a situation in which a household’s willingness to pay for renovations 
exceeds its cost under no policy action, and show that such a free riding occurs in 50% of the 
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cases. In an original study, Grösche et al. (2009) simulate the effect of grants on renovation 
choices using revealed preference data on home renovations from Germany’s residential 
sector. They find that if every eligible household had behaved rationally and applied for the 
grant, 92% of the program expenses would have been awarded to free riders. Malm (1996) 
also finds an important free riding effect. He investigates the impact of subsidies on the 
purchase of high-efficiency heating systems and estimates it at 89%.  
However, some spillover effects can reduce free riding (Eto et al., 1995; Rosenow and Galvin, 
2013). Such effects correspond to additional products being installed, as a result of the 
program but not through the program. Few studies focus on this point, but a recent evaluation 
shows that spillover effects can be substantial (NYSERDA, 2012).  
 
• Rebound effect 
The policies already presented have the objective to induce investment. However, the 
adoption of energy saving technologies is not necessarily followed by a reduction of energy 
consumption. It appears that investment in a new technology such as insulation improvement 
can entail a change in household behavior (e.g., increase in the temperature target), which at 
least partially offsets the beneficial effects of the technology. This is called the direct rebound 
effect (for a review see International Risk Governance Council, 2013). One explanation is that 
people tend to consume more energy services when it is less expensive. Therefore, the 
rebound effect reduces or offset the impact of environmental measures on energy 
consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. In a large survey, Greening et al. (2000) find that 
a 100% increase in energy efficiency led to an estimated rebound of 0%–50% for residential 
end uses. Also, Alberini et al. (2013b) examine household energy consumption in Maryland 
and show that the larger the subsidy obtained for the adoption of energy saving equipment, 
the less the electricity reduction, and this result may be explained by the rebound effect.  
Moreover the rebound effect can have indirect impact (Schipper and Grubb, 2000). When 
energy services are less costly, households have more income and can increase the demand 
for other goods that require energy for production or use. Druckman et al. (2010) simulate the 
effect of a set of abatement actions of carbon emissions in UK, using different scenarios. On 
average, the indirect rebound effect is estimated at 34% of the anticipated GHG emissions 
reductions (this means that only two thirds of the anticipated GHG emissions reductions are 
likely to be achieved). These authors also show that in the best case, it may be only 12% but 
that in extreme cases backfire may occur. Backfire means that carbon emissions increase, 
instead of decreasing. 
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An economy-wide rebound effect may also exist and take into account a wide range of effects 
at the macroeconomic level. Gillingham et al. (2013) explain this effect at a worldwide level 
using the example of fuel standards on vehicles in the United States, which can lead to a 
decrease in world oil prices causing in turn an increase in oil demand in other countries. The 
estimates of this economy-wide rebound effect varies considerably across countries, 
depending on the model used (computational general equilibrium model, macroeconomic 
model) and on the variables considered. However, results are generally greater than 37%, with 
most studies finding larger rebounds or backfire (Sorrell, 2007; International Risk 
Governance Council, 2013). For example, Barker et al. (2007) examine the rebound effect in 
the UK related to energy efficiency policies between 2000 and 2010 and show that it was not 
large enough to prevent a significant decrease in energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions. They estimate simultaneously the indirect and economy-wide effects using a 
macroeconomic model and they obtain that the rebound is around 11% on average across all 
sectors of the economy, i.e. the reduction in energy demand is 11% less than expected. The 
direct rebound effect is around 15% leading to a total rebound of 26% of the expected 
reduction of energy demand. 
 
• Green paradox  
Some environmental policies could become inefficient because of the existence of a green 
paradox (Sinn, 2008). Instead of decreasing greenhouse gas emissions, measures that aim at 
decreasing fossil energy demand (as tax carbon or subsidies on renewable energies) could 
increase pollution and accelerate climate change at least in the short run. Using a Hoteling 
model, Sinn (2008) shows that the introduction of a carbon tax that rises over time (note that 
green paradox never happens for the optimal tax path) can indeed have a negative effect. 
Since the tax will increase the price of the fossil energy over time, producers have incentive to 
extract and sell the resource immediately. Such a policy therefore accelerates environmental 
damages. Van der Ploeg and Withagen (2010) show that the green paradox occurs for 
relatively expensive but clean energy (such as solar or wind). If the government introduces 
subsidies on solar or wind energy, this leads to an overconsumption of oil and gas, i.e. to a 
more rapid depletion of these energies. In this case, the energy paradox is confirmed and it 
has negative effect on climate change. In contrast, there is no evidence of the energy paradox 
if the clean energy is sufficiently cheap relative to marginal global warming damages (as 
nuclear energy). In this case, it is attractive to leave fossil fuels unexploited and thus limit 
CO2 emissions. Grafton et al (2010) find that biofuel subsidies could lead to green paradox 
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depending on several variables, such as the demand and supply elasticities, the expected 
change in the measure, the technological change in extraction and extraction cost. It seems 
that the green paradox can also occur when a climate policy is announced in advance and the 
implementation date is uncertain. Indeed, between these two dates (that of the announcement 
and that of the implementation) the use of fossil energy and thus the greenhouse gas 
emissions increase (Smulders et al. 2010). 
 
Given all these effects that can undermine the effectiveness of environmental policies, we can 
wonder whether French environmental policies are sufficiently efficient to reach the 
ambitious objectives set by Grenelle Act. This doctoral research aims at providing insights on 
these issues. We evaluate these measures first at a national level using a simulation model 
(chapter 2) and second, we focus on one measure and observe its impact on households’ 
behavior using an econometric approach (chapter 3). 
In chapter 2, we test the impact of some existing policies (tax credit, zero rate bank loans, 
subsidies, and VAT) and of one potential policy (bonuses). We combine several approaches 
found in the literature and model energy consumption dynamics resulting from both the 
housing stock dynamics (including three end-uses: heating and hot water, lighting, and 
appliances) and the energy saving investment decisions. This study produces three major 
outputs: (1) an estimation of French residential energy consumptions and of GHG emissions 
until 2050, (2) an assessment of the impact of environmental policies compared to the public 
cost, and (3) proposals of different means to reach the objectives set out in the Grenelle Act. 
Results show that current policies are effective in the sense that they have enabled a decrease 
in energy consumption and in GHG emissions over recent years. A tax credit seems to be one 
of the most effective policy measures. However, existing policies alone will not ensure that 
the objectives set for 2050 will be reached. Additional public expenditures are necessary to 
achieve these goals. 
We saw that a tax credit seems to be the most effective policies, but that this measure 
represents a high public cost. In chapter 3, we examine the impacts of a tax credit on the 
renovation rate and on the renovation expenditures. Our objective is (1) to determine whether 
households are sensitive to this measure or whether the tax credit simply provides additional 
funding for households that would have undertaken a renovation anyway (i.e. there exists free 
riding) (2) to investigate whether the tax credit provides the households with an incentive to 
invest in more expensive and more energy-efficient renovations. To do this, we use matching 
methods and French household-level databases: ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie 
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surveys from 2001 and 2008, which regroup information on energy-efficient renovations. We 
find that tax credit has a significant and positive effect on renovation rate and renovation 
expenditures. However, the effect is low, particularly compared to the public cost of the 
measure. Results suggest the presence of a free riding effect. Moreover, building 
professionals (i.e., those qualified and certified to do renovations) seem to capture a part of 
the earnings from the tax credit through price increases. These two effects tend to lower the 
impact of the measure.  
 
 
Economic impact of environmental degradations for emerging countries: 
Evidence from India 
 
The challenges 
In emerging countries, the most important concern is not the implementation of adequate 
environmental policies to decrease greenhouse gases emissions, but the challenge is to find a 
way to limit the consequences of climate change. Indeed, emerging countries are the most 
vulnerable to global warming as we can see on map 1. This map shows the climate change 
vulnerability index (Maplecroft, 2013). This index evaluates the exposure to climate-related 
natural disasters and sea-level rise, as well as the sensitivity of populations in terms of 
developments, natural resources, and agricultural dependency. It also considers the adaptive 
ability of a country’s government and infrastructures to counter climate change. We can 
observe countries with extreme risk in red on the map and countries with high risk are in 
yellow. India is amongst the countries bearing extreme risk.  
Emerging countries are the most exposed to environmental degradations and climatic events 
caused by human activity. However, greenhouse gases emissions have been increasing 
quickly in these countries since recent years and it is highly possible that this trend continues 
in the future. Indeed, India is amongst the top carbon dioxide emitters and energy consumer, 
after China, the United States, the European Union and Russia. Total greenhouse gas 
emissions increased by 113% between 1990 and 2010 (or 3.9% per year on average over the 
period) (figure 4). For comparison, the greenhouse gases emissions of European Union 
decreased by 10% over the period, and those of the United States increase by almost 9% on 
the whole period (source: CAIT). Moreover, India is the fourth-largest energy consumer in 
the world, after the United States, China and Russia. Primary energy consumption more than 
doubled between 1990 and 2010 (figure 4) even if per capita energy consumption remains 
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much lower than that of developed countries (according to U.S. Energy Information 
Administration). Two main elements can explain this sharp increase. First, economic growth 
in India has been very high, reaching almost 7% per year between 2000 and 2010. Second, 
population growth is particularly important, with an increase of 40% between 1990 and 2010. 
Pressures on the environment are therefore strong and we can expect that they will get 
stronger with sustained growth and increasing population in the future. 
 
 
Figure 4. Evolution of energy consumption in quadrillion Btu and greenhouse gases emissions in MtCO2e in 
India 
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration for energy consumption, CAIT data for GHG emissions 
 
 
Impacts of environmental degradations 
As we saw previously environmental degradations could have an impact on HDI and income 
advancement (UNPD, 2011) but it could also have economic consequences for the 
populations. Literature is not very extensive on this subject. Some literature focuses on the 
negative impact of air pollution, especially on health, but it showed little interest for the 
impact of deforestation on individuals. However, both deforestation and restrictions on the 
access to natural resources could affect agents. Indeed, many rural people depend on natural 
resources for their income (Cavendish, 2000; Kamanga et al. 2009). For example, in India, 
200 million peoples are dependent on forests for livelihood (source: Indian Ministry of 
Environment and Forest). Individuals living in rural areas heavily rely on traditional biomass: 
more than 80% of rural households use traditional biomass as primary fuel for cooking, 
compared with only 22% of urban households (source: 2011 India census). In the meantime, 
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deforestation is one of the largest visible environmental degradations. India is the tenth 
country in the world for the size of the forest area, with about 68 million hectares (source: 
Global Forest Resource Assessment, 2010), but an estimated 41% of India’s forest cover has 
been degraded to some degree in the past decades. Pressures on forest come from many 
sources, particularly the increase in population, the overuse of resources and the need for 
land. Moreover, deforestation has other dramatic consequences. It is responsible for 20% of 
global greenhouse gases emissions (source IPCC) and tropical deforestation in Asia, Africa 
and South America are the largest contributors to these emissions.  
Pollution and environmental changes can also have an impact on individuals’ access to labor 
market. Few studies focus on this link whereas it is directly related with poverty and 
inequalities including differences between men and women. Literature on pollution is again 
slightly larger than that on environmental degradations. Sala-i-Martin (2005) shows that 
pollution, through its impact on health, has negative effects on human capital and 
productivity. Indeed, poor households cannot afford to improve their health. As a result, it is 
more difficult for them to increase their human capital and their economic productivity. In 
this case, pollution may exacerbate poverty and makes it more persistent because poor 
households may therefore enter a vicious circle, known as a poverty trap (Dasgupta and Ray, 
1986, 1987). Concerning environmental degradations as deforestation the relationship with 
the access to labor market is unclear. Kumar et al. (1988) show that a deterioration of the 
access to forest wood, measured by the time spent collecting fuel, leads to less time for 
productive agricultural activities for women. However, authors do not take into account a 
potential endogeneity of variables, therefore caution has to be taken in the interpretation of 
the results. In contrast, Cooke (1998b) stresses that in Nepal households allocate more time to 
collection activities when environmental products are more costly but the author finds no 
evidence that it induces women to spend less time farming.  
 
In this doctoral dissertation we will focus on this last point and try to bring news insights on 
the ways environment can affect individual and how they adapt to deforestation. This is the 
purpose of the last chapter (chapter 4). Deforestation, by increasing fuel scarcity could have 
an impact on individuals. Rural households in developing countries typically heavily rely on 
self-collected environmental products such as fuelwood. Women are particularly concerned 
with natural resources collection. We aim at studying whether deforestation and fuel scarcity 
has both (1) a direct impact on their decision to collect natural resources and (2) an indirect 
effect on labor market participation through collection activities. We use a bivariate probit 
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model that simultaneously estimates the decision to collect wood and that to participate to 
labor market. Using the 2004 Indian Human Development Survey, we show that fuel scarcity 
increases the probability for women to be involved in natural resource collection. Through 
this, it has a negative effect on the labor force participation, especially to family business and 
to wage activities. We find that this effect is more pronounced for households living above 
poverty line. Indeed, the income constraint is lower for them.  
 
 
Four chapters compose this dissertation. We first investigate the determinants of energy 
consumption in France (chapter 1) and then we assess the impact of environmental public 
policies at a national level (chapter 2) and at a household level (chapter 3). Finally, we study 
the impact of deforestation on women’s access to the labor market in India (chapter 4).  
We hope this dissertation brings news insights on the way pollution and environmental 
degradations affect contemporaneous economies thanks to our research on (i) the evaluation 
of public environmental policies in developed countries and on (ii) the evaluation of some 
consequences of environmental degradation in developing countries.  
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Map 1. Risks related to climate change 
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Chapter 1.   
What matters in Residential Energy Consumption? 
Evidence from France
1 
 
 
Summary 
 
Given objectives set by countries to realize energy savings and decrease greenhouse gas 
emissions, an understanding of the main factors driving household energy consumption is 
crucial for the formulation of efficient policy measures. Our objective is to identify the main 
determinants of households’ energy consumption. The model incorporates a discrete-
continuous decision framework, which allows for interactions between decisions about the 
heating system (the discrete choice) and decisions about the consumption of energy (the 
continuous choice). The results show that the intensity of energy used per square meter is 
almost completely determined by the technical properties of the dwelling and by the climate. 
The role of sociodemographic variables is particularly weak. The primary challenge for 
environmental policy thus is to encourage households to undertake renovations. 
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1.1. Introduction 
 
Following the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference (which was attended by 
major emerging countries, the United States, and Europe), several countries pledged to reduce 
their greenhouse gas emissions. The United States committed to decrease its greenhouse gas 
emissions by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020, and Europe pledged to cut it by 20% by 2020 
compared with 1990. Because the residential sector is a primary energy consumer in these 
countries, accounting for approximately one-quarter of total energy consumption (Odyssee, 
2013; International Energy Agency, 2013), an in-depth understanding of residential energy 
consumption is needed to design adequate energy policies and achieve a low-carbon society. 
Indeed, a measure will be efficient only if households are sensitive to it. Thus, the objective of 
this paper is to identify the main determinants of households’ energy consumption. 
Prior literature has explored five potential determinants: types of fuel used, energy prices, 
technical building properties, climates, and households characteristics. In general, however, 
literature has focused on one category of determinants. The most widely studied are the 
impact of energy prices and the technical properties of the dwelling (Baker et al., 1989; 
Bernard et al., 1996; Branch, 1993; Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Halvorsen and Larsen, 2001; 
Labandeira et al., 2006; Nesbakken, 1999, 2001; Parti and Parti, 1980). In contrast, few 
studies focus on households’ sociodemographics characteristics (Meier and Rehdanz, 2010; 
Santin et al., 2009; Sardianou, 2008; Vaage, 2000). Our objective is to investigate the impact 
of all categories of variables commonly used in the literature on energy consumption, to 
explore their contributions to residential energy consumption, and to estimate the influence of 
household characteristics versus dwelling properties. In doing so, we hope to fill gaps in the 
literature on French households’ energy consumption. This literature is sparse, due to the lack 
of data on French energy consumption. Studies using French data have focused on electric 
heating (Cayla et al. 2010) and on the impact of income on residential energy consumption 
(Cayla et al. 2011). Our objective is to gain greater insight into the determinants of energy 
consumption by taking into account several heating systems, including collective heating. 
Several environmental policies have been introduced in France to encourage households to 
make energy-saving investments (as a tax credit or a subsidy). We study the determinants of 
energy consumption to understand whether these kinds of policies are appropriate for 
decreasing energy consumption. This study therefore (1) investigates the relative ability of 
household sociodemographic characteristics, technical properties of the dwelling, and climatic 
specificities of the surrounding area to explain energy consumption per square meter; (2) 
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identifies some of the main sources of energy conservation in the French housing sector; and 
(3) proposes an estimation of the price elasticity and income elasticity of energy consumption 
per square meter, which has not been done previously in the French context. In doing so, we 
hope to inform the discussion of what the target of environmental policies should be. 
We use the 2006 Enquête Logement, a disaggregated household-level survey data set, 
representative of the French residential sector, that provides information on household and 
building characteristics. It enables us to calculate the total energy consumption (kWh/m
2
) for 
each household, which we can then use to identify its main determinants. Energy 
consumption provides utility indirectly through the use of various appliances. To take into 
account this level of specificity and to obtain unbiased results, we estimate energy 
consumption conditional on the heating system, using a discrete-continuous methodological 
framework. We find that households’ sociodemographic characteristics play a weak part in 
explaining the amount of energy used. Energy consumption is largely determined by dwelling 
quality and energy prices. In particular, it appears that the replacement of collective heating 
systems with individual heating systems can help significantly decrease energy consumption 
in the residential sector. To be efficient, an environmental policy must encourage households 
to renovate and adopt energy-efficient equipment.  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows: in section 2, we review literature on the 
determinants of energy consumption, then present the data in section 3. In section 4, we focus 
on the discrete-continuous model; in section 5, we present the results. Finally, we discuss the 
implications and offer some concluding remarks in section 6. 
 
 
1.2. Literature 
 
Although prior literature has explored several potential determinants of residential energy 
consumption (types of fuel used, prices, technical building properties, climates, and 
households characteristics), studies tend to focus most often on one category of determinants 
and on the estimate of prices and income elasticities. Little interest has been devoted to 
households’ sociodemographic characteristics. 
 
Furthermore, despite the focus on the impact of prices and income on energy consumption 
(Baker et al., 1989; Branch, 1993; Bernard et al., 1996; Dubin and McFadden, 1984; 
Halvorsen and Larsen, 2001; Labandeira et al., 2006; Nesbakken, 1999, 2001; Parti and Parti, 
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1980), there is a considerable variation in the estimates of energy price elasticities, ranging in 
absolute values from 0.20 to 1.14 for own-price elasticity of electricity and from 0.04 to 1.6 
for own-price elasticity of natural gas. The own-price elasticity of fuel oil has rarely been 
estimated: Newell and Pizer’s (2008) estimate in the commercial sector is particularly high, 
reaching 2.95 (see table 1.1). Income elasticity has been estimated at less than 0.23 (Branch, 
1993), and several studies find an income elasticity lower than 0.1 (Dubin and McFadden, 
1984; Nesbakken, 1999, 2001). Thus energy consumption appears weakly responsive to an 
increase of income (see table 1.1). Moreover, Cayla et al. (2010, 2011) are the only authors to 
use micro data to explore energy consumption in the French residential sector. They focus on 
electric heating (Cayla et al. 2010) and they stress the role of household income (Cayla et al. 
2011): Households with the lowest income cannot make investments in higher-performing 
equipment. 
With the exception of income, household characteristics have received relatively little 
attention. Some studies have considered the impact of age, the size of households, and the 
occupancy status of households. The age of the reference person and household size have 
been shown to have a positive impact on energy consumption, ceteris paribus (Meier and 
Rehdanz, 2010; Santin et al., 2009). The effect of occupancy status is, however, 
indeterminate. Some studies find that owners tend to consume more energy than tenants 
(Sardianou, 2008; Vaage, 2000), and others find the opposite result (Rehdanz; 2007) or no 
significant effect (Meier and Rehdanz, 2010). It is noteworthy that few studies exploit data on 
actual household behavior (e.g., inside temperature, use of bath vs. shower, number of hours 
someone is present at home, individual strategies to reduce energy costs) or preferences 
regarding comfort. However, Vringer et al. (2007) find no relationship between households’ 
total energy requirement and their value patterns or perception of climate change. 
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Table 1.1. Estimates of income elasticities and price elasticities for energy consumption in the literature  
 Price  
elasticity 
Income 
elasticity 
Discrete-continuous choice analysis   
Bernard, Bolduc, and Bélanger (1996). Quebec residential consumption for 
electricity. First step: heating equipment and instrumental variable (IV) method. 
Short-term results. Own-price elasticity of electricity  
             Cross-price elasticities of: Oil  
                                                        Gas 
 
 
-0.67 
0.04 
0.08 
 
 
0.14 
Dubin and McFadden (1984). United States. First step: heating and water 
equipment. Elasticities of household electricity demand, including portfolio shift. 
Own-price elasticity of electricity  
                        Cross-price elasticity of gas 
 
 
-0.26 
0.39 
 
 
0.02 
Halvorsen and Larsen (2001). Norway. Longitudinal approach. Analysis of 
flexibility of household electricity consumption over time. Survey of Consumer 
Expenditure, 1974–1994. 
Short-term electricity elasticity 
Long-term electricity elasticity 
 
 
 
-0.43 
-0.44 
 
Labandeira, Labeaga, and Rodriguez (2006). Spain, household micro data. Demand 
model for a simultaneous analysis of energy goods, IV method. Results from whole 
sample, uncompensated own-price elasticities of: Electricity 
Natural gas 
LPG 
 
 
 
-0.79 
-0.04 
-0.36 
 
Nesbakken (2001). Norwegian micro data. Simultaneous discrete-continuous 
choice model (heating equipment). Short-term results. 
-0.21 0.06 
Nesbakken (1999). Norway. Simultaneous discrete-continuous choice model 
(heating equipment). Short-term results from pooled data, 1993–1995. 
-0.50 0.01 
Newell and Pizer (2008). U.S. commercial sector. Long-term results, from a 
detailed model then aggregated with fuel choice variable. 
Own-price elasticities of: Electricity 
                                          Natural gas 
                                          Fuel oil 
                                          District services 
 
 
-1.14 
-1.60 
-2.95 
-0.88 
 
Vaage K. (2000). Norway. Household’s energy consumption. First step: heating 
equipment. Long-term results, from a reduced model. 
-1.24  
Conditional demand analysis   
Baker et. al. (1989). United Kingdom. Study household gas and electricity 
expenditures: Electricity 
                      Gas 
 
-0.758 
-0.311 
 
0.131 
0.115 
Branch (1993). United States. Study electricity consumption with a generalized 
least squares GLS estimator. 
Electricity 
 
 
-0.20 
 
 
0.23 
Garbacz (1984). Estimation of the U.S. electricity consumption via two-stage least 
squares 2SLS. 
Marginal price 
 
-0.13 to -0.59 
 
Leth-Petersen and Togeby (2001), Denmark, panel data, 1984–1995. 
Oil 
District heating 
 
-0.08 
-0.02 
 
Meier and Rehdanz (2010). United Kingdom, household-level panel data.                    
Oil 
Gas 
 
-0.4 to -0.49 
-0.34 to -0.56 
 
Parti and Parti (1980). Demand for electricity for San Diego County. -0.58 0.15 
Rehdanz (2007). Germany, household-level panel. Oil 
                                                                                  Gas 
-2.03 to -1.68 
-0.63 to -0.44 
 
Source: Synthesis of authors 
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In contrast, significant attention has been paid to the impact of the technical properties of 
housing (insulation, year of construction, building materials, design of the building) on energy 
consumption. Newer buildings tend to consume less energy (Rehdanz, 2007; Santin et al., 
2009; Vaage, 2000), which leads Leth-Petersen and Togeby (2001) to conclude that building 
regulations play a significant role in improving energy efficiency in new buildings in 
Denmark. Some other results do not converge. For example, Santin et al.’s (2009) study in the 
Netherlands shows that insulated surfaces have a negative effect on energy consumption, 
whereas Sardianou (2008) finds no evidence of the impact of thermal quality of buildings in 
Greece. This result might be due to different climates. In addition, the latter study finds no 
significant impact of housing type (detached or nondetached houses), whereas this is an 
important explanatory variable in Nesbakken (2001) and Vaage (2000), both of whom work 
with Norwegian data. 
With respect to regional differences, climate data are generally taken into account in empirical 
studies. Models typically include average outside temperatures measured by degree/days, or 
dummy variables for colder or warmer regions. Climate variables have a significant impact on 
energy consumption and indicate that energy consumption is greater in the colder regions 
(Meier and Rehdanz, 2010; Nesbakken, 1999; Vaage, 2000). 
Appliances and the type of fuel used also have an impact on energy consumption. Most 
studies only take into account the heating system (Bernard et al., 1996; Nesbakken, 1999, 
2001; Vaage, 2000). For example, Dubin and McFadden (1984) consider only the space- and 
water-heating fuel choice, treating other appliances owned by the household as exogenous. 
This is not too restrictive, however, given the relatively large weight placed on heating in 
households’ energy consumption. 
Energy consumption is embedded in a complex system. Energy provides utility indirectly 
through the use of various appliances. In this sense, we face an endogeneity problem: To 
obtain unbiased results, energy consumption must be studied conditional on a household’s 
stock of appliances. Therefore, some literature (Dubin and McFadden,1984; Nesbakken, 
1999, 2001; Newell and Pizer, 2008; Vaage, 2000) has focused in a first step on the heating 
system itself. Choice of heating system can depend on the same variables explaining energy 
consumption (e.g., household and building characteristics, climate areas) and also variables 
such as the availability of fuel and the relative utilization costs (Braun, 2010). Using 
Norwegian data, Vaage (2000) shows that the probability of choosing electricity as the only 
fuel for heating increases with income and is more often chosen in flats and new buildings. In 
a second step, this literature estimates the determinant of energy consumption, taking into 
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account results from the first step. These studies then observe the impact of the chosen 
heating system on energy consumption: households that only have electric heaters use far less 
energy than households using other heating systems (Nesbakken, 1999). 
 
Our objective is to determine the weight of each category of variable to explain energy 
consumption. We summarize the main determinants of energy consumption, as analyzed in 
the literature, in figure 1.1. 
 
Figure 1.1: Main determinants of heating system choice and energy consumption found in the literature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.3. Data 
 
Our objective is to understand the main factors that drive energy consumption. We explore 
both the main determinants of energy consumption per square meter and the contribution of 
each variable category in figure 1.1 to explain energy consumption per square meter. We use 
the 2006 Enquête Logement (INSEE), a disaggregated household-level survey data set, 
representative of the French residential sector. This survey provides information on 36,955 
households related to their housing, heating systems, household characteristics, and 
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geography. Although few household-level data on French energy consumption are available, 
information included in the Enquête Logement survey enables us to calculate energy 
consumption in terms of kWh/m
2
. However, we observe only one year; therefore, we cannot 
control for unobserved heterogeneity. We present the variables in table 1.2.  
 
 
Table 1.2. Description of variables  
 Variables Vector 
Name 
Description 
Energy consumption (per m²)  Final energy consumption in kWh/m² is defined as the sum of all 
energy consumption for all types of fuels used for residential 
purposes in a dwelling (use of appliances, heating, cooling, cooking, 
and lighting). 
Technical properties of 
dwelling  
DW  
Individual house type  Dummies: attached houses, semidetached houses, detached houses 
Collective dwelling 
characteristics 
 
Number of dwellings in block of flats; floor 
Size  Dwelling size in m² 
Specificities  Dummies: roof <3m, office in the dwelling; veranda, moisture 
problem, cellar not converted, attic 
Construction date (vintage)  Dummies: before 1948, 1949–1974, 1975–1989, 1990–2005  
Insulation characteristics  Dummies: double-glazing, recent roof insulation, sufficient roof 
insulation, insufficient roof insulation, nonexistent roof insulation 
Exposure (according to 
households) 
  
Dummies: poor exposure, medium exposure, good exposure 
Location  Dummies: downtown, suburb, rural town. 
Climate areas CL In France, INSEE divided regions into seven different climate areas 
(see map 1.1 in appendix). 
Dummies: mountain climate, semicontinental climate, cooler 
oceanic climate, mixed oceanic climate, oceanic climate, mild 
oceanic climate, Mediterranean climate 
Heating system  HS Dummies: collective heating system with gas or fuel,  
individual system with electricity, individual system with gas, 
individual system with fuel  
Price of energy  P Average energy price: weighted average of different fuel prices; 
weights depending on the specific mix of fuels used by each 
household. 
Household sociodemographic 
variables  
SDH  
Demographic 
characteristics 
 Number of people in the dwelling, age of household member 
answering the questions in the survey 
Occupancy state  Dummies: own, renter, socially subsidised housing, private rent, 
free-housed 
Educational level of 
household member 
answering the questionnaire 
  
 
Dummies: without certificate, less than baccalaureate, baccalaureate, 
more than baccalaureate. 
Income  Monthly income per consumption unit 
 
 
To conduct this study, we need to know household energy consumption in kWh/m
2
. We can 
calculate it using energy expenditures provided by the Enquête Logement. This survey 
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provides information on the total expenditure of each household across each type of fuel 
(regrouping expenditures for heating, cooling, lighting, and other uses of appliances) over the 
preceding 12 months. Combining this information with the energy prices in kWh, we can 
compute household energy consumption. Prices of natural gas, electricity, oil, wood, district 
service, and coal are not available in the survey and come from the Ministère de l'économie, 
des finances et de l'industrie. There is no regional difference in energy prices in France. 
However, the prices of electricity and natural gas depend on the use of the fuel (heating, 
cooking, water) and the size of the housing. We take these characteristics into account to 
determine the unit price in kWh of each type of fuel and for each household,
2
 then calculate 
total energy consumption. This step of the work was particularly difficult and led us to 
eliminate a significant part of the sample, particularly households using collective heating 
systems. Indeed, a particularity in France is the existence of collective heating, in which 
several households living in the same block of flats share the same heating system. 
Approximately 44% of households using this type of heating system were unable to state their 
actual energy expenditures in the survey because their energy bill is combined with other 
shared charges (expenditures for the elevator, cleaning of common space, gardening, and so 
forth). With this interesting observation, we can deduce that approximately 7% of French 
households cannot properly react to any kind of price signal because they cannot calculate the 
real cost of their energy use. Moreover, because approximately 90% of French households use 
fuel oil, electricity, or natural gas, we focus our analysis on these three fuel types (see figure 
1.2 in appendix). We therefore excluded households that mainly used wood, coal, or a district 
service for heating. Our final sample comprises 19,849 dwellings. Households using 
collective heating still represent a significant part of our sample (41% of flats). Weights have 
been applied to ensure the sample is representative. As such, the proportion of variables 
representing flats and houses, occupancy status, and construction period are maintained. 
 
The average energy consumption for residential needs (heating, cooking, cooling, lighting, 
use of appliances) was 191.30 kWh/m² in 2006. This result falls in the range of what is 
commonly computed in the French residential sector (ANAH, 2008). The residential park is 
split into two broad categories (houses and flats). We observe that final energy consumption 
is significantly higher for houses than for flats: 201 kWh/m² per year for houses versus  
178 kWh/m² for flats (see table 1.3).  
 
                                                
2
 Price per kWh is €0.0645 for oil, €0.0594 on average for natural gas, and €0.1005 on average for electricity. 
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Table 1.3. Final energy consumption by heating system for individual houses and flats 
 Houses Flats 
Final energy 
consumption (kWh/m²) 
Weight in 
the 
housing 
park 
Final energy 
consumption (kWh/m²) 
Weight in 
the 
housing 
park 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Individual heating 
       Electricity  
       Natural gas  
       Fuel 
Collective heating 
 
158.93 
216.52 
239.33 
- 
 
74.39 
   84.37 
89.89 
- 
 
21.57% 
18.51% 
16.49% 
- 
 
146.33 
194.64 
- 
194.59 
 
77.00 
89.47 
- 
83.22 
 
14.64% 
10.82% 
- 
17.87% 
Year of construction 
       Before 1948 
       1949–1974 
       1975–1989 
       After 1990 
Double-glazing 
       With 
       Without 
 
216.98 
230.48 
184.88 
164.76 
 
193.73 
224.33 
 
95.10 
90.60 
80.74 
70.65 
 
85.64 
96.13 
 
16.73% 
13.50% 
15.25% 
11.20% 
 
42.78% 
13.90% 
 
183.89 
193.12 
160.25 
145.02 
 
172.73 
189.73 
 
88.93 
84.89 
79.81 
77.02 
 
85.27 
86.07 
 
11.34% 
18.45% 
7.44% 
6.09% 
 
29.14% 
14.18% 
Total 201.24 89.30 56.67% 178.30 85.90 43.33% 
Number of observations 11,476 8,373 
Source: 2006 Enquête Logement (INSEE). 
Note: Weights have been applied to maintain representativeness of the sample.  
 
These two kinds of dwellings are different, which can explain the energy consumption 
differential. The fuel used differs according to the dwelling type. In our sample, 38% of 
households living in houses use an electric heater, 33% use a natural gas heater, and 29% use 
an oil heater. For collective residential buildings, 34% use an electric heater, 51% use a 
natural gas heater, and 15% use an oil heater. It is noteworthy that households equipped with 
an electric heater consume significantly less energy than those heating with other fuels. The 
difference in energy consumption per square meter between users of electric and oil heat is 
particularly striking for households living in houses. 
Notably, in flats, 41% of households use a collective heating system, and they register 
significantly higher energy consumption on average than those using an individual heating 
system (194.6 kWh/m
2
 vs. 166.86 kWh/m
2
). This can be explained by both the higher level of 
energy used when the energy is a public good (the incentive to reduce consumption is weak) 
and the difference of energy type used (mainly gas and fuel oil). With respect to the first 
explanation, Levinson and Niemann (2004) show using U.S. data that energy consumption is 
generally higher when tenants are not directly confronted with the marginal cost of their own 
energy use. This is the case when collective heating is not associated with individual metering 
or when a household cannot modulate the temperature of its own flat, which is a common 
situation in France in flats heated by a collective heating system. That is also the case when 
energy costs are included in the monthly rent. In these situations, tenants have little incentive 
to use energy efficiently. Maruejols and Young (2011) show that split incentives result from 
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bill-paying arrangements. Households that do not pay directly for their heat but instead have 
these costs included in their rent or condo fees opt for a higher thermal comfort. 
Other building characteristics differ between the two types of housing. Residential buildings, 
and flats in particular, are typically older structures, with a majority of the existing housing 
built before 1975 (53% of houses and 69% of flats). This period of construction is associated 
with the highest energy consumption, related to the insulation characteristics. For example, 
61% of buildings built during this period were not equipped with double-glazing. 
 
Table 1.4. Final energy consumption by households’ characteristics 
 Final energy 
consumption (kWh/m²) 
% of households 
Mean SD Houses Flats 
Occupancy status 
   Owners 
   Private tenant 
   Socially subsidised housing
1.a
 
 
196.98 
178.92 
183.34 
 
88.75 
89.36 
84.80 
 
85.24 
10.07 
4.69 
 
37.47 
31.00 
31.53 
Number of persons in the household 
   1 or 2 persons 
   3 - 4 persons 
   5 persons or more 
 
189.36 
193.98 
199.87 
 
89.59 
86.20 
87.60 
 
58.87 
33.97 
7.16 
 
74.47 
21.07 
4.46 
Age of reference person 
   between 16 and 24 years old 
   between 25 and 39 years old 
   between 40 and 54 years old 
   55 years old and more 
 
176.56 
182.03 
188.14 
198.13 
 
91.43 
85.15 
86.26 
90.88 
 
0.48 
17.33 
30.37 
51.81 
 
2.95 
29.10 
26.85 
41.11 
Educational level of the person of reference 
   without certificate 
   brevet diploma or vocational training qualification 
   baccalaureate 
   baccalaureate + 2 years or more 
 
203.54 
196.55 
182.20 
178.53 
 
96.48 
90.02 
81.00 
82.21 
 
14.96 
51.83 
11.93 
21.27 
 
15.99 
40.56 
13.20 
30.25 
Annual income per consumption unit 
   below €5,000  
   between €5,000 and €10,000  
   between €10,000 and €15,000  
   more than €15,000 
 
192.49 
195.63 
194.45 
186.32 
 
92.56  
93.26  
88.97  
83.29 
 
13.55 
23.60 
23.30 
37.79 
 
22.69 
22.12 
18.64 
34.55 
Source: 2006 Enquête Logement (INSEE). 
Note: Weights have been applied to maintain the sample representative 
1.aThese dwellings are allocated according to household income levels and sociodemographic characteristics. 
 
 
Moreover, the profile of households is somewhat different according to the type of housing in 
which they live (table 1.4). In flats, the majority of households are tenants, whereas in houses, 
the majority are owner-occupied; on average, this latter group consumes more energy. 
Households living in flats are also smaller (on average, 2 people compared with 2.5 in 
individual houses) and younger (the person of reference in a flat [i.e., the household member 
answering the questions in the survey] is, on average, 5 years younger than the person of 
reference in a house), and energy consumption increases with the size and the age of the 
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household. We also observe that the intensity of energy use decreases with the level of 
education. In contrast, income per consumption unit seems to have no impact on energy 
consumption per square meter. These observations suggest that household characteristics can 
have an impact on the intensity of energy used. We pay particular attention to this point in the 
following sections 
 
Because the characteristics of houses and flats are significantly different (e.g., distribution of 
heating systems and fuels), we study the determinants of energy consumption separately for 
these two types of housing in the rest of this study. 
 
 
1.4. Method 
1.4.1. Methodology issues 
Techniques used to model residential energy consumption can be grouped broadly into two 
main categories: ‘‘top-down’’ and ‘‘bottom-up’’ models (for reviews, see Swan and Ugursal, 
2009; Zagamé, 2008). The top-down approach considers the residential sector as a whole and 
does not address energy consumption broken down into individual uses. The bottom-up 
approach encompasses all models that use input data. Because we want to estimate energy 
consumption (in kWh/m²), we use a bottom-up approach. We face two potential problems of 
endogeneity: the first is related to the stock of appliances or the heating system, and the 
second is related to energy prices. 
 
Energy consumption can be described as a two-step process. First, households choose their 
heating system or their stock of appliances. Second, they decide how much energy to 
consume, given the available technology (relating to the inside temperature for example). This 
process leads to a potential endogeneity problem regarding the stock of appliances, which we 
must take into account to obtain unbiased results. Literature employs two general 
methodological frameworks to estimate residential energy consumption: conditional demand 
analysis and discrete-continuous choice analysis. 
The first methodology estimates energy consumption, conditional on a given stock of 
appliances (Baker et al., 1989; Branch, 1993; Larsen and Nesbakken, 2004). This approach 
was proposed by Parti and Parti (1980), who disaggregate the total household consumption 
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for electricity into a set of component demand functions for electricity usage in 16 appliance 
categories. The approach has been used in several studies (Leth-Petersen and Togeby, 2001; 
Meier and Rehdanz, 2010; Rehdanz, 2007). However, this method has two drawbacks. It 
focuses only on continuous energy consumption, without taking into account possible changes 
in equipment stock, and it requires a data set with information on the ownership of a variety 
of appliances (Swan and Ugursal, 2009). The second modeling methodology uses discrete and 
continuous choice analysis. An assumption under this framework is that, due to its 
dependence on appliance use, elasticities should not be estimated exclusively on the basis of 
one energy equation but also in terms of the choice of fuels for heating or cooling and the 
stock of other appliances. It is common for the choice of appliances using energy and energy 
consumption to be assessed in different steps. In a first step for example, the probability of 
using a specific heating system may be estimated, and in a second step, energy consumption 
is analyzed, introducing as an explanatory variable the estimated probability of using a 
specific heating system. The joint discrete-continuous decision framework makes it possible 
to account for the interrelationship between the choice of appliances and the intensity of 
energy use. This two-stage model is largely used to correct for endogeneity of discrete 
variables (Heckman and Robb, 1985). Dubin and McFadden (1984) were the first to apply 
this approach to the estimation of residential energy consumption: they use U.S. household 
data to simultaneously model the choice of appliances and energy consumption. In turn, they 
avoid the potential endogeneity bias resulting from unobserved factors that influence both 
appliance choice and its intensity of use. This approach has since been used in several studies 
(Baker and Blundell, 1991; Bernard et al., 1996; Nesbakken, 1999, 2001; Newell and Pizer, 
2008; Vaage, 2000). We estimate the determinants of French households’ energy 
consumption using this latter method. 
 
Moreover, we take into account a second potential endogeneity problem related to energy 
prices. One of our objectives is to estimate price elasticity. Therefore, we introduced as 
explanatory variable in the second step the average energy prices (calculated as the weighted 
average of different fuel prices, with weights depending on the specific mix of fuels used by 
each household). To this end, we use instrumental variables to estimate the energy 
consumption choice, and we choose as instruments the previous energy prices. 
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1.4.2. Analysis method: discrete and continuous choices model 
We focus on a discrete-continuous model. In the first stage of our model, we model decisions 
regarding space-heating systems with a multinomial probit. This is the “heating system 
choice.” Due to data limitations in the 2006 Enquête Logement, we can only examine heating 
system choices, and we have to ignore appliances, light, and energy choice for cooking. 
However, given the considerable weight of heating expenditures in French households’ total 
residential energy expenditures, which is assessed at approximately 70% of total energy 
consumption by the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE), 
this restriction does not necessarily prevent our analyses from yielding relevant insights. 
Moreover, most papers take into account only the choice of heating system in the first step 
(Bernard et al., 1996; Nesbakken, 1999, 2001; Vaage, 2000). Therefore, we estimate the 
probability that households in the flat sector choose one of the three mutually exclusive types 
of heating system: (1) an individual system with electricity, (2) an individual system with gas, 
and (3) a collective heating system with gas or fuel. In the house sector, all households have 
an individual heating system, but they must choose between three types of fuel for their main 
heating system: (1) electricity, (2) natural gas, and (3) oil. As we observed previously, the 
choice of heating system (HS) is commonly explained by most of the variables that also 
explain energy consumption, namely, the technical properties of the dwelling (DW), the 
climate area (CL), and sociodemographic characteristics (SDH). In addition, some variables 
explain only the heating system choice. These variables are grouped in the vector Z. It 
includes the dwelling location (downtown, suburbs, rural area) to take into account the 
availability of fuel in the area (Braun, 2010; Nesbakken, 1999, 2001; Newell and Pizer, 2008; 
Vaage, 2000). City gas is not available in a rural area. It also includes a dummy equal to 1 if 
the flat or the house is a co-ownership. In this case, the household is not the only one to 
choose the heating system.  
Therefore,  
��!,! = �! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
���!,! + �!
!
�!,! + �!,!. 
 
Conditional on this previous choice, a household decides how much energy to consume. 
Therefore, in the second stage, we estimate the total energy consumption (the logarithm of the 
energy consumption in kWh/m²), conditional on the chosen heating system. This is the 
“energy consumption choice.” The joint estimation of both choices enables us to capture the 
potential correlation between unobservable variables in the discrete and the continuous stages. 
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We estimate it using a double least squares model, which enables us to correct for the 
endogeneity issue of energy prices.
3
 In addition, two-step methods can lead to an 
underestimation of standard errors of the second step. We apply a bootstrap correction on the 
variance-covariance matrix to avoid bias in the interpretation of coefficients’ significance 
level (Murphy and Topel, 1985). 
We want to compare the role of different categories of variables in explaining energy 
consumption per square meter. This includes the household’s sociodemographic 
characteristics (SDH), energy price (P), the technical properties of the dwelling (DW), the 
heating system (HS), and the climatic specificities of the area (CL). First, we estimate a 
complete model, taking into account all these variables. We also introduce multiplicative 
variables to correct for collinearity problems. This complete model estimates the logarithm of 
energy consumption per square meter in dwelling i belonging to housing category k (flat or 
house). We introduced the predicted heating system ( ). 
 
(1) Complete model:  
ln(�!,!) = �! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!�!,! + �!
!
���!,! + �!,!. 
 
Second, we test three different interlocked models to assess how the five categories of 
variables predict the variance in energy consumption. We estimate these interlocked models 
to compare the predictive power of the five different categories of variables (F-test of a set of 
coefficient) and the goodness of fit of the reduced model (adjusted R-square). The 
technological model explains energy consumption by characteristics of the building (DW), 
predicted heating system ( ), and climate dummies (CL). 
 
(2) Technological model: 
ln(�!,!) = �! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!,!. 
 
The eco-technological model is the technological model with the average price (P). 
(3) Eco-technological model: 
 
ln(�!,!) = �! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!
!
��!,! + �!�!,! + �!,!. 
 
                                                
3  
We use as instruments previous energy prices. We show the validity of these instruments in appendix  
(table 1.10). 
SHˆ
SHˆ
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The sociodemographic model assesses the energy consumption by the household 
characteristics only (SDH). 
(4) Sociodemographic model:  
ln(�!,!) = �! + �!
!
���!,! + �!,!. 
 
 
1.5. Results 
 
We focus on estimations on energy consumption. The results of the first step are available in 
appendix (tables 1.8 and 1.9). We evaluate the explanatory power of the different models 
presented in the previous section
4
 (Santin et al., 2009) and carry out tests a set of coefficients 
to determine the contribution of each category of variables (households’ sociodemographic 
characteristics, technical properties of housing, energy price, climate area, and heating 
system) to explain energy consumption.
5
 The results are similar for flats and houses. It 
appears that energy consumption is almost completely determined by technology and climate. 
Table 1.5 shows that the complete model (model 1) explains approximately 35% of the 
variance of energy consumption. Technical properties of the dwelling, the type of heating 
system, and the climate characteristics of its location (model 2) explain 19% of the variation 
of energy consumption for houses and 17% for flats. It is striking to observe how the 
sociodemographic model (model 4) registers a low R-square, emphasizing that the influence 
of socioeconomic factors on energy consumption is weak compared with that of building 
features and climate. Income and household sociodemographic characteristics play only a 
weak role in explaining the variance of energy consumption (approximately 2% in houses and 
4.5% in flats). In the short run, energy consumption per square meter is determined only 
slightly by the household itself. Santin et al. (2009) obtain a similar result in the Dutch 
housing context, with only 5% of variance of energy consumption explained by 
sociodemographic variables and by household behavior. They include variables similar to 
those we considered in our model (income, household size, age of respondent, occupancy 
status), excluding variables on educational level, but with additional information on 
temperature in the housing. This result illustrates that, in the short run, the possibility for a 
                                                
4
 This approach gives an indication of the relative importance of different categories of variables in explaining energy 
consumption. However, the results must be interpreted with caution. Removing significant variables from the model can 
introduce a bias in the estimation.  
5
 We measure the significance of a set of coefficient using a Fisher test.  
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given household in a given dwelling to reduce its energy consumption is extremely weak in 
the absence of investment in the quality of the lodging.  
 
Table 1.5. Comparison of goodness of fit of different models (variable to explain: consumption by m² [in ln] in 
flats. F-test and adjusted R-squares) 
Variables Complete 
model (1) 
Technological 
model (2) 
Economic 
and 
technological 
model (3) 
Sociodemographic 
model (4) 
Results for houses     
Group 1: technical properties of dwelling 
DW 
F: 90.42*** F: 66.38*** F: 79.65*** — 
Group 2: climate dummies CL F: 59.35*** F: 53.98*** F: 59.22*** — 
Group 3: heating system HS F: 13.53*** F: 47.61*** F: 28.94*** — 
Group 4: price of energy P F: 413.01*** — F: 398.56*** — 
Group 5: sociodemographic variables SDH F: 11.53*** — — F: 27.74*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.3506 0.1965 0.3231 0.0272 
Observations 11,476 11,476 11,476 11,476 
Results for flats     
Group 1: technical properties of dwelling 
DW 
38.67*** 68.90*** 83.38*** — 
Group 2: climate dummies CL 40.10*** 48.71*** 54.89*** — 
Group 3: heating system HS 3.29** 16.77*** 0.19
ns
 — 
Group 4: price of energy P 412.51*** — 629.01*** — 
Group 5: sociodemographic variables SDH 47.32*** — — 40.42*** 
Adjusted R-square 0.3440 0.1696 0.2978 0.0450 
Observations 8,373 8,373 8,373 8,373 
Note: The complete list of each group of variables appears in table 1.2. 
 
The results enable us to identify some of the main sources of energy conservation in the 
French housing sector. In the flats sector, there is a strong effect of collective heating on 
energy consumption. Buildings equipped with a central heater (either natural gas or oil) have 
significantly higher levels of consumption than those equipped with an individual heater 
(either natural gas or electricity), ceteris paribus. This is in the line of the results of Santin et 
al. (2009), who show that in dwellings in which heating is included in the rent, more energy is 
used. The installation of individual metering or the replacement of collective systems by 
individual heating systems could be helpful in decreasing energy consumption in collective 
housing blocks. In addition, energy consumption per square meter is lower in dwellings 
heated by electricity than in dwellings heated by fuel oil, ceteris paribus (see table 1.6 below 
and table 1.11 in appendix).  
With regard to insulation characteristics, double-glazing reduces energy consumption on 
average in flats, but the effect is less pronounced in the more recently constructed segment. 
However, in houses, roof insulation renovations are more efficient for saving energy than the 
installation of double-glazing in houses. Environmental policies should target these kinds of 
renovations to have a significant effect on energy consumption. The impact of double-glazing 
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is not significant for houses, ceteris paribus, except for those built between 1975 and 1989 
(compared with those built before 1948). This surprising result may be due to the “rebound 
effect.” Such an effect appears when investment in a new technology such as double-glazing 
can entail a change in household behavior (e.g., increase of temperature target), which at least 
partially offsets the beneficial effects of the technology. In a large survey, Greening et al. 
(2000) find that a 100% increase in energy efficiency led to an estimated rebound of 0%–50% 
for residential end uses. 
It appears that among other technical properties, the size of the dwelling has a negative impact 
on energy consumption per square meter. Flats with a better exposure and more recent 
constructions (built after 1975) have lower energy consumption. In contrast, in houses, an 
unconverted cellar or attic, a veranda, or a detached house rather than an attached one tend to 
increase energy consumption. 
Moreover, as we expected, the quantity of energy consumed is significantly lower in the areas 
with a warmer climate: oceanic and Mediterranean compared with mountain areas. In 
contrast, energy consumption is the highest in the semicontinental areas. This confirms 
Nesbakken’s (1999) and Meier and Rehdanz’s (2010) results. 
Households’ characteristics have received little attention in the literature, and as we observed, 
they play a weak part in explaining energy consumption. However, the number of household 
members, their income per consumption unit, their education, presence at home, occupancy 
status, and the age of the head of the household have a significant impact on energy 
consumption. Income elasticity is low (0.02) in houses and not significant in flats. In most 
studies, income elasticity is estimated to be less than 0.15 (see table 1.1). Energy consumption 
is a normal good, but it remains weakly responsive to an increase of income per consumption 
unit.  
 
Table 1.6. Estimates of household energy consumption per square meter in a year - individual dwellings 
Double least squares. Explained variable: household energy consumption per m² a year (in logarithm) 
Explanatory factors Coeff. 
Student t 
boostrap correction 
Technical properties of dwelling    
House type    
  attached houses  ref   
  semi_detached_houses -0.0078 -0.68  
  detached_houses 0.0780 7.16 *** 
Dwelling area    
  ln_dwelling_area (m²) -0.4926 -28.56 
 
*** 
Specificities    
  roof_less 3 meters -0.0355 -2.36 
 
** 
  office in the dwelling 0.0645 2.67 
 
*** 
  veranda 0.0223 2.02 ** 
  moisture problem -0.0020 -0.18  
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  cellar_not_converted 0.0556 4.88 *** 
  attic 0.0307 4.20 *** 
Dwelling construction period    
  construction_before 1948  ref   
  Construction 1949–1974  0.0514 2.81 *** 
  Construction 1975–1989  -0.0149 -0.52  
  Construction 1990–2005 -0.0257 -0.40  
Insulation characteristics    
  recent_roof_insulation -0.0704 -3.55 *** 
  adequate_roof_insulation -0.0261 -1.52  
  inadequate_roof_insulation  -0.0104 -0.55  
  nonexistent_roof_insulation ref   
  recent_roof_insulation*construction 1975–1989 0,0429 1.54  
  recent_roof_insulation*construction 1990–2005 -0,0664 -1.69 * 
  adequate_roof_insulation*construction 1975–1989 -0,0289 -1.36  
  adequate_roof_insulation*construction 1990–2005 -0,0320 -0.77  
  double_glazing -0.0232 -1.28 
 
 
  double_glazing*construction 1949–1974  -0.0333 -1.59  
  double_glazing*construction 1975–1989 -0.0503 -1.97 ** 
  double_glazing*construction 1990–2005 -0.0581 -0.92  
Dwelling exposure (according to households)    
  poor_exposure ref   
  medium_exposure -0.0062 -0.22  
  good_exposure -0.0059 -0.21  
Climate areas    
  mountain_climate ref   
  semi_continental_climate 0.0513 2.67 *** 
  mild_oceanic_climate -0.0492 -2.72 *** 
  mixed_oceanic_climate_ 0.0065 0.35  
  oceanic_climate -0.1670 -9.47 *** 
  cooler_oceanic_climate -0.1166 -5.77 *** 
  mediterranean_climate -0.1175 -5.83 *** 
Heating type    
  predicted probability to choose electric heating ref   
   predicted probability to choose gas heating 0.0438 1.02  
  predicted probability to choose fuel oil heating 0.2405 3.67 *** 
Energy price    
  ln_average energy price -0.4685 
 
-21.15 *** 
 Household sociodemographic characteristics    
Household demographic characteristics    
  ln_nb_persons 0.4501 4.29 *** 
  ln_age_ ref_person (age of household member answering the questions) 0.2016 6.21 *** 
  ln_nb_persons*ln_age_ ref_person -0.0690 -2.59 
 
** 
Household occupancy state    
  owner ref   
  socially subsidised housing -0.0386 -2.22 ** 
  private tenant -0.0606 -3.76 *** 
Educational level of household member answering the questions in the survey    
  without_certificate  ref   
  brevet_diploma or vocational_training_qualification 0.0085 0.74  
  baccalaureat 0.0047 0.32  
  baccalaureat +2 years or more  0.0008 0.05  
Income and others characteristics    
  ln_annual_income_per_consumption_unit 0.0295 3.87 
 
*** 
  retired -0.0011 -0.09  
  unemployed 0.0174 1.10  
  homemaker 0.0032 0.30   
constant 7.1658 42.46 
 
*** 
Number of observations 11,476 
R
2
 0.3532 
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
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Among other sociodemographic characteristics, the age of the head of household, the number 
of people living in the dwelling, and the presence at home (which is captured by the presence 
of an office in houses and the type of employment in flats: unemployed or homemakers) 
increase the intensity of energy used per square meter. Education level is only significant for 
flats, in which more educated people consume less energy than less educated ones. In 
addition, the impact of occupancy status on energy consumption depends on the type of 
dwellings. Tenants consume more energy than homeowners in flats. In contrast, owners have 
a significantly higher energy consumption than tenants occupying private and subsidized 
housing in houses.  
Households are sensitive to energy price evolution. Price elasticity in absolute value is equal 
to 0.46 in houses and 0.86 in flats. With cross-sectional data, this means that households 
facing higher average energy prices consume less energy than others. Moreover, the higher 
price elasticity in flats means that households living in this kind of dwelling are more 
responsive to the price of energy. The main policy implication of these results is that adopting 
a policy of building renovation or introducing supplementary taxes on energy prices could be 
helpful in significantly decreasing energy consumption in France. This last measure could 
affect primarily the poorest people and raise the issue of energy poverty, but taxes could be 
redistributed to fund other environmental policies as subsidies. 
 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
 
In this study, using a micro data set, we estimate the residential energy consumption of 
French households, conditional on their heating system. Households face a two-stage decision 
process when determining their energy consumption. First, they choose which energy to use 
for their heating system. Conditional on this first step, households then determine how much 
energy to use in a second step. We estimate energy consumption for two different types of 
dwellings: houses and flats. We compare the predictive power of four different models for 
each category of housing: (1) a complete model, (2) a technological model (with consumption 
explained by characteristics of building, heating system, and climate dummies), (3) an eco-
technological model (technological model with average level of energy price), and (4) a 
sociodemographic model (consumption explained by household characteristics alone). 
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The first result of our analysis is that energy consumption is almost completely determined by 
the technical properties of a dwelling, the type of heating technology, and climate dummies. 
In the short run, without large investments in insulation and new types of energy-efficient 
appliances, changes in energy consumption will be weak. The second contribution is to 
identify some of the main sources of energy conservation. It appears that in addition to 
standard measures such as roof insulation and the improvement of exposure in new buildings, 
the replacement of collective systems with individual heating systems would improve 
buildings’ energy efficiency. In contrast, the effect of double glazing is surprisingly 
ambiguous, which raises the possibility of the existence of a “rebound effect” problem. The 
third contribution of this study is to propose an estimation of the price elasticity and of the 
income elasticity of energy consumption per square meter, an issue that is not well 
documented in prior literature for French households. The results show that price elasticities 
are in the range of what is generally found in other countries. Price elasticity in absolute 
values reaches 0.81 in flats and 0.46 in houses; households are responsive to an increase in 
energy prices. In contrast, we find almost no variation of energy used per square meter with 
the level of household income. This result is also common in prior literature. Given these 
results, we conclude that the challenge for environmental policies is to encourage households 
to undertake renovation in their dwelling. 
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1.7. Appendix 
 
1.7.1. Data 
Figure 1.2. French dwelling characteristics (full sample) 
 
 
Source: 2006 Enquête Logement (INSEE)—results for the France  
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Table 1.7. Data description—the final sample 
  Houses Flats 
      Mean                      SD                       Mean            SD 
House type         
gathered_houses 0.1389 0.3459   
semi_detached_houses 0.3219 0.4672   
detached_houses 0.5392 0.4985     
Flat characteristics         
public_housing   0.3699 0.4828 
co_ownership  0.0689 0.2533 0.5460 0.4979 
ln_nb_dwellings_in_block_of_flats    2.6910 1.0249 
ln_floor   1.0340 0.6154 
Dwelling characteristics     
ln_dwelling_area 4.6442 0.3280 4.1230 0.3963 
roof_less_3meters 0.9380 0.2412 0.9473 0.2234 
office_in_the_dwelling 0.0223 0.1477 0.0045 0.0672 
veranda 0.1115 0.3147 0.0232 0.1505 
moisture_problem 0.1715 0.3770 0.2885 0.4531 
cellar_not_converted 0.1693 0.3750   
attic 0.5071 0.5000   
Dwelling construction period     
construction_before 1948 0.2368 0.4251 0.2463 0.4309 
Construction 1949–1974  0.2375 0.4255 0.4051 0.4909 
Construction 1975–1989  0.2436 0.4293 0.1710 0.3766 
Construction 1990–2000  0.2822 0.4501 0.1776 0.3822 
Insulation characteristics     
double_glazing 0.7744 0.4180 0.6817 0.4658 
recent_roof_insulation 0.3975 0.4894   
sufficient_roof_insulation  0.4258 0.4945   
insufficient_roof_insulation  0.1129 0.3165   
nonexistent_roof_insulation 0.0638 0.2444   
Exposure (according to households) 
poor_exposure 
    
bad_exposure 0.0200 0.1401 0.0664 0.2490 
medium_exposure 0.1245 0.3302 0.1747 0.3798 
good_exposure 0.8554 0.3517 0.7589 0.4278 
Location 
downtown 
    
to n 0.3486 0.4765 0.5942 0.4911 
suburbs 0.4115 0.4921 0.3930 0.4885 
rural_town 0.2400 0.4271 0.0128 0.1123 
Climate areas     
mountain_climate 0.0566 0.2310 0.0364 0.1874 
semi_continental_climate 0.0771 0.2668 0.0626 0.2422 
cooler_oceanic_climate 0.1261 0.3320 0.0508 0.2195 
mixed_oceanic_climate 0.2921 0.4547 0.4086 0.4916 
oceanic_climate 0.1792 0.3836 0.1395 0.3465 
mild_oceanic_climate 0.1163 0.3206 0.0742 0.2621 
mediterranean_climate 0.1526 0.3596 0.2280 0.4196 
Energy price     
ln average energyies price 1.8836 0.2361 1.9233 0.2437 
price of electricity (for 100kWh) 2.2948 0.0817 2.3251 0.1136 
price of gas (for 100kWh)  1.7342 0.2572 1.6670 0.2536 
price of fuel oil (for 100kWh) 1.8641 0.0000 1.8641 0.0000 
Demographic characteristics 
ln_nb_persons  
    
person 0.9061 0.5306 0.6669 0.5625 
ln_age_ref_person (age of household member) 
answering the questions in the survey) 
3.9356 0.2979 3.8233 0.3501 
Occupa cy state     
ownership 0.8377 0.3688 0.2838 0.4509 
socially subsidised housing  0.0044 0.0665 0.0140 0.1174 
private_rent 0.0021 0.0457 0.0165 0.1273 
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Educational level of household member answering 
the questions in the survey     
without_certificate 0.1419 0.3489 0.2064 0.4047 
less_than_baccalaureat 0.4841 0.4998 0.3917 0.4882 
baccalaureat 0.1305 0.3369 0.1344 0.3411 
more_than_baccalaureat 0.2436 0.4292 0.2675 0.4427 
Others characteristics     
retired 0.3502 0.4771 0.2408 0.4276 
unemployed 0.0626 0.2422 0.1571 0.3639 
homemaker 0.1379 0.3449 0.1387 0.3456 
Standard living of households     
ln_monthly_income_per_consumption_unit 9.7379 0.6138 9.4397 0.7798 
ln_energy_consumption (m²) 5.1695 0.4577 5.0738 0.5066 
Number of observations      11,476                            8,373                
 
 
 
Map 1.1. Climate Areas of France 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: INSEE 
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found primarily in large detached houses in rural areas that were built before 1974, rarely are 
equipped with double-glazing, and are owner-occupied. 
 
 
Table 1.8. Multinomial probit regression—houses 
Discrete choice 
Individual dwellings 
Electricity heating Gas heating    Fuel oil heating 
 Coeff. Student t  Coeff. Student t  Coeff. Student t  
Technical properties of dwelling          
House type          
  gathered_houses  ref  ref  ref  
  semi_detached_houses -0. 0146 -0.91   0.0387 2.36    ** -0.0241 -1.85 * 
  detached_houses 0. 0429 2.87 *** -0.1195 -7.73 *** 0.0766 6.42 *** 
Dwelling area          
  ln_dwelling_area (m²) -0.2802 -15.22 *** 0.1110 6.09 *** 0.1692 12.80 *** 
Specificities          
  co_ownership 0.0426 2.10 ** 0.0295 1.41  -0.0721 -4.70 *** 
  roof_less_3meters -0.0015 -0.07    -0.0252 -1.16  0.0267 1.79 * 
  cellar_not_converted -0.0790 -5.84 *** -0.0130 -0.91  0.0920 7.83 *** 
  attic -0.0302 -2.91 *** 0.0041 0.38  0.0261 3.24 *** 
Dwelling construction period          
  construction_before48 ref  ref  ref  
  Construction 1949–1974 -0.1161 -7.79 *** 0.0609 3.93 *** 0.0552 4.64 *** 
  Construction 1975–1989 0.3144 20.13 *** -0.1845 -12.16 *** -0.1299 -14.51 *** 
  Construction 1990–2006 0.2057 11.62    *** -0.0500 -2.84 *** -0.1557 -15.56 *** 
Insulation characteristics          
  double_glazing 0.1431 11.43 *** -0.0637 -4.65 *** -0.0794 -7.13 *** 
  recent_roof_insulation -0.0294 -1.21  0.0888 3.65 *** -0.0594 -3.63 *** 
  adequate_roof_insulation -0.0013 -0.06  0.0467 2.03 ** -0.0453 -2.92    *** 
  inadequate_roof_insulation 0.0069 0.26  0.0328 1.24  -0.0397 -2.42 ** 
  nonexistent_roof_insulation ref  ref  ref  
Dwelling localization          
  downtown ref  ref  ref  
  suburbs 0.0130 1.08  -0.0088 -0.73  -0.0042 -0.44  
  rural_town 0.2042 14.29 *** -0.3951 -34.48 *** 0.1909 14.80 *** 
Climate areas          
  mountain_climate ref  ref  ref  
  semi_continental_climate -0.1521 -6.37 *** 0.1721 5.97 *** -0.0200 -1.10    
  cooler_oceanic_climate -0.0365 -1.45  0.1306 4.82 *** -0.0941 -7.15 *** 
  mixed_oceanic_climate_range -0.0633 -2.74 *** 0.2276 9.29 *** -0.1643 -13.13 *** 
  oceanic_climate -0.0082 -0.33  0.0609 2.30 ** -0.0527 -3.53 *** 
  mild_oceanic_climate 0.0344 1.28  0.0964 3.47 *** -0.1307 -11.87 *** 
  mediterranean_climate 0.1652 6.20 *** -0.1469 -5.70 *** -0.0183 -1.07  
Household characteristics          
Households demographic   
characteristics 
         
  ln_nb_persons -0.0418 -3.49 *** 0.0379 3.09 *** 0.0039 0.41  
  ln_age_ref_pers -0.0632 -2.88 *** -0.0008 -0.03  0.0640 3.58 *** 
Household occupancy state          
  ownership ref  ref  ref  
  socially subsidised housing -0.1740 -10.26 *** 0.3126 16.03 *** -0.1386 -10.18 *** 
  private_tenant 0.1554 8.11 *** -0.0994 -5.32 *** -0.0560 -4.38 *** 
Rate of correct predictions 61.5%         
Number of observations 11,476         
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. * Significant at 10%. 
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Table 1.9. Probit multinomial—flats 
Discrete choice 
 
Individual heating Collective heating 
(gas or fuel oil) Electricity heating Gas heating 
 Coeff Student t Coeff Studen
t t  
 Coeff Stud
ent t  
 
Technical properties of dwelling        
Number of dwelling in apartment buildings        
  ln_nb_dwellings  -0.0342 -4.30 *** -0.0049 -0.67  0.0390 11.33 *** 
  floor (ln) -0.0166 -1.39  -0.0136 -1.26  0.0302 6.26 *** 
Dwelling area          
 ln_dwelling_area (m²) -0.4122 -18.86 *** 0.3425 17.18 *** 0.0698 6.88 *** 
Specificities          
  public_housing -0.3781 -25.73 *** 0.1499 7.11 *** 0.2282 10.71 *** 
  co_ownership 0.0215 1.06  0.0042 0.23  -0.0257 -2.38 ** 
  roof_less_3meters 0.0067 0.22  0.0046 0.17    -0.0113 -0.63  
Dwelling construction period          
  construction_before48 ref  ref  ref  
  Construction 1949–1974 -0.2674 -14.48 *** 0.0104 0.56  0.2570 15.45 *** 
  Construction 1975–1989 0.0991 4.38 *** -0.1209 -6.08 *** 0.0219 1.74 * 
  Construction 1990–2000 0.1741 8.18 *** -0.1313 -6.62 *** -0.0428 -4.56 *** 
Insulation characteristics          
  double_glazing 0.1446 9.10 *** -0.0918 -6.33 *** -0.0528 -7.50 *** 
Dwelling localization         
  downtown ref  ref  ref  
  suburbs -0.0051 -0.33    0.0003 0.02  0.0048 0.73  
  rural_town 0.3732 11.59 *** -0.3296 -13.01 *** -0.0435 -2.44 ** 
Climate areas          
  mountain_climate ref  ref  ref  
  semi_continental_climate -0.1659 -3.44 *** 0.1228 2.89 *** 0.0431 1.79 * 
  cooler_oceanic_climate -0.0131 -0.26  0.0045 0.10  0.0086 0.46  
  mixed_oceanic_climate 0.1134 2.81 *** -0.1183 -3.34 *** 0.0048 0.33  
  oceanic_climate -0.0839 -1.97 ** 0.1197 3.03 *** -0.0358 -3.21 *** 
  mild_oceanic_climate 0.1022 2.38 ** -0.0418 -1.03  -0.0603 -7.52 *** 
  mediterranean_climate 0.2286 6.07 *** -0.1476 -4.27 *** -0.0809 -8.27    *** 
Household characteristics          
Households demographic characteristics          
  ln_nb_persons 0.0256 1.86 * -0.0233 -1.85 *  -0.0023 -0.43  
  ln_age_ref_pers 0.0055 0.25  -0.0200 -0.99  0.0145 1.61  
Household occupancy state          
  ownership ref  ref  ref  
  tenant 0.1559 8.34 *** -0.0749 -4.23 *** -0.0810 -7.99 *** 
Rate of correct predictions 64.9%         
Number of observations 8,373         
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
 
 
 
1.7.3. Enercy consumption estimations 
 
Table 1.10. Tests of overidentifying restrictions 
 Houses estimation Flats estimation 
Instruments Gas city price in 1986 and 1996 Electricity price in 1986 and price of the 
electricity subscription 
Sargan test p-value = 0.1903 p-value =0.4900 
Basmann test p-value = 0.1912 p-value =0.4910 
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Table 1.11. Estimates of household energy consumption per m² (in logarithm) in a year: flats 
Linear regression for flats. Continuous choice. Double least Squared.  
Explanatory factors Coefficient Student t 
bootstrap correction Technical properties of the housing unit    
Collective dwelling characteristics    
  nb of dwellings in blocks of flats (ln) -0.0252 -3.92 *** 
  floor (ln) -0.0630 -7.47 *** 
Dwelling area    
  ln_dwelling_area (m²) -0.4853 -14.34 *** 
Specificities    
  roof_less_3meters  0.0376 1.67 * 
  veranda 0.0131 0.39  
  moisture problem 0.0412 4.06 *** 
Dwelling construction period    
  construction 1949–1974 (ref. construction before 1948) -0.0440 -1.49  
  construction 1975–1989 (ref. construction before 1948) -0.0472 -1.85 * 
  construction 1990–2005 (ref. construction before 1948) -0.2012 -3.12 *** 
Insulation characteristics    
  double_glazing -0.0548 -2.67 *** 
  double_glazing*construction 1949–1974  0.0409 1.70 * 
  double_glazing*construction 1975–1989 0.0309 1.05  
  double_glazing*construction 1990–2005 0.1194 1.80 * 
Dwelling exposure (according to households)    
  medium_exposure (ref. poor exposure) -0.0414 -1.95 * 
  good_exposure (ref. poor exposure) -0.0397 -2.08 ** 
Climate areas    
  semi_continental_climate (ref.  mountain_climate) 0.0696 2.31 ** 
  cooler_oceanic_climate (ref.  mountain_climate) -0.0233 -0.73  
  mixed_oceanic_climate (ref.  mountain_climate) 0.0458 1.78 * 
  oceanic_climate (ref.  mountain_climate) -0.2095 -7.70 *** 
  mild_oceanic_climate (ref.  mountain_climate) -0.0494 -1.59  
  mediterranean_climate (ref.  mountain_climate) -0.0482 -1.67 * 
Heating System    
  predicted probability to choose individual electric heating ref   
  predicted probability to choose individual gas heating 0.1262 1.92 * 
  predicted probability to choose collective heating (gas or fuel oil) 0.2165 2.59 ** 
Energy price    
  ln_average energy_price  -0.8152 -19.81 *** 
Household sociodemographic characteristics    
Household demographic characteristics    
  ln_nb_persons  0.1934 18.46 *** 
  ln_age_ref_person (age of household member answering the questions in the survey) 0.0830 3.83 *** 
Household occupancy state    
  rent 0.4780 3.95 *** 
  rent*area 
   
-0.1150 -3.97 *** 
  socially subsidised tenant  -0.0969 -3.75 *** 
Educational level of household member 
 answering the questions in the survey 
  
  without_certificate ref   
  brevet_diploma or vocational_training_qualification -0.0267 -2.03 ** 
  baccalaureate -0.0381 -2.24 ** 
  baccalaureat +2 years or more -0.0137 -0.88  
Income and others characteristics    
  ln annual income per consumption unit 0.0038 0.49  
  retired 0.0058 0.37  
  unemployed 0.0245 1.73 * 
  homemaker 0.0380 2.54 ** 
constant 8.3024 45.91 *** 
number of observations 8,373 
R
2
                         0.3468 
***Significant at 1%. **Significant at 5%. *Significant at 10%. 
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Chapter 2.   
Evaluation of the impact of environmental public policy 
measures on energy consumption and greenhouse gas 
emissions in the French residential sector
6 
 
 
Summary 
 
A cut in energy consumption by 2050 to reach 50 kWhpe/m
2
/year and reduce GHG emissions 
by 75% are important objectives of environmental policy in France. The residential sector 
represents a significant potential source of energy savings. In this paper, our main objective is 
to construct a simulation model and to evaluate the impact of environmental public policy 
measures. We model energy consumption and GHG emissions, the decision to invest in 
energy saving renovations and the dynamics of the housing stock. This study has three major 
outputs. First, we estimate the energy consumption and GHG emissions of the residential 
sector in France through 2050. Second, we study the impact of environmental public policy 
measures. Lastly, we propose different means to reach the objectives. The results show that 
while current policies are effective, they are not sufficient to reach the objectives. 
 
 
  
                                                
6
 A version of this paper is published as: Charlier, Dorothée and Risch, Anna. "Evaluation of the Impact of Environmental 
Public Policy Measures on Energy Consumption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions in the French Residential Sector." Energy 
Policy, 46(0), pp. 170-84 
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2.1. Introduction 
 
Energy consumption and GHG emissions are a key concern in France. French legislation 
known as the Grenelle 1 Act has set objectives to reduce GHG emissions by 75% by 2050 and 
reach 50 kWhpe/m
2
/year. The residential sector (with heating and hot water, lighting and 
appliances) consumes more energy than any other sector in France. It also has considerable 
potential to save energy, particularly through energy-efficient, cost-effective renovations. 
However, households do not invest significantly in energy saving measures even when these 
could save them money. The literature about this so-called energy paradox is extensive 
(Brown, 2001; Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sanstad et al., 1995; van Soest and Bulte, 2001) with 
most authors arguing that market imperfections are the underlying cause of the paradox. The 
intervention of the government, through public policy, may be a solution to these market 
failures. Environmental policies currently are targeting the residential sector to better exploit 
its energy saving potential. Several measures have been introduced in recent years, including 
income tax deductions, subsidies and zero rate bank loans, to encourage households to 
undertake energy efficient renovations. It seems important to evaluate the impact of these 
measures.  
To our knowledge, two models of simulation study residential energy consumption and 
dynamics of housing stock in France. MENFIS and Res-IRF models aimed at assessing the 
impact of environmental policies (MEDDTL et al., 2011 and Giraudet et al., 2011). These 
both models segment housing on the basis of energy labels. The first one considers a very 
large number of renovations and finds that tax credit allows decreasing residential energy 
consumption by 8% between 2008 and 2010. The second one considers only important 
renovations, which allow housing switching to another label, but takes into account 
households behavior concerning demand for heating-space energy consumption as rebound 
effect. They show that policies improve the energy efficiency of building stock but, with the 
exception of carbon tax, generate a rebound effect. Our objective is to bring a complementary 
approach to these models. Our method is different especially in the construction of the model, 
and we provide additional information on the behavior of households in term of energy saving 
investment, including segmentation by income quintile.  
Overall, the residential sector is complex due to the wide variety of housing types and diverse 
household behaviors. Each type of housing has different technical characteristics determined 
by a combination of factors, including when the building was constructed, its potential for 
renovation and surface area, whether the housing is individual or collective, the climate, etc. 
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The behavior of households also varies depending on whether they own or rent the place in 
which they live, their sensitivity to the environment (Levinson and Niemann, 2004), and their 
lifestyle (Weber and Perrels, 2000). 
Previous studies have taken diverse approaches to analyzing the use of energy in the 
residential sector. Some focus on the dynamics of housing stock under the assumption that 
renovations, demolitions and constructions have a strong impact on energy demand (Sartori et 
al., 2008) and GHG emissions. Nemry et al. (2000) predict emissions by determining the 
number of square meters of Belgian housing projected to be built each year until 2020. Other 
studies model energy consumption. In the 21
st
 century, on a global level, energy consumption 
for both heating and air conditioning will increase, although heating will do so to a lesser 
extent than air conditioning (Isaac and van Vuuren, 2009). This will impact GHG emissions, 
hence the importance of setting up and testing the effect of measures which improve energy 
efficiency. Shimoda et al. (2004) have developed a model to predict the level of energy 
consumption in Osaka and to test the effects of changes in lifestyle, efficiency of appliances, 
and the quality of insulation. Siller et al. (2007) show that energy consumption and GHG 
emissions could be reduced significantly by 2050 in Switzerland, but this would require the 
implementation of ambitious policies. Several studies indicate that incentives to change the 
source of heating energy have a strong impact on gas emissions (Jaccard et al., 1996; Kadian 
et al., 2007), whereas technologies that improve energy efficiency are more effective with 
regard to reducing energy consumption (Kadian et al., 2007). In Japan, the large scale 
introduction of photovoltaic panels is a key measure aiming to reduce gas emissions 
(Shimoda et al., 2010). Yet other studies examine the decision to invest in energy saving 
technologies. Amstalden et al. (2007) show that the expected energy price has a significant 
impact on the analysis of the profitability of energy saving investment. The introduction of 
environmental measures such as subsidies, taxes or income tax deduction also has an 
important effect. Jakob (2006) works on the marginal cost of energy-saving technologies and 
considers the feasibility of some investments. For uninsulated housing, it is profitable in most 
cases to invest in thermal insulation, especially if the homeowner anticipates high energy 
prices. 
In this article, we have chosen to combine these approaches and model energy consumption 
dynamics resulting from both housing stock dynamics and energy saving investment 
decisions. We propose a simulation model built using a bottom-up approach. Bottom-up 
models calculate the energy consumption of groups of houses and then extrapolate these 
results to represent the nation. We extrapolate the estimated energy consumption and GHG 
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emissions of a representative set of dwellings. The major attribute of bottom-up approach is 
the determination of typical end-use energy contribution and the inclusion of socioeconomic 
using billing data from a survey sample of households. However, with this method, 
assumptions of occupant behavior are made
7
 (see Swan and Ugursal (2009) for a precise 
review of this techniques). This study produces three major outputs: (i) an estimation of 
French residential energy consumption and GHG emissions through 2050, (ii) an assessment 
of the impact of environmental policies, and (iii) proposals of different means to reach the 
objectives set out in the Grenelle 1 Act (referred to in the remainder of the text as the 
‘Grenelle I objectives’). We test the impact of existing policies (income tax deduction, zero 
rate bank loans, subsidies, and VAT) and one potential policy (bonuses). We also calculate 
the amount these policies cost for the government. The results show that current policies are 
effective in the sense that they have enabled a decrease of energy consumption and GHG 
emissions over recent years. However, they alone will not ensure that the objectives set for 
2050 will be reached. Additional public investment is necessary to achieve these goals. The 
remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the current public policies 
in France, section 3 describes the model, section 4 presents the results, and section 5 discusses 
the sensitivity analysis conducted. 
 
2.2. Public policy 
 
In France, several environmental policies are meant to encourage households to undertake 
energy saving renovations. There are four principal financial supports, and households can 
receive them if renovations are done by building professionals. A tax deduction allows part of 
the expense to be deducted from their income tax. The deduction rate is a function of 
equipment (for example double glazing or heating system), and the portion of expenses 
deducted depends on the number of persons in the household. A zero rate bank loan is offered 
to homeowners who make several renovations or an energy-saving investment. Since 2011, it 
can no longer be combined with the income tax deduction. Homeowners who make 
renovations involving insulation or choose an efficient heating system also can receive a 
subsidy depending on household income. Finally, a reduced value added tax of 5.5% is 
applied to all types of renovations (the normal rate is 19.6%). The last policy is decided by the 
European Union whereas the others are decided by the French government and therefore can 
be modified more easily (table 2.1). 
                                                
7
 For example, we consider that the heating temperature in the dwelling is 19°C or the length of occupation by day is set to. 
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We explain in the part 2.3.2.1 how these policies are introduced in the model. 
Table 2.1. Public Policies 
Measure Description Rate 
Income tax 
deduction 
A part of the expenses in energy saving renovation can 
be deducted from the household income tax (or 
refunded if the household pays no income tax). This 
concerns only a range of specific renovations and the 
expenses deducted is limited to a certain amount, 
depending on the household characteristics 
15% for double glazing  
25% for roof and wall 
insulation  
25% for modernization of 
heating system  
40% for adoption of renewable 
energy 
VAT reduction A reduction of the indirect tax based on consumption 5.5% (instead of 19.6%) 
Zero rate bank 
loan 
No interest on the amount of the bank loan. It concerns 
homeowners who make several renovations or an 
important energy saving investment. The amount of the 
loan depends on the renovation 
 
Subsidy A subsidy, for homeowner, depending on household 
income (concerns mainly first income quintile 
households) 
35% of renovation expense 
Note: To receive these financial assistances, an household has to hire a company to make the renovations. If he 
decides to make the renovations itself, he cannot receive a subsidy, a VAT reduction, an income tax deduction or 
a zero bank loan.  
 
 
2.3. Model 
 
To simulate energy consumption and GHG emissions we use a bottom-up method. We 
consider that 12 types of dwellings represent the range of housing available in France. The 
twelve types differ depending on the type of housing (collective or individual), the main fuel 
source for heating and hot water (electricity, gas, oil and renewable energy), and the type of 
heating in flats (individual: only for one dwelling, or collective: common for the building). 
We assess the energy consumption for each representative dwelling. The model is dynamic: 
the weight of the representative dwelling in the total housing stock is affected by heating 
system renovations, and evolution in the number of households and their characteristics. We 
estimate separately for each representative dwelling the evolution of the housing stock and the 
energy consumption. The model is implemented in simulation software, named IODE. This 
platform is free and has been developed by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau
8
. The model 
is constructed in two steps. First, the dynamics of the housing stock is built. Second, energy 
                                                
8
 This tool takes into account all stages of construction and operation models. The features are the writing of equations and 
the simulation of scenarios. 
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consumption is modeled. In order to make the section easier to read, a list of variables is 
provided in table 2.5 in the appendix section. 
 
2.3.1. Modeling the dynamics of the housing stock 
The population is assumed to be exogenous and is divided into five categories of households 
(single, couple without children, couple with children, single-parent family and others). Each 
household category is characterized by a propensity to live in a defined type of housing. For 
each category of representative dwelling i the housing stock in year t corresponds to the 
housing needs of households (it is equal to the number of households living in the category). 
The structure of the household and the way it changes over time affect the structure of 
housing stock (i.e., the number of dwellings in each representative category). 
To estimate housing demand through 2050, we use scenarios for the evolution of the 
population and of household structure provided by INSEE (French Institute of Statistics). 
Housing stock in year t in category i (Sit) thus is an endogenous variable determined by the 
evolution and structure of households and different households’ propensity to live in 
particular types of housing. This variable evolves over time and has an impact on the energy 
demand of the housing stock. Each year, the additional housing needed corresponds to the 
number of new constructions (NCit). The number of new constructions is equal to the 
difference between the stock of the current year and the stock of the previous year (Sit-1) plus 
the number of demolitions (Dit). The number of dwellings demolished at time t is a percentage 
dit of housing stock of the previous year. This share is exogenous and constant over time. This 
approach is based on the study of Nemry et al. (2000). So, we have: 
 
  (1) 
and 
  (2) 
 
In the model, two age variables are estimated. First, we calculate the average age of the 
housing stock (AGE1it). We consider that new buildings are one year old and the age of 
demolished housing in time t is the average age of housing stock from the previous year. So, 
we have: 
1
=
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  (3) 
 
We then calculate a second age, which is closer to the concept of obsolescence (AGE2it). In 
this case, all renovations of type r in time t in each category i are taken into account (Rrit). The 
calculation of renovations is developed in part 2.3.2.1. We consider AGE2it as a proxy for 
housing quality. It is an endogenous variable that reflects the renovations of previous years. 
Renovations reduce AGE2it by bringing new blood into the housing stock. We calculate the 
modernization effect produced by renovated housing by calculating the number of kilowatts 
per hour saved after a renovation (AGE2Rrit-1). 
 
 (4) 
 
Finally, the average surface area of each representative dwelling (SAit) is obtained using the 
average surface area of the previous year (SAit-1), the surface area of the new constructions 
(SCit) and the surface area of demolitions. Demolished surfaces are equal to the surface area 
of the previous year. The surface area of new construction (SCit) is exogenous and increases at 
a constant rate of 0.46% each year. The average surface area of each representative dwelling 
is: 
  (5) 
 
2.3.2. Modeling energy consumption and GHG emissions 
The average energy consumption in kWh in primary energy (ECt) is the sum of the energy 
consumption for each end-use j (ECEND_USEt): heating and hot water (Ht), lighting (Lt) and 
appliances (At)
9
. 
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 Note that in the model we do not take climate change into account. First, the change in temperature is still quite uncertain. 
Second, if climate becomes hotter in the next years, we expect the energy consumption due to heating system to decrease, but 
that due to air conditioning to increase, leading therefore to an ambiguous effect on overall energy consumption.  
It is also worth noting that at present, air conditioning ownership is quite low in France (only 4% of the dwelling are 
equipped with air conditioning in 2006 according to ADEME). Thus, it is not included in the model. 
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  (6) 
 
  (7) 
 
Each end-use then is a sum of the energy consumption of each of the 12 representative 
dwellings. The total energy consumption related to heating and hot water (Ht) is the sum of 
energy consumption for a representative dwelling (Hit) multiplied by the stock corresponding 
to a category (Sit). On the same way, the total energy consumption related to appliances (At) is 
the sum of energy consumption for a representative dwelling (Ait) multiplied by the stock of 
this category (Sit). Finally, the total energy consumption related to lighting (Lt) is the sum of 
energy consumption for a representative dwelling (Lit) multiplied by the stock of this category 
(Sit). The methodology is exactly the same for GHG emissions. 
 
  (8) 
 
We will now present a method to calculate the total energy consumption for a representative 
dwelling in kWh/m
2
/year (ECit), which is also applied to calculate GHG emissions. 
 
2.3.2.1. Energy consumption and GHG emissions related to heating and hot water 
We determine the average energy consumption for heating and hot water for each 
representative dwelling (Hit). It is determined by renovations (Rit), new constructions (NCit) 
and the average energy consumption of the previous year (Hit-1). Heating consumption (Hit) in 
segment i at time t in kWhpe/m
2
/year is equal to the consumption for a representative dwelling 
the previous year in kWhpe/m
2
/year (Hit-1) multiplied by housing stock without renovation 
plus the consumption for each renovated dwelling of type r (Hrit) multiplied by the number of 
renovations r (Rrit) plus the new constructions (NCit) multiplied by the consumption of the 
latter (HCit). The whole is divided by the housing stock. 
We consider five types of renovation for individual dwellings (glazing insulation, wall 
insulation, roof insulation, equipment for heating and hot water, and the replacement of fuel 
by renewable energy) and an additional type for collective dwellings (the individualization of 
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the heating system for collective buildings with collective heating)
10
. Equipment for heating 
and hot water and changing fuel to renewable energy are renovations that cannot be 
combined. Finally, we obtain 23 possible combinations in the individual sector and 35 in the 
collective one. We calculate for each type of renovation the associated energy saving in 
kWhpe/m
2
/year (Grit). The consumption for each renovated dwelling of type r (Hrit) is obtained 
by the difference between the average consumption in the previous year (Hit-1) and the energy 
savings provided by the renovation r (Grit). We therefore have: 
 
  (9) 
 
 
 
(10) 
 
To estimate the number of renovations (Rrit), we proceed in two stages following a sequential 
approach. First, we compute the probability that a household invests in a renovation that 
improves energy efficiency (PIrit) and we conduct a cost-benefit analysis. Second, we assign a 
probability to the possibility that the co-owners in a collective building will vote in favor of 
the measure (PCrit). In this type of housing, some renovations cannot be decided at the 
household level but must be decided by the community of co-owners. We then obtain the 
following equation for individual housing units: 
  (11) 
And for collective ones: 
  (12) 
 
The probability that a household invests in an energy efficiency renovation PIrit depends on a 
cost-benefit analysis, that is to say, discounted energy savings for renovation (Grit) versus its 
total cost (Crit) and on the household’s financial constraint (FCit). We shall now describe these 
three elements. 
The energy savings (in kWhpe/m
2
/year (Grit)) equations are linear functions of the age of the 
housing (AGE2it). It is cheaper to save 1 kWh when the housing unit has never been 
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 Each category of household can realize only one combination of renovations. These combinations are sequential that is to 
say, in a first time, the household considers the better combination (in terms of energy savings). If this renovation is not 
affordable, it considers the second combinations and so on. Thus, this method prevents multiple renovations of the same type 
in the same house. 
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renovated. The older the housing stock, the larger is the number and impact of possible 
renovations. Energy savings are estimated in kilowatt-hour of primary energy. 
Therefore, before calculating energy savings in euros, we convert primary energy into final 
energy
11
. To avoid comparing an annual energy saving in euros to one-shot total cost, we 
discount the expected benefit to obtain a present value: 
 
  (13) 
 
where ϕ is the market long term interest rate and Tk the average life of equipment (Source: 
ADEME and Tns SOFRES (2009), Agence De l’Environnement et de la Maitrise de 
l’Energie). All costs and all benefits are calculated each year. Thus, an investment that is not 
profitable today may become so over time, notably as the dwelling ages. 
The cost of renovation depends on the price of the renovation, per square meter and potential 
public policies. Households may incur two types of loans: a conventional bank loan and a 
zero rate bank loan. They also can receive an income tax deduction and a subsidy and benefit 
from reduced VAT rates. However, a distinction is made between renovations carried out by a 
hired company and those made by households themselves. If a household decides to make the 
renovations itself to save the cost of hiring a company to do the work, the household will not 
receive the assistance (subsidies, VAT reduction, income tax deduction and zero rate bank 
loan) included under the public policies. The percentage of households choosing to do the 
renovation work themselves is different for each type of renovation and varies over time. The 
evolution is based on the ratio between the total cost of a measure (including the cost of hired 
labor) and the cost without the hired labor. The share of households engaging in renovations 
on their own increases with the cost of hired labor. 
The maximum amount in euros that the households can invest in a home renovation, namely 
the financial constraint, should depend on income quintile, tenure, disposable income, saving 
rate, share of savings devoted to energy efficiency investments and borrowing power. Indeed, 
it is more difficult for a household with debts and low income to invest in an energy 
efficiency renovation. To determine the financial constraints for each category of dwelling, 
each income quintile and each year: 
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 For electricity only, it is necessary to produce 2.58 kWh/m
2
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- we first multiply (i) saving rate and (ii) the share of savings rate devoted to energy 
efficiency investments with (iii) the disposable income,  
- second, we add the debt ratio. 
These variables are different depending on whether homeowners or tenants are considered. 
The probability (PIrit) is determined by a decision rule in three stages. This probability is 
calculated each year for each combination of renovations. The value of PIrit is between 0 (in 
this case, the household does not renovate) and 1. First, we compare the cost of renovation 
with the household’s financial constraint. If a household cannot afford the renovation, we set 
PIrit = 0. In a second stage, if PIrit ≠ 0, we calculate the length of time that allows a positive 
return on investment. Third, depending on the duration, we assign a value to the probability 
PIrit. The latter decreases over time. To set this probability, we take into account the average 
length of occupancy (5.2 years with a margin up to 7 years) and the tenure. If the household is 
a homeowner, the probability associated to renovation is higher. A tenant has less incentive to 
make an energy efficiency investment because he does not stay long enough in the dwelling 
to secure a return on the investment. Meanwhile, renovations increase the value of the 
dwelling for homeowners. 
In France, there are collective dwellings (e.g., apartment buildings) with a collective heating 
system. One energy bill is divided among all residents of the building contingent on shares 
allocated when the dwelling was purchased. The cost of excess energy consumption is borne 
by all residents of the building. Moreover, in this type of housing, decisions are made by 
majority vote at owners’ meetings. The energy-saving measures have a lower probability of 
being accepted. This is due, for example, to households living in a well-located apartment 
being less willing to pay for an energy-saving investment, or to households living below the 
roof being more interested in roof renovations than households living on the first floor. 
Therefore, we set a probability that the co-ownership accepts the measure in collective 
dwellings (PCit). 
 
2.3.2.2. Energy consumption related to appliances 
The electricity consumption of appliances is the sum of the consumption of each dwelling in 
kWhpe/m
2
/year. We take into account eight appliance categories (e.g., refrigerator, freezer, 
dishwasher, washing machine, tumble dryer, oven, television and computers) and an 
additional consumption related to other devices (coffee maker, boiler, lawnmower …). The 
probability for appliance ownership is determined by the rates of household equipment, and 
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we assume they are constant over the period. We assign an average consumption for each 
device in kWhpe/m
2
/year, which is computed according to its energy label. In France, each 
appliance is associated with an energy label, from A+ for those that consume the least amount 
of energy to D for the largest energy consumers. For computers and televisions, we count an 
additional energy consumption related to standby. 
We set a probability that households are equipped with an appliance belonging to a specified 
energy label. It then is weighted with the rates of the equipment utilization and of household 
equipment. No data is available about the ownership of appliances with different energy 
labels, so we assume the number of households owning efficient energy label appliances (A 
and A+) is growing over time. First, this assumption is based on past trends. Second, we 
assume that appliances with lower energy consumption become cheaper over time and the 
household sensitivity concerning environment quality increases. We conduct a sensitivity 
analysis. It shows that the impact of a change in the repartition is not really significant. 
 
2.3.2.3. Energy consumption related to lighting 
We consider that there are three kinds of light bulbs in a dwelling: halogen, standard and 
energy saving. To calculate the energy consumption from lighting in kWhpe/m
2
/year, the 
consumption of each type is weighted. The number of light bulbs depends on the surface area. 
On average, each French household owns 22 lamps in a dwelling of 110 m
2
. We therefore 
assume that there is 0.25 bulb light by m
2
 in a dwelling (source: ADEME). 
The weights of different lighting technologies are set in 2006 according to the observation of 
ADEME (70% of standard, 5% of halogen and 25% of energy saving). Then, we assume that 
they change each decade: progressively, energy saving light bulbs replace standard light bulbs 
and the halogen stays constant over the period. This assumption is based on trends computed 
on the previous years. 
References for the sources of data and scenarios used to construct the model are presented in 
table 2.6 in appendix section. The model is summarized in the following framework (figure 
2.1). Endogenous variables are represented by oval. 
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Figure 2.1. The main determinants of energy consumption and GHG emissions in the model 
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2.4. Results 
 
One of our objectives is to estimate the impact of environmental policies. To judge their 
effectiveness, we use two criteria. First, we assess the extent to which these policies facilitate 
achieving the Grenelle targets (an average energy consumption of 50 kWhep/m
2
 by 2050 in the 
residential sector and reducing GHG emissions by 75% compared to the level of emissions in 
1990). To reduce GHG emissions by 75% in the residential sector, the maximum amount of 
CO2 that the residential sector can emit in 2050 is 13.75 million tons. Second, we study the 
cost of the measures for the government. How much must the government invest to save one 
ton of CO2? To answer to this question, we calculate the cost of a policy and we divide it by 
the GHG emissions saved thanks to a policy measure. The cost for the government is 
estimated by comparing two scenarios: one where no policy is implemented, the second 
where a selected policy which we wish to examine is implemented. This allows us to take into 
account the impact and cost of one policy at a time. We study the impact of current 
environmental policies with these indicators. 
To estimate the energy consumption of the housing stock until 2050, we calibrate the model 
using 2006 data from: (i) INSEE, l’enquête logement 2006, (ii) the Ministry of Ecology, 
Energy, Sustainable Development and the Sea and (iii) simulation software
12
 which estimates 
energy consumption and GHG emissions on the basis of building characteristics (year of 
construction, surface area, thermal insulation, fuel and heating system). The energy prices 
depend on evolution scenarios provided by International Energy Agency. 
In 2007, our results are consistent with Agence Nationale de L’habitat. According to the 
latter, energy consumption is 274 kWhpe/m
2
 and we obtain 283.6 kWhpe/m
2
. Parameters 
values used for calibration are summarized in appendix in table 2.7. 
We now present our results. Different scenarios are tested. They are summarized in appendix 
in table 2.8. First, the effects of current environmental policies are tested. Second, public 
policies to achieve the Grenelle I goals are simulated. 
 
2.4.1. The effects of current environmental policies 
We consider a reference scenario in which public policies in 2050 are the same as in the 
                                                
12
 The simulation software is named PROMODUL. This software is used to estimate energy consumption and greenhouse 
gases emission for each category of dwelling, using 3CL method. This is the standard method to estimate consumption and 
greenhouse gases emissions in France and it is used to label the dwelling. This computation method is described by French 
decree in September 2006. PROMODUL is an extra tool that we used just to feed the model with data. 
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period between 2006 and 2010 (e.g., an income tax deduction at a constant rate during the 
entire period, a zero rate bank loan, a subsidy, a VAT with a reduced rate of 5.5% instead of 
19.6%, and households can receive several forms of financial support at the same time). 
Before to study the impact of public policies, quantitative results of basic variables are 
presented using this reference scenario. 
 
2.4.1.1. Quantitative results of basic variables in the reference scenario 
The number of dwellings increases by 50% between 2006 and 2050. Average surface area 
(figure 2.2) is growing over time as well as new constructions. When the housing stock shows 
signs of obsolescence, the number of renovations is high; however, once renovated, the 
quality of the housing stock increases, and households consequently have less incentive to 
renovate. Then, energy consumption and GHG emissions (figure 2.3) decrease over the 
period. The decrease is more pronounced at the beginning of the period thanks to public 
policies. AGE2 (meaning obsolescence) is still relatively constant over the period around 60 
years. 
Figure 2.2. Evolution of the average surface area in square meters 
 
Figure 2.3. Evolution of energy consumption and GHG emissions 
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We note a sharp decline in renovations between 2008 and 2020 in individual housing units 
although they are more numerous than in collective dwellings (figure 2.4).  
Figure 2.4. Number of renovations and the type of dwelling (in the reference scenario) 
 
 
In the reference scenario, households prefer investing in one renovation rather than in a 
combination of renovations. The renovations favored are double-glazing insulation and wall 
and roof insulation. From 2013 on, roof insulation and heating systems changes become 
dominant. In general, the switch from fuel to renewable energy is very rare over the entire 
period (see figures 2.5 and 2.6). 
 
Figure 2.5. Number of renovations in collective buildings by type (in the reference scenario) 
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Figure 2.6. Number of renovations in individuals housing units by type (in the reference scenario) 
 
 
Renovations change the structure of the housing stock (see figures 2.7 and 2.8). Indeed, the 
weight of each category changes over time. Renewable energy takes a more prominent place 
in 2050. This result is even stronger in individual housing. 
 
Figure 2.7. Weight of each category in collective buildings (in the reference scenario) 
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Figure 2.8. Weight of each category in individual housing units (in the reference scenario) 
 
 
It is mostly the households in the fourth income quintile who invest up to 2026 (figure 2.9). 
Fifth quintile households already live in energy efficient housing. After 2026, the poorest 
households invest because investing in energy efficient measures becomes profitable: the 
older the housing stock, the larger the energy saving associated with renovation. In 2010, we 
have the following result: individuals belonging to the first quintile can afford measures 
costing up to 4500 euros and individuals belonging to the second quintile may finance 
measures costing up to 8400 euros (figure 2.10). 
 
Figure 2.9. Number of renovations by quintile (in the reference scenario) 
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Figure 2.10. Investment capacity in euros of households by quintile (in the reference scenario) 
 
 
In fact, only individuals in the fifth income quintile can finance class A renovation (i.e.,  
< 50kWh/m
2
/year), that cost between 40 000 and 60 000 euros. 
 
2.4.1.2. The effects of current public policies 
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2
/year and  
63 millions of tons of CO2 are reached in the model. In the absence of public policy, 
consumption would have been 28% higher and emissions would have multiplied by 1.5. 
These measures remain effective in future years (compared to the reference scenario and the 
scenario without policy from 2011). 
By comparing the discounted benefit and the cost of measures, we note that in the absence of 
environmental policies, very few energy-saving renovations are profitable or can be financed 
by households (results are summarized in table 2.2). Without public policy measures, energy 
consumption and GHG emissions decrease because the housing stock is showing signs of 
obsolescence and renovations are necessary. However, to achieve the Grenelle I objectives of 
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2
/year and CO2 emissions of 13.75 millions of tons by 
2050, public policy measures are required. Our results are similar to those of Siller et al. 
(2007) for Switzerland and those from French simulation models (MEDDTL et al., 2011 and 
Giraudet et al., 2011), further underscoring that implementation of ambitious public policies 
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on new constructions is not sufficient for the objectives to be reached. 
 
To study the effectiveness of the policies, we can estimate the extent of free-riding by 
calculating the ratio between the number of renovations made in the absence of policy 
measures and the number of renovations with policy measures. ‘‘Free riders’’ are households 
who would have made energy efficiency investments even in the absence of public policy. 
This free-ridership may undermine the effectiveness of environmental policies
13
. Comparing 
the sum of renovations between 2011 and 2050 without and with policies (reference scenario), 
free-ridership represents 40.15% of the number of renovations during the entire period. This 
result is consistent with the finding of Grösche and Vance (2009). In the following section, 
we compare public policies and propose measures to reach the Grenelle I objectives. 
 
Table 2.2. Effects of current environmental policies 
 kWhpe 
/m² /year 
Decrease compared 
to the current 
situation (situation 
in 2010 with 
current policies) 
Millions 
of tons of 
CO2 
Decrease 
compared to 
the current 
situation 
Situation in 2010:     
Situation in 2010, with current policies 240.94
2.a
 - 63.01 - 
Situation in 2010, if no policy had been 
implemented 
 
308.45 
 
+28% 
 
97.36 
 
+55% 
Situation in 2050 (with different scenarios):     
Objective by 2050 50.00 -79% 13.75 -78% 
Reference scenario: situation in 2050, if policies 
remain unchanged compared to 2010
2.b
 
 
91.67 
 
-62% 
 
35.01 
 
-44% 
Situation in 2050 without any policy from 2011 124.89 -48% 46.50 -26% 
Situation in 2050 if income tax deduction and 
zero rate bank loan are not cumulative from 2011 
 
100.14 
 
-58% 
 
38.41 
 
-39% 
Note: 2.a 
With current policies, we obtained with simulations an average energy consumption of 240.94 kWhpe/m
2
 in 
2010, whereas without policy the energy consumption is 28% higher and reach 308.45 kWhpe/m
2
.
 
2.b 
This is our reference situation: we consider that the current policies remain unchanged from 2010 until 2050, 
this means a VAT with a reduced rate of 5.5%, a income tax deduction, a zero rate bank loan and a subsidy and an household 
can receive several forms of financial support at the same time. 
 
 
2.4.2. Comparison of policies 
A scenario without public policy measure and a scenario with only one public policy measure 
are compared to evaluate the effectiveness of each measure. Using this method, only the 
impact of the selected public policy is studied (see figures 2.11 and 2.12). We can deduce the 
savings in energy consumption and GHG emissions due to public policy measures. It also 
                                                
13
 For more information, the free-ridership was studied in the literature by Malm (1996) and Grösche and Vance (2009). 
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gives us the renovation surplus linked to the measure (figure 2.13 represents the number of 
renovations by public policies). Thus, we estimate the cost for the government by ton of CO2 
saved with a measure. In the absence of public policy, mostly the richest households (fifth and 
fourth income quintiles) invest in energy-saving renovations. 
 
Figure 2.11. Energy consumption in kWh/m
2
/year by type of public policies 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12. GHG emissions in KgCO2/m
2
/year by type of public policies 
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Figure 2.13. Number of renovations by public policies 
 
 
 
The income tax deduction seems to be one of the most efficient policy measures (see  
table 2.3). Indeed, the scenario leading to the smallest energy and GHG emissions savings 
between 2006 and 2050 is the scenario without this measure. The zero rate bank loans have a 
similar impact on energy consumption and GHG emissions, but its cost to the government is 
higher. The subsidy is the least costly measure, but has not an impact. We simulate the effects 
of an increase of the maximum amount of renovations covered by the subsidy and an increase 
on applicable rates. Rates are a function of household income. At first glance, the subsidy thus 
does not seem to be the most effective solution. An increase in VAT encourages households 
to do the renovations themselves because the cost of renovations increases. In these five 
scenarios, households prefer to undertake roof and wall insulation renovations (figure 2.14). 
These renovations offer the best value for money. Regarding the cost of policy measures, the 
income tax deduction and zero rate bank loan are the most expensive but the most efficient. 
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Figure 2.14. Number of renovations by type under income tax deduction scenario 
 
 
 
The effectiveness of a policy is stronger if it is combined with another one. A single 
environmental policy is not sufficient to encourage households to renovate. All measures do 
not have the same long-term impact on energy consumption. Subsidies concern only 
homeowners, while tenants often live in collective and less energy efficient dwellings. 
Tenants have no incentive to renovate because they do not stay long enough in a dwelling to 
make such an investment worth their while, and they cannot exploit the investment by selling 
their property. This result is consistent with Diaz-Rainey and Ashton (2009) where they show 
the importance of tenure in adoption decisions. In addition, households belonging to the 
second income quintile do not receive enough subsidies to enable them to renovate; in 
consequence, they hardly ever renovate. In some sense, we face a problem of energy poverty. 
All results presented in the following table are given compared to a scenario without public 
policies. 
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Table 2.3. Comparison of policies 
 Energy consumption 
saved in 2050, in % 
compared to a scenario 
without policy 
CO2 saved in 2050, 
in % compared to a 
scenario without 
policy 
Cost (of shortfall) of 
policies in constant euro 
by ton of CO2 saved, 
between 2006 and 2050 
Income tax deduction -24 %* -22,1 % 115 € 
Zero rate bank loan -26 % -21 % 194 € 
Subsidy -2.7 % -2 % 36 €  
VAT -12.6 % -13.7 % 44 € 
All policies take together -37.4 % -35.24 % - 
Note:  *With income tax deduction only, the energy consumption in 2050 is 24% lower compared to a scenario without 
policy 
 
 
2.4.3. Public policy measures to achieve the Grenelle I goals 
In a first step, we examine whether adjustments in the public policy measures in place will 
allow the Grenelle I objectives to be achieved. We observe, however, that even with all of 
these policies, the objectives will not be reached. In a second step, we therefore introduce a 
new measure: bonuses. 
The income tax deduction seems to be the most efficient measure. However, to achieve the 
objectives, the income tax deduction rate must be increased significantly. We simulate the 
effect of several rates from 2010, with the same rate applied to all types of renovations with 
the exception of individualizing heating systems, which is not currently eligible for income 
tax deductions. The tax-deductible amount is limited, and essentially is based on the number 
of persons in the household. In the calculation, the platform limits do not change. We reach 
13.01 million tons of GHG emissions and 50 kWhpe/ m
2
 in 2050 (see figures 2.15 and 2.16) 
with a rate of 54% (compared to the current rates of 15% for double-glazing, 25% for roof 
and wall insulation and modernization of the heating system, and 40% for adoption of 
renewable energy). This means a cost of 258 euros for the government per ton of CO2 saved 
(all public costs are expressed in euro 2006). The effectiveness of one euro invested by the 
state is less when income tax deduction rates are high. This can be explained by free-ridership 
because many households would have renovated even if the rate had been lower. 
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Figure 2.15. Energy consumption in 2050 with different income tax deduction rates 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16. Energy consumption in 2050 with different income tax deduction rates 
 
 
 
Another possible policy measure that we test in our model are bonuses. Bonuses are 
introduced in 2010, and the amount of each bonus increases at the same rate as inflation. A 
bonus can be linked to low income or can be made available to all households. Incentives for 
a specific renovation or a combination of several renovations (i.e., 2 or more) also can be 
introduced. Starting with a bonus for all households and applicable to all kinds of renovations, 
a bonus of 2900 euros per renovation (cost to the government of 255 euros per ton of CO2 
saved) is required to achieve the factor 4 (see figures 2.17 and 2.18) and a bonus of  
4050 euros per renovation to reach 50 kWhpe/m
2
 (cost to the government 257 euros per ton of 
CO2 saved). A bonus of 4050 euros corresponds to 1/3 of the average cost of one renovation. 
However, this bonus fully finances window, roof and wall insulation. Half the cost of 
switching to renewable energy is financed by this bonus. From 2500 euros, the impact of one 
euro of additional bonus diminishes (the slope of the curve is lower). 
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Introducing a bonus based on low income (households earning less than 9200 euros per year 
in 2010), we reach factor 4 with a 4100 euros bonus per renovation and 50 kWhpe/m
2
 with a 
5100 euros bonus per renovation. The costs of these measures (see table 2.9 in appendix) to 
the government are respectively 441 euros per ton of CO2 saved and 435 euros per ton of 
CO2 saved. It is more expensive to fund a single category of households rather than all 
households. 
A bonus also can be set to a specific type of renovation. However, it is more difficult to 
achieve the objectives. We consider an incentive to encourage households to change their 
heating systems and in particular to adopt renewable energy. A bonus of 6800 euros is 
necessary to reach the factor 4 (and the cost to the government is 1236 euros per ton of CO2 
saved), which is higher than the price of some equipment. It is not possible to reach the 
objective of 50 kWhpe/m
2
/year by adding this type of measure to the reference scenario. 
The public cost of all these different policy measures are resumed in table 2.9 in appendix. 
 
Figure 2.17. Energy consumption in 2050 with different amount of bonuses 
 
Figure 2.18. Greenhouse gases in 2050 with different amount of bonuses 
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2.5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
All results presented are for the year 2050. Energy consumption is in kWhpe by square meter 
and GHG emissions are in million of tons. Results are summarized in table 2.10 in appendix. 
Energy prices clearly are key variables in the model. Savings in euros associated with a 
renovation vary according to energy prices. A sharp increase in prices would lead the 
household, all things being equal, to quickly invest in energy-saving renovations. If the IEA 
rates are maintained, the objective of 50 kWhpe/m
2
/year would be reached in 2078. This result 
is consistent with Amstalden et al. (2007). Expecting high energy prices, efficiency 
investments are close to profitability even without policy support.  
When the discount parameter decreases, the number of energy saving renovations increase 
because the net discounted profits are higher. The level of energy consumption is a decreasing 
function of the discount rate. The level of energy consumption also is an increasing function 
of homeowner share. One may intuitively deduct that the higher the homeowner share is, the 
higher the number of households impacted by the measure, and therefore the higher the 
number of renovations will be. Also, tenants currently have no incentive to renovate. In 
France, part of the population are tenants for life. This means that part of the population will 
never involve themselves with energy savings investments. However, even if the entire 
population became homeowners, the objectives would not be reached. The issue of renovation 
seems more related to a calculation of profitability than to occupational status. 
Finally, the smaller the inflation rate is, the smaller will be energy consumption and GHG 
emissions. Indeed, a lower inflation rate reduces the cost of renovations. Energy prices 
increase faster than the inflation rate. The ratio between discounted savings and the cost of 
renovations rises. Energy saving investments become more profitable. 
 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we estimate energy consumption through 2050 and evaluate the impact of 
environmental policies. We construct a simulation model using a bottom-up approach. We 
model energy consumption and GHG emissions by taking into account decisions to invest in 
energy saving measures and the dynamics of the housing stock. In the model, energy 
consumption is divided into three end-uses: heating and hot water, lighting, and appliances. 
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Particular attention is paid to decisions regarding home renovations. Several environmental 
public policies are tested: income tax deduction with different deduction rates, subsidies, 
bonuses. Our results indicate that current policies are effective, but not enough to reach the 
Grenelle I objectives. 
These conclusions may be modified as we have made numerous assumptions. Energy 
consumption estimates (particularly the reference consumption and the gains from 
renovations) are based on technical analysis. Such an estimation method does not take into 
account, for example, the rebound effect.
14
 Moreover, in the model we consider that the 
thermal regulations have an immediate effect, although this may be unrealistic in reality. We 
also had to assume some ad-hoc evolution of the distribution of appliances across energy 
labels through 2050. Furthermore, energy prices are key variables in the model. The effects 
obtained on energy consumption and GHG emissions may be very different depending on 
their evolution. Finally, it is obviously impossible to take into account future technological 
innovations or the environmental sensitivity of households that we hope will play an 
important role in the future. 
With these caveats in mind, we draw the following key conclusions from our analysis. First, 
the results show that while current policies are effective, they are not sufficient to reach the 
objectives. If the current public policy measures are kept without modifications, (i.e., the 
income tax deduction, the zero rate bank loan, VAT at 5.5% and the subsidy) energy 
consumption will still be 91.67kWhpe/m
2
/year in 2050. In the absence of public policy 
between 2006 and 2010, consumption would have been 28% higher and emissions would 
have been multiplied by 1.5. By comparing the discounted benefit and the cost of measures, 
we note that in the absence of environmental policies, very few energy-saving renovations are 
profitable or can be financed by households. The income tax deduction seems to be one of the 
most efficient policy measure. The effectiveness of a policy is stronger if it is combined with 
another one.
15
 We could reach the factor 4 with an income deduction rate of 45% for all 
renovation from 2011, a zero rate bank loan that can be combined with the income tax 
deduction over the whole period, a VAT at 5.5%, a bonus of 1000 euros for households 
belonging to first and second income quintiles and a bonus of 500 euros for others 
households. This combination is one of the possible efficient policy mix. 
 
                                                
14
 The rebound effect appears if investment in an energy-saving technology (like double-glazing) entails a change in 
household behavior (increase of temperature target for instance) which offsets the beneficial effects of the technology on 
energy consumption. 
15
 However, we can note that the redundancies of policies can lead to inefficiency. Some households benefit from several 
policies but they would have invested in a home renovation with only one financial support. 
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2.7. Appendix 
 
2.7.1. Introduction of a carbon tax  
We can also test the imapct of a carbon tax. We introduce a tax in the energy-savings 
equations in euros. If the government taxes energy-intensive housing, the tax will be added as 
a benefit for households that want to renovate (since this tax will no longer be requested after 
renovation). 
If a carbon tax is introduced in 2010 which increases by 2% per year, the same rate as 
inflation, a tax of 185 euros per tons of CO2 is needed to divide emissions by 4 and a tax of 
360 euros to reach the energy consumption goal of 50 kWhpe/m /year (figures 2.19 and 
2.20). We note that the GHG emissions and energy consumption decrease sharply following 
the introduction of a tax (with a more pronounced effect for GHG emissions). However, 
beyond a tax of 150 euros, the effect of an additional euro is very low. A tax of 180 euros 
would earn the state 176 euros per ton of CO2 saved (292 billion euros over the period) and a 
tax of 360 euros would earn the state 172 euros per ton of CO2 saved (374 billion euros). The 
latter tax level, which would be more expensive for households, is more effective at 
persuading households to invest in energy-saving renovations. 
 
Figure 2.19. Energy consumption in 2050 with a carbon tax 
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Figure 2.20. Greenhouse gases in 2050 with a carbon tax 
 
 
A carbon tax is efficient on GHG emissions but it becomes costly for households when the 
objective is to reach kWhpe/m2/year. Since the taxes we tested mainly affect the poorest 
people (because they live in the least efficient dwellings), they are the most socially unfair 
measure. However, they could be redistributed to fund other environmental policies. By 
combining several measures, it is possible to bring the cost to the government close to zero. 
For example, we can reach the factor 4 with an income deduction rate of 40% and a carbon 
tax of 100 euros per ton of CO2. In this case, the tax will fund the income tax deduction cost. 
However, results with carbon tax do not take into account the effects on the whole economy 
and every aspect of people's lives.
16
 In a such context, results with carbon tax should be taken 
with caution. 
 
 
2.7.2. Change in the evolution of the population  
 
We can also test the impact of a change in the evolution and the structure of the population 
compared to a baseline scenario. We can simulate the impact of a higher growth in the 
number of households (table 2.4). In scenario A, we consider that the number of households 
increases by 2% by year (vs. 1% in the reference scenario). In this case, new constructions 
                                                
16
Just as an example of a measure not included in the model, people could react to a carbon tax that is sufficiently high by 
accepting a lower indoors temperature in winter and saving energy through less heating. 
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increase to meet households needs. This lead to a decrease in energy consumption per square 
meter and in the average CO2 emissions by dwelling. However, the housing stock is more 
important and the total CO2 emissions is thus higher. Conversely, in scenario B, we estimate 
the effect of a shock of the population, which could be related to an epidemic or a war. We 
assume that the number of households drops to 10% in 2020. In this case, we observe the 
opposite effect. Given the lower number of new constructions, the energy consumption per 
square meters and the CO2 emissions by dwelling is slightly higher than in the reference 
scenario. It is indeed more tricky to decrease energy consumption and greenhouse gases 
emissions through renovations. In a scenario C, we simulate a change in the structure of 
population, i.e. we assume that the growth of couples is greater than single person households 
(we decrease the growth of single person households by 40 percentage points and we increase 
those of couples with and without children by 20 percentage points each). This leads to a 
decrease of the weight of collective housing in the housing stock but the impact on energy 
consumption is weak. 
 
A change in the evolution of the number of households has an impact throught new 
constructions. It would be appropriate to combine a change of population with a hardening of 
thermal regulations. We assume that thermal regulation sets an energy consumption of  
10 kWhpe/m
2
 for new constructions since 2013 and 0 kWh since 2020 (vs. respectively 50 
kWh and 10 kWh in reference scenario). However, the thermal regulation will not offset the 
increase of total emissions following the rise of the number of households. 
A change in the evolution and the composition of households will not allow reaching the 
objectives set by the government.  
 
Table 2.4. Simulation with new assumptions on the evolution of the population 
 Average energy 
consumption by 
kWhpe/m² in 2050 
Millions of 
tons of 
CO2 
Average CO2 
emissions by 
dwelling in kg.CO2 
Weight of 
collective 
housing 
Reference scenario:  
Rate of households growth of 1% by 
year 
91.67 35.01 11.05 48% 
Scenario A:  
Rate of households growth of 2% by 
year since 2012 
79.69 47.15 9.70 51% 
Scenario B: 
Shock on population in 2020: decrease 
in the number of households of 10%  
93.27 31.13 11.13 47% 
Scenario C:  
Change in the structure of population: 
the growth of couples is greater than 
single person households 
91.52 34.47 10.76 42% 
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 Average energy 
consumption by 
kWhpe/m² in 2050 
Millions of 
tons of 
CO2 
Average CO2 
emissions by 
dwelling in kg.CO2 
Weight of 
collective 
housing 
Scenario D: 
Hardening of thermal regulations in 
the reference scenario 
89.97 33.10 10.43 48% 
Scenario E:  
Hardening of thermal regulation + rate 
of households growth of 2% by year 
since 2012 
76.83 42.4 8.63 51% 
 
2.7.3. Variables and data 
Table 2.5. List of variables 
Variables Definitions 
Sit Housing stock in year t in category i 
Sit-1 Housing stock in year t-1 in category i 
NCit  Number of new constructions in year t in category i 
dit Percentage of dwellings demolished at time t in category i 
Dit Number of dwellings demolished at time t in category i 
AGE1it The average age of the housing stock at time t in category i 
AGE2it The obsolescence of the housing stock at time t in category i 
Rrit Renovations of type r at time t in category i 
AGE2Rit The number of kilowatts per hour saved after a renovation 
SAit Average surface area at time t in category i 
SAit-1 Average surface area at time t-1 in category i 
SCit Surface area of new constructions at time t-1 in category i 
SDit Surface area of demolitions at time t-1 in category i 
ECt Average energy consumption in kWh in primary energy in time t 
ECend_uset Energy consumption for each end use in kWh in primary energy in time t 
Ht Energy consumption for heating and hot water in kWh in primary energy in time t 
Lt Energy consumption for lighting in kWh in primary energy in time t 
At Energy consumption for appliances in kWh in primary energy in time t 
Hit Energy consumption for heating and hot water in kWh in primary energy in time t in 
category i 
Ait Energy consumption for appliances in kWh in primary energy in time t in category i 
Lit Energy consumption for lighting in kWh in primary energy in time t in category i 
ECit Average energy consumption in kWh in primary energy in time t in category i 
Hit-1 Energy consumption for heating and hot water in kWh in primary energy in time t-1 in 
category i 
Hrit Energy consumption for heating and hot water for each renovated dwelling of type r in 
kWh in primary energy in time t in category i 
HCit Energy consumption of new constructions for heating and hot water in kWh in primary 
energy in time t in category i 
Grit Energy savings for each renovated dwelling of type r in kWh in primary energy in time t 
in category i 
Rrit Number of renovations of type r in time t in category i 
PIrit Probability that a household invests in a renovation r that improves energy efficiency in 
time t in category i 
PCrit Probability that co-owners in collective buildings vote a renovation r that improves energy 
efficiency in time t in category i 
Crit Cost of a renovation of type r in kWh in primary energy in time t in category i 
FCit Household’s financial constraint in time t in category i 
PVit Present value in time t in category i 
Φ Long term interest rate 
Tk Average life of equipment k 
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Table 2.6. Main assumptions in the model 
Parameters Sources of data and assumptions 
Housing Stock A function of demographic evolution 
Demolition A constant share of the housing stock. In 2006, data come from Ministry of Ecology, 
Energy, Sustainable Development and the Sea (website: http://www.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/). 
Renovations Depending on obsolescence of dwelling and cost-benefits analysis. 
Energy Consumption 
related to heating and 
hot water 
Depending on energy consumption of new constructions (based on thermal 
regulations), demolitions and renovations (energy consumption are obtained using 
PROMODUL software and the data are available from the authors upon request. In 
this software, energy consumption can be calculated using 3CL method to estimate 
energy consumption and GHG emissions in France, and it is used to label the 
dwellings. This computation method is described by a French decree in November 
2006).  
Cost Benefit analysis Depending on: 
-household financial constraint (data come from INSEE) 
-prices of renovations (from ADEME) 
-energy savings  
Energy savings Energy savings in kWh and kgCO2 are linear functions of AGE2it. These functions 
were constructed using PROMODUL software. 
Energy savings in euros through the renovation depend on: 
-energy prices (projection of IEA) 
-average life of equipment (ADEME) 
Energy Consumption 
related to appliances 
Depending on: 
-repartition in energy label (ADEME) 
-utilization and equipment rate (INSEE) 
Energy Consumption 
related to lighting 
Depending on: 
-the number and the kind of lights bulbs  (data from ADEME) 
-surface area (from INSEE in 2006 and then the surface area for new construction is 
increasing by 0.46% per year. This figure is based on the twenty previous years 
trend) 
 
Table 2.7. Main values of parameters used for calibration 
Parameters 2006 Annual change Sources 
Number of dwellings 26,049,046 Depending on number of 
households 
Ministry of Ecology, 
Energy, Sustainable 
Development and the Sea 
Number of new 
constructions 
0.84% of the total 
housing stock 
Endogenous Ministry of Ecology, 
Energy, Sustainable 
Development and the Sea 
Demolition rate 0.05% Constant of the period INSEE 
Energy consumption 
for new dwelling 
110 kWh/m²/year 110 kWh/m² until 2013,          
50 kWh/m²/year until 2030, 
10 kWh/m²/year after. 
Thermal regulations, 
Ministry of Ecology, 
Energy, Sustainable 
Development and the Sea 
Surface area (in square 
meter) 
65 m² in collective 
buildings and 110 m² 
in individual housing 
Surface area for new 
construction is increasing 
by 0.46% per year 
INSEE 
Average area per new 
built dwelling 
66 m² in collective 
buildings and 110 m² 
in individual housing 
0.46% per year INSEE, projection of past 
trend 
AGE1 60 Endogenous INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
AGE2 60 Endogenous  INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
Energy prices 
(euros/kWh/m²) 
   
Gas 0.0622  3.6% IEA 
Fuel 0.0651  3.3% IEA 
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Parameters 2006 Annual change Sources 
Electricity 0.091  3.1% IEA 
Interest rate of bank 
loan for renovation 
works  
6.12% Constant over the period INSEE 
Inflation rate 2% 2% OECD 
Average cost of 
renovations (in euros 
by square meter) 
   
double glazing  27.6 2% ADEME 
wall insulation 15.31 2% ADEME 
roof insulation 
changing heating system 
10.72 
35.88 
2% 
2% 
ADEME 
ADEME 
renewable energy 106.42 2% ADEME 
Average disposable 
income (in euros) 
   
Quintile 1 7274 2% INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
Quintile 2 14550 2% INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
Quintile 3 21921 2% 
 
INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
Quintile 4 31412 2% INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
Quintile 5 56260 2% INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
Homeowner share 47.8% Constant over the period INSEE, l'enquête logement 
2006 
 
 
Table 2.8. Scenoarios used to test public policies 
Comparison of current policies 
N° Scenario Description Sources 
1 Reference 
Scenario 
-Value added tax of 5.5% to all types of renovations (instead of 
19.6%) 
-Zero rate bank loan 
-Subsidy for homeowner: 35% of renovation expense. 
-Income tax deduction: 15% for double glazing, 25% for roof and 
wall insulation, 25% for modernization of heating system and 
40% for adoption of renewable energy 
Current public 
policies in France 
2 Income tax 
deduction 
Only income tax deduction is introduced. Rates are the 
followings:  15% for double glazing, 25% for roof and wall 
insulation, 25% for modernization of heating system and 40% for 
adoption of renewable energy 
3 Subsidy  Only subsidy for homeowner is introduced. 35% of renovation 
expense. 
4 Zero rate bank 
loan 
Only zero rate bank loans is introduced.  
5 Value added 
tax 
Only value added tax is introduced: 5.5% instead of 19.6% 
Public policy measures to achieve the Grenelle I goals 
6 Income tax 
deduction 
Tests of several rates from 2010 Ministry have 
planed to change 
rates. 
7 Bonuses Bonuses on low income. Different amounts of bonuses are tested.  Local level  
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Table 2.9. Public cost of the different policy measures 
  Policy measures  Public cost of policies per ton of 
CO ! saved to reach 13.75 million 
tons (in euro 2006) 
 Public cost of policies per ton of 
CO 2  saved to reach                  
50 kWh ��/m
2
/year (in euro 2006) 
Income tax deduction    258 *     258 
Bonus for all renovations    255   257 
Bonus for low income    441   435 
Bonus to encourage 
renewable energies  
 
1,236 
 
Impossible 
Measures  Public Benefit of policy per ton of 
CO ! saved to reach 13.75 million 
tons 
 Public Benefit of policy per ton 
of CO ! saved to reach                 
50 kWh ��/m
2
/year 
  Carbon tax    176   360 
Note: 
 *
 The public cost per ton of CO ! saved to reach 13.75 million tons with the income tax deduction is 258 
euros (euro 2006) 
 
 
2.7.4. Sensitivity analysis 
Table 2.10. Results of sensitivity anaylisis 
   Low scenario   Ref. Scenario   High Scenario  
 Inflation rate    1%    2%    3%  
  Energy consumption*   91.76 ***   91.67    89.63  
 GHG emissions**   35.5    35.01    34.1  
 Interest rate of bank loan    5.12%    6.12%    7.12%  
 for renovation works        
  Energy consumption    88.43    91.67    94.67  
 GHG emissions    33.2    35.01    36.8  
 Discounting rate     1.98%    2.98%    3.98%  
  Energy consumption    86.54    91.67    95.16  
 GHG emissions    32.9    35.01    36.7  
 Anticipated increase in domestic        
 prices from 2010 by year        
 Gas    2.6%    3.6%    4.6%  
  Energy consumption    102.07    91.67    74.91  
 GHG emissions    40.8    35.01    26.02  
 Fuel    2.3%    3.3%    4.3%  
  Energy consumption    94.85   91.67   82.78  
 GHG emissions    36.8    35.01    30.3  
 Electricity    2.1%    3.1%    4.1%  
  Energy consumption    95.08    91.67    88.41  
 GHG emissions    36.2    35.01    33.8  
 All energies    - 1 pp      +1 pp  
  Energy consumption    109.9    91.67    64.33  
 GHG emissions    43.9    35.01    20.6  
Bulbs light repartition 
 
Energy consumption  
GHG emissions 
constant over the 
period 
92.73 
35.09 
 
 
91.67 
35.01 
only economy saving light 
bulbs from 2020 
91.37 
34.99 
Equipment utilization of 
appliances 
 Energy consumption  
GHG emissions 
 
 
constant over the 
period 
91.67 
35.01 
100% (all household have 
all appliances) from 2020 
97.05 
35.49 
 Homeowner share    -10 pp      +10 pp  
  Energy consumption    92.67    91.67    90.66  
 GHG emissions    35.5    35.01    34.5 
Notes: * in kWhep/m
2
/year, ** in tons of C02, ***in the case where inflation rate is equal to 1%, the average 
energy consumption is 91.76 kWhpe/m
2
/year 
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Chapter 3.   
Environmental fiscal incentives: Effectiveness or free-
riding effect? An econometric evaluation of the French 
energy tax credit 
 
 
Summary 
 
In several countries, fiscal incentives have been introduced to encourage households to 
undertake energy-efficient renovations or adopt renewable energies. Our objective is to study 
the sensitivity of households to fiscal measures and to determine if a tax credit is effective or 
if free riding undermines its effect. We examine the impacts on renovation rate and on 
renovation expenditures using matching methods. We use French household-level databases, 
which regroup information on energy-efficient renovations. A tax credit has little effect on the 
decision to renovate. Building professionals (i.e., those qualified and approved to do 
renovations) capture a part of the earnings from the tax credit, and this tends to diminish the 
impact of the measure. Moreover, the presence of free riding reduces the actual effect of the 
tax credit. 
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3.1. Introduction 
 
Energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions are key concerns. However, household 
energy use continues to increase in most developed countries—in the European Union, for 
example, by an average of 0.6% per year since 1990 (source Odyssee, 2013). The growth of 
the population, which has led to an increase in the number and the size of homes and an 
increase in electronic equipment, tends to raise energy needs. To reverse this trend, several 
measures (e.g., tax credits, subsidies, thermal regulations, zero-rate bank loans) have been 
introduced in many developed countries to encourage households to undertake energy-
efficient renovations in their homes. Our objective is to evaluate the effectiveness of such a 
fiscal incentive, and more precisely, the impact of a French tax credit on households’ 
behavior.  
It is crucial for households to renovate their housing to significantly decrease residential 
energy consumption. In the 2011 Energy Efficiency Plan, the European Commission states 
that the greatest energy-saving potential lies in buildings due to the improvements in 
efficiency of insulation or appliances. Energy use is largely determined by buildings’ 
characteristics, whereas occupants’ characteristics and behavior have more negligible effects 
on energy consumption (Santin et al., 2009). However, households do not invest in energy-
saving measures even if it is profitable in the long run. Many authors (Brown, 2001; Jaffe and 
Stavins, 1994; Sanstad et al., 1995; Van Soest and Bulte, 2001) refer to this phenomenon as 
the “energy paradox.” They explain this paradox essentially as a market imperfection (i.e., 
uncertainty about energy prices or energy savings following a renovation and the 
irreversibility of the investment).  
A tax credit has been implemented in France to offset such market imperfections. Since 2005, 
the credit has aimed to encourage households (owners or tenants) to undertake energy-
efficient renovations (e.g., insulation, changes in heating equipment) and to adopt renewable 
energy systems in their main housing. A condition to benefit from the tax credit is that a 
qualified building professional must be hired to perform the renovation work.
17
 This measure 
is very popular. From 2005 to 2008, 4.2 million French households received the tax credit 
(Clerc and Mauroux, 2010); this represents a significant cost for the government: the public 
cost reached €7.8 billion during this period and €4.2 billion during 2009–2010. Given these 
                                                
17 
The tax credit allows part of the renovation expenses to be deducted from income taxes. A deduction rate of up to 50% of 
the equipment costs depends on the kind of renovation carried out (e.g., change in heating system, improvement of the 
insulation) and the equipment chosen (e.g., adoption of renewable energy). The maximum amount of expenses deducted 
depends on the number of people in the household (the maximum deductible expense is €8,000 for a household with one 
person and €16,000 for a couple).  
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significant expenses, it is important to assess the effectiveness of this credit to provide further 
guidance for policy makers. However, few studies have examined the impact of French 
environmental public policies. 
Some simulation models evaluate the impact of environmental policies at an aggregate level 
(Charlier and Risch, 2012; Giraudet et al., 2011; MEDDTL et al., 2011). They conclude that a 
tax credit helps decrease energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. However, they 
point out that French environmental measures are not sufficient to reach government 
objectives, which are to cut energy consumption in the building sector by 38% by 2020 
relative to 2008. Our objective here is to study in detail the sensitivity of households relative 
to this measure. At the household level, Mauroux (2012) uses fiscal data and a matching 
method to study the 2006 tax credit increase for some energy-saving renovations. However, 
this increase pertains to only a limited segment of households, namely, owners living for less 
than 3 years in housing built before 1977. This change seems effective, as 1 in 15 households 
that received the tax credit would not have renovated if the rate had stayed the same. Studies 
focusing on the French tax credit do not pay much attention to the free-riding effect. Free 
riders are households that would have made energy-efficiency investments even in the 
absence of public policy. In this paper, we focus on the introduction of the tax credit, and we 
try to determine if a tax credit is effective or if free riding reduces its effect. 
Several articles have studied the impact of similar tax credits, and their results diverge 
regarding the effectiveness of such a policy. On the one hand, some studies show that a tax 
credit is efficient. Hasset and Metcalf (1995) measure the impact of both the U.S. federal and 
state tax policies on the probability of making conservation-related investments. Using a 
discrete choice model on panel data, they show that conservation incentive programs have a 
statistically significant effect on investment, after controlling for individual fixed effects. 
Subsidies have been introduced in Switzerland in the form of tax credits or deductions, and 
similar results are observed: the likelihood that homeowners undertake energy-efficient 
renovations increases with the size of the subsidy (Alberini et al., 2011). On the other hand, 
some studies obtain more mixed results. For example, the 2011 U.S. federal tax credit for 
home energy-efficiency renovations has encouraged only 2%–12% of homeowners in Florida 
to adopt energy-efficient equipment (Zhao et al., 2012). Alberini et al. (2013a) compare 
homeowners’ behaviors before and after the 2007 implementation of a tax credit in Italy. 
They conclude that the tax credit had a significant and positive impact on the replacement of 
windows but no significant effect on the replacement of heating systems. They explain this 
finding by free riding. 
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As in the preceding example, some studies have called attention to the existence of the free-
riding effect and stress that it can undermine the effectiveness of programs that subsidize the 
cost of renovation. Using a Tobit model on 1979 data, Dubin and Henson (1988) find no 
evidence that a U.S. tax credit incentivized conservation expenditures. They point out that this 
measure provided windfall gains to households that would have insulated their home anyway 
(i.e., free riding). Similarly, Pon and Alberini (2012) focus on the American Reinvestment 
and Recovery Act of 2009, which offers tax credits for the installation of energy-efficient 
investments. They find no evidence of the impact of this policy on the adoption of energy-
efficient equipment or on the number of renovations. Their results suggest that this measure is 
not significant in convincing homeowners to replace their older, less efficient equipment with 
energy-efficient equipment, but it is more effective in encouraging homeowners who are 
already planning to replace an appliance to select the more energy-efficient product.  
Recent literature has attempted to assess the extent of the free-riding effect. Estimates range 
from 50% to 92%. Grösche and Vance (2009) use a cross-section of data from the 2005 
German Residential Energy Consumption Survey and show that free riding occurs in 50% of 
the cases (they define free riding as a situation in which a household’s willingness to pay for 
renovations exceeds its cost). Grösche et al. (2009) use revealed preference data on home 
renovations from Germany’s residential sector to simulate the effect of grants on renovation 
choices. They conclude that 92% of the program expenses would be awarded to free riders if 
every eligible household behaved rationally and applied for the grant. Malm (1996) further 
confirms the high extent of free riding. He investigates the impact of subsidies on the 
purchase of high-efficiency heating systems and estimates free riding at 89%. Free riding can 
go beyond the decision to invest. Alberini et al. (2013b) examine household energy 
consumption in four counties in Maryland and focus on the replacement of existing 
equipment with a newer and more energy-efficient equipment. Using a difference-in-
differences approach, they show that the larger the rebate, the less the electricity reduction.  
In contrast, some papers explain that free riding can be diminished by spillover effects (Eto et 
al., 1995; Rosenow and Galvin, 2013), which lead to additional products being installed, as 
result of the program but not through the program. Few studies focus on this point, but a 
recent evaluation shows that spillover effects can be substantial (NYSERDA, 2012). 
Nevertheless, literature suggests that special attention should be given to fiscal incentives that 
encourage energy-saving investments in the residential sector and that it is important to assess 
the impact of such measures. The effectiveness of such a policy remains questionable. 
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Thus, we study the effect of the tax credit on households’ behavior. To appraise the 
effectiveness of the measure, we first estimate the impact of the introduction of the tax credit 
on the renovation rate (i.e., extensive effect). Our objective is to determine if households are 
sensitive to this measure or if the tax credit provides funding for households that would have 
undertaken a renovation anyway. Second, we assess the extent to which the tax credit 
increases renovation expenditures (i.e., the intensive effect). Our objective is to investigate 
whether the tax credit incentivizes households to invest in more expensive and more energy-
efficient renovations. To do this, we use a methodology rarely put into practice in 
environmental economics. 
As is true of any policy evaluations, we cannot observe what the renovation rate or 
expenditures would have been if the tax credit had not been introduced (Rubin, 1974). To 
overcome this problem and obtain an unbiased evaluation, we use a matching method 
(Heckman, Ichimura and Todd, 1997, 1998; Rubin, 1977). This methodology helps examine 
evaluation issues in labor economics (see, e.g., Blundell and Costa Dias, 2008; Brodaty et al., 
2002; Caliendo et al., 2005; Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009; Sabatier, 2012) but has only 
recently been applied to environmental economics. To conduct this study, we use French data 
from ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie surveys from 2001 and 2008. This source 
provides information on energy-saving renovations and on household and housing 
characteristics. 
We find that, in general, the tax credit has a low impact on the decision to renovate. Two 
factors tend to diminish the impact of the credit and explain this result. First, through price 
increases, building professionals capture part of the earnings from the tax credit. Second, the 
results suggest the presence of free riding. 
We organize the remainder of this paper as follows: in section 2, we present the data; in 
section 3, we discuss the method; in section 4, we present the results; and in section 5, we 
provide a sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
3.2. Data  
 
We use ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie surveys from 2001 and 2008. In these 
databases, information is available about whether renovations took place and the type of 
renovations undertaken (e.g., improvement of insulation, modification of heating system, 
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adoption of renewable energy). In addition, we find information on households’ 
characteristics (e.g., income, occupational status, household size, age of reference person, 
occupancy status) and housing characteristics (type of dwelling [i.e., house or apartment], 
surface area, year of construction, type of heating system) as well as geographic area (climatic 
area, size of the urban area) and energy bills. A zero-interest bank loan was introduced in 
2009. Therefore, we do not take into account databases after 2008, because we may capture 
the effect of the two policies and want to isolate the impact of the tax credit. Therefore, we 
observe energy-saving renovations four years before and four years after the introduction of 
the tax credit in 2005. 
 
Each year, approximately 7,000 households are surveyed about whether they undertook 
energy-saving renovations. We do not observe the same households over the whole period. 
Because we pooled databases, we cannot take into account the temporal characteristics of the 
data or any change in the policy. In section 5, we pay particular attention to the way this 
approach affects the results. 
After accounting for missing observations, our final sample comprises 41,057 households. 
Overall, this sample remains representative of French households and of the French housing 
(table 3.1). In our sample, 53.5% of households are observed after 2005 (i.e., when the tax 
credit was introduced). 
 
Table 3.1. Household characteristics 
 
 Sample 1: 
Household 
characteristics 
Sample 2: Households 
that make renovations 
Households 
that intend to 
request the tax 
credit 
Before 
2005 
2005 and 
after 
Before 
2005 
2005 and 
after 
Owners 71.7% 71.9% 96.0% 97.6% 98.3% 
Income  
          group 1 (the poorest) 4.6% 4.1% 
 
1.5% 
 
1.5% 
 
0.9% 
          group 2 16.0% 14.0% 12.4% 8.4% 7.3% 
          group 3 13.4% 10.0% 12.7% 7.7% 7.5% 
          group 4 18.4% 14.4% 17.6% 13.6% 14.0% 
          group 5 31.1% 34.1% 35.9% 39.7% 40.4% 
          group 6  (the wealthiest) 16.6% 23.4% 20.0% 29.0% 29.9% 
Age 
: less than 35 years 
14.9% 14.0% 10.2% 9.9% 9.3% 
1 person in the household 23.3% 25.9% 17.7% 18.7% 18.0% 
2 or 3 people in the houehold 54.7% 53.0% 63.0% 61.3% 60.5% 
4 people or more in the household 22.0% 21.1% 19.4% 20.1% 21.5% 
Number of years spent in the housing 15.08 15.75 17.76 17.75 17.62 
Environmental sensitivity      
          energy-saaving bulbs 50.1% 68.2% 55.4% 73.6% 76.2% 
          Espaces info energie 13.0% 18.5% 17.1% 24.9% 26.2% 
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 Sample 1: 
Household 
characteristics 
Sample 2: Households 
that make renovations 
Households 
that intend to 
request the tax 
credit 
Before 
2005 
2005 and 
after 
Before 
2005 
2005 and 
after 
Houses 66.6% 67.1% 82.2% 83.6% 84.8% 
Years of construction  
          before 1948 25.0% 24.9% 
 
29.2% 
 
29.6% 
 
28.2% 
          1949–1974 31.1% 29.2% 39.6% 34.9% 36.1% 
          1975–1988 27.7% 26.0% 27.6% 28.7% 29.0% 
          after 1989 16.3% 20.0% 3.6% 6.8% 6.7% 
Annual energy expenditure (m
2
) 11.53 13.10 11.74 13.14 13.23 
Number of observations 
19,089  
(46.5%) 
21,968 
(53.5%) 
961 
(42.1%) 
1,319 
(57.9%) 
1,013 
(76.8% of 
eligible 
households  
Source: ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie surveys–Final sample. 
Note: In sample 2, we account only for renovations eligible for the tax credit (eligible equipment, renovation 
performed by a professional). 
 
 
We consider only five types of energy-saving renovations eligible for the tax credit: opaque 
surface insulation, glazed surface insulation, installation or replacement of the boiler, 
adoption of renewable energy, and installation of a heating regulation or programming 
system. Taking into account only these renovations, we observe a renovation rate slightly 
higher in the four years following the introduction of the tax credit (9.12% vs. 8.17%). To 
benefit from the credit, households must hire a professional to do the renovation work. Thus, 
we study renovation expenditures, considering only those renovations performed by a 
qualified professional, including the cost of labor and the cost of equipment. The difference in 
renovation expenditures, including only households that renovate, is more significant, 
reaching an average of €5,054.2 after the introduction of the tax credit versus €3,913.3 before. 
Moreover, the renovation rate decreases in 2004 and then continually increases after 2005, 
except for a small decline in 2006 (see figure 3.1). We observe a similar evolution for 
renovation expenditures: The average amount spent for housing renovations decreased in 
2004 and then has continually increased since the introduction of the tax credit.  
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Figure 3.1. The influence of public policies on renovations  
 
 
Source: ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie surveys – Final sample. 
 
Considering only renovation work performed by a household itself, the renovation rate is low 
and constant during the period, averaging 2.2% each year (table 3.2). We do not observe a 
substitution effect from renovation performed by households to renovation performed by a 
professional. If this were the case, the impact of the tax credit would have been lower. 
Moreover, we do not observe a significant difference in average expenditures in renovation 
performed by the household itself before or after the introduction of the tax credit. The tax 
credit does not seem to have any effect on noneligible renovations. Therefore, there seems to 
be no spillover effect. 
 
Table 3.2. Comparison renovations performed by a professional or by the household itself 
 
Before introduction of 
the tax credit 
After introduction 
of the tax credit T-test 
Renovation rate     
   Performed by building professional 6.02% 6.92% *** 
   Performed by households itself 2.15% 2.21% n.s. 
Renovation expenditures (including only 
households that renovate)    
   Performed by building professional 3,750.63 € 4,906.71 € *** 
   Performed by households itself 1,030.45 € 963.10 € n.s. 
Source: ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie surveys–Final sample. 
Note:  ***difference significant at 1%; n.s.: not significant. 
    We account only for equipments eligible to the tax credit. 
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At first glance, these observations suggest that the tax credit has a positive impact on 
renovation rate and on the amount spent by a household for a renovation. However, the 
effectiveness of fiscal measures may be mitigated by free riding. The survey provides 
information on the effect of the tax credit on households’ behavior. Among households that 
received or intended to receive the tax credit, only 11% on average each year performed a 
renovation that they had not considered before the introduction of the measure (figure 3.2). In 
contrast, 55% of these households declared that the tax credit had no effect on their behavior. 
Thus, more than half of the households receiving the tax credit would have performed the 
renovation without this financial subsidy. Free riding seems to play a significant role and fall 
within the range of the estimates from Grösche and Vance (2009), but it is below the 
estimates from Malm (1996) and Grösche et al. (2009). 
 
Figure 3.2. Impact of tax credit on households’ behavior 
 
Source: ADEME-SOFRES Maîtrise de l’Energie surveys–Final sample. 
 
Households that renovate are mainly owners who live in their house, and they belong to the 
wealthiest income group (table 3.1). This trend is more pronounced after the introduction of 
the tax credit and even more pronounced among households that intend to request the tax 
credit. Of households that renovated before 2005, 56% belong to the two wealthiest income 
groups, compared with 69% after 2005. After 2005, the renovated units are slightly more 
recent: 35.5% are built after 1975 versus 31.2% before the introduction of the tax credit. One 
particularity of the tax credit is that all households can potentially benefit from this measure. 
However, only 76.8% of households intended to request the tax credit.  
In the following section, we take our analysis a step further and assess the effectiveness of the 
tax credit, ceteris paribus. Our objective is to study the impact of the tax credit on the rate and 
expenditures of energy-saving renovations. We explore two questions: Does the tax credit 
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encourage households to renovate? Does this measure provide an incentive for households to 
spend more money on energy-efficient renovations? 
 
 
3.3. Methodology 
 
3.3.1. An evaluation problem 
The tax credit was introduced in 2005 (T = 1) to encourage households to undertake energy-
saving renovations. As we noted previously, the likelihood of renovation and of requesting 
the tax credit were correlated with household characteristics x (e.g., income, occupancy 
status). Consequently, the impact of the tax credit is the difference between the renovation 
rate (or renovation expenditures) with the policy (�!) and the renovation rate (or renovation 
expenditures) that would have been observed without the policy (�!) (Rubin, 1974). Thus, we 
can express the impact of the tax credit as follows: 
∆ � = �[�! / � = 1,� = �]− �[�! / � = 1,� = �]. 
 
As such, the impact is unobservable because it is impossible to simultaneously observe both 
situations, and it is specific to each individual. We must therefore estimate what would have 
happened without the tax credit—that is, the counterfactual renovation rate (or expenditures) 
given by �[�! / � = 1,� = �]. We use a matching method to estimate the counterfactual 
situation, which involves matching each household that can benefit from the tax credit (the 
treated group) with a household that cannot benefit from it (the control group), with the same 
observable characteristics x being equal. One particularity of the tax credit is that all 
households have been eligible for the measure since 2005. As we mentioned previously, the 
stipulation of the French tax credit is that for a household to benefit from it, an energy-saving 
renovation must be made by a qualified building professional. This characteristic makes the 
tax credit a bit different from other public policies, such as employment policies, which 
usually target a particular segment of the population. Consequently, in our case, all 
households observed between 2005 and 2008 form the treated group, and we cannot identify a 
control group for this period. However, we need information on households that undertake 
energy-saving renovations and are ineligible for the tax credit. By definition, households 
observed between 2001 and 2004 are ineligible for the credit, and thus we consider them the 
control group. To derive a control group in a different time period from the treated group 
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could lead to a problem if the tax credit has an impact on unobservable variables. The 
matching method must respect the conditional independence assumption (CIA), which means 
that households in control and treated groups must be similar not only in terms of observable 
characteristics but also in terms of unobservable characteristics. This assumption can hold, 
because our database contains a rich set of variables used to explain renovations, including 
sociodemographic variables, information on housing, information on energy used, and energy 
bills. However, in our case, it is important to pay attention to this assumption, especially 
because we pooled databases from 2001 to 2008. We thus cannot take into account the 
temporal characteristics of the data or any changes occurring during this period, for example, 
relative to the policy or macroeconomic index (as interest rate). We test the sensitivity of the 
results relative to this assumption in section 5. 
 
The method consists of matching similar households from treated and control groups. A 
common way of matching households is propensity score matching (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 
1983). This matching is based on a single propensity score reflecting the probability of being 
eligible for the tax credit (or the probability of belonging to the treated group), conditional on 
the observed characteristics x (Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1998; Rubin, 1977). We 
estimate the probability of being eligible for the tax credit using a logit model. We introduce 
in the model variables that may explain the probability of being eligible and also the 
renovation decision.  
First, we take into account households’ sociodemographic characteristics, such as income, 
age, occupancy status, number of people in the household, years spent in the housing, and a 
proxy for environmental sensitivity. Change in income is a determinant of home improvement 
decisions (Cameron, 1985; Potepan, 1989), and considering this variable enables us to control 
for the potential change of purchasing power during the period. Regarding expenditures, 
Mendelsohn (1977) shows that people who have higher incomes spend more on renovation. 
Studies show that occupancy status also plays a role in the decision to renovate and stress that 
owners have a higher probability of undertaking a renovation (Diaz-Rainey and Ashton, 
2009). We add the number of people in the household to control for the tax credit ceiling. The 
more people in the household, the higher the maximum amount of expenses that can be 
deducted.
18
 In addition, Diaz-Rainey and Ashton (2009) show that the longer individuals live 
in a property, the greater the likelihood of adoption of energy-efficient measures. Moreover, 
                                                
18
As a reminder, the maximum amount of expenses deducted depends on the number of people in the household (the 
maximum of the expenses deducted is €8,000 for a household with one person and €16,000 for a couple). 
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Bogdon (1996) shows that household characteristics are important determinants of the 
homeowner’s decision to hire someone else to do the work. We use a proxy for environmental 
sensitivity, assuming that households that have energy-saving bulbs (compared with standard 
bulbs) and know about the Espaces Info-Energie are more sensitive to environmental issues. 
The Espaces Info-Energie aggregates 250 places where households can find all the 
information they need about energy consumption, renewable energies, and energy-saving 
renovations. It was initiated in 2001 to alert and inform households.  
Second, we introduce variables on housing characteristics, such as year of construction, type 
of housing (house or apartment), and surface. These variables are likely determinants of 
renovation decisions (e.g., Nair, Gustavsson, and Mahapatra, 2010). We consider the year of 
construction a proxy for insulation quality, which can have an impact on the decision to 
renovate. Moreover, Montgomery (1992) shows that the age of the building has a positive 
impact on renovation expenditures. 
Third, we take into account information on energy and type of heating system. In France, 
some dwellings use a collective heating system. Households that use collective heating 
consume more energy, which might encourage them to undertake a renovation. However, 
changing the heating system becomes more difficult if heating is collective, because the 
decision must be made by all the co-owners. We also consider energy bills and a dummy 
equal to 1 if the heating energy price increases more than 4% in the year. We arbitrarily chose 
this number, which is approximately two times higher than the annual average inflation 
(approximately 1.8% on average over the period) and slightly higher than the average annual 
growth rate of the energy price index (approximately 3.5% on average over the period). The 
energy price information comes from the French National Institute of Statistics and Economic 
Studies (INSEE). It seems important to take these variables into account because of the 
increase of energy prices in recent years. A period of rising prices might encourage 
households to decrease energy consumption with energy-efficiency renovation, because 
households are sensitive to energy prices (Cameron, 1985). Moreover, households that 
believe energy cost is high are more likely to renovate (Nair, Gustavsson and Mahapatra, 
2010).  
Fourth, we introduce variables on geographic area, such as climatic area, and a dummy equal 
to 1 if the households live in a rural area. This enables us to control for regional differences.  
 
Once households are matched on the basis of their propensity score, we used what we 
observed for matched households to estimate the counterfactual situation and then the effect 
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of the tax credit. For binary variables such as renovation rate, Aakvik (2001) suggests first 
using Mantel and Haenszel’s (1959) test to draw conclusions about the significance of the 
results. This enables us to test the null hypothesis of no tax credit effect. It is a nonparametric 
test, which compares the number of people in the treated group who perform a renovation 
with the same expected number given that the tax credit effect is zero. If the effect is 
significant, the magnitude of the effect of the tax credit can be estimated as the difference 
between the proportions of households that undertake a renovation in the treated and control 
groups belonging to the matched sample (Brodaty et al., 2001). For continuous variables such 
as renovation expenditures, the effect of the tax credit can be estimated as the difference 
between the mean expenditures for the treated group and the mean expenditures for the 
control group in the matched sample (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). This differential can be 
estimated using different matching estimators (e.g., nearest-neighbor estimator, stratification 
matching, kernel matching). We use kernel matching to estimate the impact of the measure on 
renovation rates. This estimator, proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1998), is a 
nonparametric estimator in which weighted averages of all ineligible households are used to 
construct each participant’s counterfactual. Smith and Todd (2005), Heckman, Ichimura, 
Smith, and Todd (1998), and Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997, 1998) argue for the 
advantages of kernel matching. It offers the most robust estimates in large samples (Heckman, 
Ichimura, and Todd 1997, 1998). 
 
3.3.2. Estimation strategy 
3.3.2.1. Renovation rate 
To estimate the impact of the tax credit on the renovation rate (figure 3.3), we consider the 
entire sample and observe the energy-saving renovations, taking into account only opaque 
surface insulation, glazed surface insulation, installation/replacement of the boiler, adoption 
of renewable energy, and installation of a heating regulation or programming system. As we 
have noted, to benefit from the tax credit, households must hire a qualified professional to 
perform these renovations. The share of renovations performed by households themselves is 
low and constant during the period. Consequently, we chose to observe the impact of the tax 
credit on total renovation rate. 
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Figure 3.3. Impact of the tax credit on renovation rate—matching method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3.2.2. Renovation expenditures 
To estimate the impact of the tax credit on renovation expenditures (figure 3.4), we consider 
only renovations performed by qualified professionals, including the costs of labor and of 
equipment.
19
  
 
Figure 3.4. Impact of the tax credit on renovation expenditures—matching method 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We estimate the impact of the tax credit on current prices (i.e., amounts declared by 
households in the survey).
20
 Prior literature assumes that only households capture earnings 
related to the tax credit. We can identify whether households share the earnings with building 
                                                
19
 We do not estimate the impact on the different types of renovation separately because of the small number of observations 
in the control group.  
20
We consider only the positive expenditures. In this second analysis, we do not include households that do not renovate.  
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professionals by taking into account the evolution of renovation costs. We use the annual 
price index for housing maintenance and improvements to deflate renovation expenditures 
and convert them into 2001 prices. This price index comes from INSEE. In figure 3.5, we 
observe that the prices of renovation increase more than inflation over the whole period. Thus, 
it is possible that building professionals take advantage of the tax credit to increase their 
margins. Studying the impact of the tax credit on expenditures at constant prices enables us 
first to identify a potential margin generated by the professional as a result of the tax credit 
and then determine whether households perform more important renovations after the 
introduction of the credit. We present the results of this analysis in the following section. 
 
Figure 3.5. Evolution of prices for maintenance and improvement compared with the general inflation rate  
 
Source: INSEE. 
 
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. Propensity score 
We estimate the propensity score—that is, the probability of being eligible for the tax credit. 
We use (1) the full sample to estimate the impact of the tax credit on the renovation rate and 
(2) a subsample including only households that hired qualified professionals to renovate to 
estimate the impact of the measure on renovation expenditures (table 3.3). 
In terms of results, several control variables have an impact on the probability of being 
eligible for the tax credit. Using energy-saving bulbs and being aware of the Espaces Info-
Energie have significant and positive effects. This suggests that the environmental sensitivity 
of households has a positive impact on the probability of being eligible for the credit. As we 
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expected given the energy price evolution over the period, the higher the energy expenditures 
per square meter, the higher the probability of being eligible for the tax credit.  
Household composition has a significant impact as well: Having fewer than four people in the 
household increases the probability of eligibility. This is not surprising, given that INSEE has 
observed an increase in single-parent families or people living alone. Focusing only on the 
full sample, we note that a young age of the housing, a high housing surface area, and living 
in an apartment are indicative of being eligible for the tax credit. In addition, being a 
homeowner decreases the probability of being eligible in the full sample but increases the 
probability of being eligible in the subsample. This suggests that fewer households are 
homeowners. However, there are more owners who have renovated after 2005 than before. A 
tenant has less incentive to make an energy-efficiency investment because the return on the 
investment is lower than for an owner. The length of occupancy tends to be lower than that of 
an owner, and a tenant does not realize any property value increase due to renovation. In 
France, part of the population qualifies as “tenant for life,” and the tax credit seems 
insufficient to encourage them to renovate. 
Moreover, in the subsample only, income, living in a house, and the year of construction of 
the building have no impact on the probability of being eligible. That is, the introduction of 
the tax credit does not encourage low-income people or households living in apartments to 
renovate more. Apartments are often in collective-heating buildings, and some renovations 
cannot be decided at the household level but must be made by the community. Thus, to agree 
on and then undertake renovation is more difficult. In addition, the credit does not lead to an 
increase in renovations for older buildings. Using the age of the building as a proxy for 
insulation quality, we find that renovations in less energy-efficient housing have not increased 
following the introduction of the tax credit. Older houses are often occupied by households in 
an energy poverty situation—that is, lower-income households that cannot undertake major 
energy-saving renovations. Given these results, the tax credit seems to fail to encourage 
households that are not prone to renovate, and this suggests the presence of free riding.  
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Table 3.3. Probability of being eligible for the tax credit 
 Full sample 
Households that 
renovate (performed by 
a professional only) 
  Coeff SE   Coeff. SE  
Households characteristics         
owners -0.1855 0.0283 *** 0.4853 0.2654 * 
age of reference person less than 35 years -0.0325 0.0332  0.0890 0.1670  
1 person in the household (ref. 4 persons or more) 0.6215 0.0744 *** 0.8058 0.3771 ** 
2 persons in the household (ref. 4 persons or more) 0.1142 0.0683 * 0.6096 0.3103 ** 
3 persons in the household (ref. 4 persons or more) 0.1878 0.0858 ** 0.5505 0.3661  
income group 1 (the poorest) (ref. the group 6: the wealthiest) -0.1404 0.1118  0.3146 0.7903  
             group 2 -0.4057 0.0858 *** 0.3790 0.4223  
             group 3 -0.5152 0.0902 *** 0.0285 0.4105  
             group 4 -0.5339 0.0843 *** -0.5950 0.3800  
             group 5 -0.2588 0.0730 *** -0.0144 0.3085  
energy sensitivity:  energy-saving bulbs 0.7706 0.0215 *** 0.8093 0.0972 *** 
                                Espace info-energie 0.3270 0.0293 *** 0.3407 0.1149 *** 
nb years spent in the housing 0.0098 0.0010 *** 0.0070 0.0039 * 
Building characteristics         
houses (=1 if the dwelling is a house) -0.1466 0.0324 *** -0.0181 0.1644  
surface area in m
2
 0.0014 0.0003 *** 0.0018 0.0011  
year of construction (ref. after 1989) : before 1948 -0.1751 0.0811 ** -0.1473 0.6433  
                                                             1949–1974  -0.4013 0.0835 *** -0.8590 0.6500  
                                                             1975–1988 -0.1846 0.0815 ** -0.2096 0.6501  
collective heating system with fuel oil -0.0082 0.1186  1.2167 0.6396 * 
collective heating system with gas 0.5301 0.0887 *** 1.7982 0.4904 *** 
individual heating system with electricity 0.8507 0.0644 *** 1.6021 0.3016 *** 
individual heating system with gas 0.1914 0.0656 *** 0.7405 0.2743 *** 
individual heating with fuel and other ref     ref    
Energy prices information         
annual energy exenditure by m
2
 0.0866 0.0095 *** 0.1487 0.0652 ** 
energy price variation (=1 if heating energy price increase 
more than 4% during the year observed)  0.6525 0.0250 *** 0.5198 0.1029 *** 
income group 1 * annual energy expenditure -0.0346 0.0076 *** -0.0619 0.0622  
income group 2 * annual energy expenditure -0.0184 0.0063 *** -0.1025 0.0312 *** 
income group 3 * annual energy expenditure -0.0187 0.0066 *** -0.0800 0.0292 *** 
income group 4 * annual energy expenditure -0.0094 0.0064  -0.0048 0.0293  
income group 5 * annual energy expenditure -0.0027 0.0056  -0.0224 0.0237  
1 pers in the HH * annual energy expenditure -0.0131 0.0054 ** -0.0203 0.0281  
2 pers in the HH * annual energy expenditure -0.0058 0.0051  -0.0424 0.0235 * 
3 pers in the HH * annual energy expenditure -0.0071 0.0065  -0.0510 0.0273 * 
construction before 1948 * annual energy expenditure -0.0153 0.0065 ** -0.0456 0.0583  
construction 1949–1974 * annual energy expenditure -0.0025 0.0067  -0.0054 0.0587  
construction 1975–1988* annual energy expenditure -0.0145 0.0068 ** -0.0412 0.0589  
collective heating with fuel * annual energy expenditure  -0.0154 0.0077 ** -0.0682 0.0424  
collective heating with gas * annual energy expenditure -0.0379 0.0061 *** -0.1118 0.0325 *** 
individual heating with electricity *annual energy expenditure -0.0371 0.0047 *** -0.0988 0.0220 *** 
individual heating with gas * annual energy expenditure -0.0078 0.0047 * -0.0416 0.0200 ** 
Geographic area         
climatic area 1 (the coldest, in northeast) -0.0834 0.0743  -0.3942 0.3505  
climatic area 2 -0.2112 0.0818 ** -0.5233 0.3807  
climatic area 3 (the warmest, in south) ref   ref   
annual energy expenditure * climatic area 1 0.0021 0.0058  0.0453 0.0285  
annual energy expenditure * climatic area 2 0.0204 0.0066 *** 0.0677 0.0312 ** 
rural area 0.2768 0.0285 *** -0.3157 0.1086 *** 
constante -1.3565 0.1298 *** -2.3872 0.8140 *** 
Log-likelihood  -26,265.122        -1,402.970 
Number of observations 41,057 2,280 
Correct prediction rate 63.33% 65.09% 
Note: ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%. 
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These estimations enable us to calculate the propensity scores, which we use to match 
households from the treated and control groups. The idea of the method is to match an eligible 
household with an equivalent ineligible household. The balancing assumption between 
characteristics of treated and control groups is valid for the full sample and the subsample. 
Figures 3.8 and 3.9 in the appendix show the deviation of household characteristics of the 
control group from those of the treated group, before and after matching. The deviation is 
largely reduced after matching. Moreover, to verify that the household characteristics of the 
treated and control groups are similar after matching, we use two indicators: the standardized 
percentage bias and overall explanatory power of the propensity score estimations (table 3.4). 
The standardized percentage bias is the percentage difference of the sample means in the 
treated and control groups as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample 
variances in both groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). The overall bias decreases 
significantly after matching. We study the overall explanatory power of the propensity score 
estimations using the likelihood ratio (LR) chi-square test. This test enables us to conclude 
that before matching, at least one of the regression coefficients in the model is not equal to 
zero. In contrast, all regression coefficients are simultaneously equal to zero after matching. 
Considering these results, we can use the matched sample to estimate the effect of the tax 
credit.  
 
Table 3.4. Matching quality 
 Renovation rate Renovation expenditures 
 Standardized 
percentage bias 
LR χ
2
 Standardized 
percentage bias 
LR χ
2
 
Before matching 6.4% 4,176.58 
p > χ
2
 = 0.0000 
7.2% 298.02 
p > χ
2
 = 0.000 
After matching 0.5%  41.84 
p > χ
2
 = 0.565 
1.7% 26.26 
p > χ
2
 = 0.984 
 
 
3.4.2. Impact of tax credit 
3.4.2.1. Renovation rate 
Our objective is to estimate the impact of the tax credit on the renovation rate. We first draw 
conclusions about the significance of the effect using Mantel and Haenszel’s (1959) test. We 
calculate the this MH test statistic as follows:  
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where Nr is the number of households in the stratum r, including both treated households (N1r) 
and control households (N0r), and Yr is the number of households that renovate, including both 
eligible households (Y1r) and ineligible households (Y0r). The MH statistic follows a chi-
square distribution with one degree of freedom (Aakvik, 2001). The MH test statistic is 3.41 
and is significant at a 1% level. The tax credit has a significant effect on the total renovation 
rate. 
 
We then estimate the magnitude of the effect of the measure on the renovation rate using the 
kernel-matching estimator, which enables us to assess the differential of renovation rates 
between similar treated and control households. The results appear in table 3.5. They confirm 
the significance of the impact. The effect of the tax credit is positive but very low. It increases 
renovations by 0.86%, ceteris paribus. This result is low compared with other reported results. 
Although some studies find no evidence that tax credits have an impact on the number of 
renovations (Pon and Alberini, 2012), other studies report a more significant impact. An 
increase of 10 percentage points of U.S. tax incentives leads to a 24% increase in the 
probability of performing energy-efficiency improvements in housing (Hassett and Metcalf, 
1995). More recently, the current U.S. federal home energy-efficiency tax credit program 
reportedly has encouraged 2%–12% of homeowners to invest in energy-saving equipment 
(Zhao et al., 2012). 
 
Table 3.5. Impact of the tax credit on renovation rate—kernel-matching estimates 
 Renovation rate 
Effect of the tax credit 
Standard error 
0.0086 
(0.0031)*** 
Number of observations 
Number in treated group 
41,057 
21,968 
Note 1: Bootstrapped standard errors, obtained after 500 replications, appear in parentheses.  
Note 2: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
 
This result means that between 2005 and 2008, approximately 900,000 dwellings were 
renovated as a result of the introduction of the tax credit (see table 3.6). There were 25.7 
million main dwellings in 2005 and 26.6 million in 2008 in France (according to INSEE). We 
compare the public cost of the measure (i.e. the cost for the government), which is €7.8 billion 
over the period, with these 900,000 dwellings. The public cost reaches €8,658 per house that 
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would not have been renovated without the tax credit. This is significant, given that the 
average expenditure on the period is €5,054.2 in our sample (figure 3.1). The impact of the 
tax credit is low compared with the public cost of the measure. This finding can be explained 
because 4.2 million French households received a tax credit (Clerc and Mauroux, 2010), but 
only 900,000 renovated specifically as a result of this credit, which indicates the presence of 
free riding. 
 
Table 3.6. Number of energy-saving renovations  
 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Number of dwellings 25,743,000 26,047,000 26,353,000 26,616,000 
Public cost of tax credit €7.8 billion over the period 
Rate of energy-saving renovations in the 
survey 
8.81% 8.55% 9.43% 9.50% 
Estimation of the rate of renovations 
undertaken as a result of the tax credit  
0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 0.86% 
Estimation of the number of renovations 
as a result of the tax credit  
221,390 224,004 226,636 228,898 
900,928 dwellings over the period 
Source: INSEE and ADEME-SOFRES Survey. 
 
The low impact of the tax credit on the renovation rate can be related to some free riding, but 
it is not the sole explanation. Other factors, such as an increase of the cost of renovation, can 
reduce the incentive effect of the measure. Moreover, the tax credit does not really encourage 
households to renovate, but it can encourage households to perform more important energy-
saving renovations. We explore this point in the next subsection. 
 
3.4.2.2. Renovation expenditures 
Tax credit has a significant and positive impact on the total renovation expenditures. The tax 
credit led to a 24.65% increase of expenditures (at current price) during the 2005–2008 
period. This value is much larger than the result in Dubin and Henson (1988), who find no 
evidence that tax credits have an impact on renovation expenditures. 
According to the working group on housing energy improvement (OPEN), the total 
expenditures (out of VAT) in energy-saving renovations reached €12.78 billion in 2006 and 
€15.10 billion in 2008. Assuming that expenditures in 2005 and 2007 were similar and 
knowing that 24.65% of these amounts were due to the introduction of the tax credit, we can 
observe that the credit led to a total expenditure of €13.42 billion during the period, of which 
€7.8 billion came from the government (the public cost of the measure) and the remaining 
€5.62 billion from households. In other words, for every €1 spent by the government, the tax 
credit leads households to spend an additional €0.72. The leverage of this credit is low. 
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The previous result does not mean that the tax credit allows households to perform more 
important renovations. The effect is reduced by the price increase observed during the period. 
If we consider constant prices, the impact is three times lower (table 3.7), down to 8.9%. In 
other words, the tax credit is followed by an increase in the renovation expenditures, but two-
thirds of this rise is due to an increase of the prices. However, our results remain in the line 
with those of Pon and Alberini (2012), who show that tax incentives are not significant in 
encouraging households to invest in energy-saving equipment but are effective in encouraging 
homeowners who are already looking to replace appliances to select the more energy-efficient 
one. 
We observe that the rise of prices for maintenance and improvement is higher than general 
inflation (figure 3.5). The inflation during the period following the introduction of the tax 
credit is lower than the period before (the index of consumer prices increases 7.4% between 
2005 and 2008 and 8.5% between 2001 and 2004). In contrast, the increase of the index for 
housing maintenance and improvement is higher between 2005 and 2008 (15.7%) than during 
the preceding period (14.5%). This suggests that building professionals took advantage of the 
tax credit to increase their prices. Households share earnings from the tax credit with building 
professionals. Through price increases, the credit provides subsidies to professionals, which 
may partially explain the low impact of the tax credit on renovation rates.  
Professionals can capture part of the earnings, given that the market of energy-saving 
renovations is imperfectly competitive. First, suppliers cannot meet all demand, which gives 
market power to these building professionals. In France, we observe a saturation of the supply 
in the energy-saving renovations market (Moussaoui, 2008). Second, market imperfections 
are also related to a lack of price transparency and a lack of information to the consumers, for 
example, pertaining to the energy savings as a result of a renovation (Beillan et al. 2011; 
Francfort, 2009).  
 
Table 3.7. Impact of the tax credit on renovation expenditures—kernel-matching estimates 
 Renovation expenditure 
Current prices Constant prices 
Effect of the tax credit 
Standard error 
0.2465 
(0.0469)*** 
0.0890 
(0.0405)** 
Number of observations 
Number in treated group 
2,280 
1,319 
Note 1: Bootstrapped standard errors, obtained after 500 replications, appear in parentheses. 
Note 2: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
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3.5. Sensitivity analysis 
 
Matching is based on the CIA: Given the observable characteristics, the renovation rate (or 
expenditures) is independent of the probability of being eligible for the tax credit. This 
assumption is not satisfied when unobserved characteristics of the treated group differ from 
unobserved characteristics of the control group, and our results may be biased. In this section, 
we observe the sensitivity of the results to a deviation from this assumption.  
The control group is on a different time period than the treated group, and we are not able to 
take into account time information because we pooled the database. An unobserved factor 
(e.g., renovation prices, households preferences) can have an impact on the decision to 
renovate and may change over the period. Consequently, it can differ between the treated and 
control groups. A sensitivity analysis enables us to appraise the extent to which the results can 
be altered by unobserved factors. For example, renovation price trends can affect the cost–
benefit analysis of the renovation and the profitability of the investment. We observe a 
decrease in the renovation rate in 2004 and 2006 (figure 3.1), marking the years of the most 
significant increases in renovation prices (figure 3.5). However, the effect of an increase in 
the cost of renovation is reduced by the tax credit, because the tax deduction is a percentage 
of the cost of the equipment, and the higher the cost of the equipment, the larger the 
deduction. Moreover, even if households are sensitive to a change in renovation prices 
(Cameron, 1985), Charlier (2013) stresses that households are more sensitive to the gain of 
the renovation. Energy saving related to the investment is based on housing characteristics, 
and we control for these variables. Nonetheless, it seems appropriate to study the sensitivity 
of the results with respect to deviation from the CIA. 
 
We use Ichino et al.’s (2007) approach. It is the appropriate approach following a 
nonparametric model for the outcome equation. We test the impact of an unobserved binary 
variable u that affects the potential outcome Y (renovation rate or renovation expenditures) 
and eligibility for the tax credit (T = 1). The conditional independence given the set of 
variables x is not valid, but this assumption holds given x and u. In other words,  
�� � = 1 �!,�!, � ≠ �� � = 1 �  
and 
�� � = 1 �!,�!, �,� = �� � = 1 �,� , 
where u is assumed to be binary (e.g., u = 1 if the cost–benefit analysis of the renovation is 
favorable to the investment, and u = 0 otherwise). 
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First, we must characterize the distribution of u, which depends on the choice of four 
parameters. In the case of a binary outcome (renovation rate), the distribution of u is defined 
by: 
               Pr � = 1 � = �,� = �, � = Pr  � = 1 � = �,� = � ≡ �!", 
where i, j ∈ 0,1 , which gives the probability that u = 1 in each of the four groups defined by 
the treatment status (i = 0 or 1) and the outcome value (j = 0 or 1).  
In the case of a continuous outcome (the renovation expenditures), we apply to Y a binary 
transformation, and we define Pij as follows:  
Pr(u = 1|T =i, I(Y >y∗)=j) ≡ Pij, 
where i, j ∈ 0,1 , I is the indicator function, Y is the renovation expenditures, and y* is the 
mean of Y. 
We can assign arbitrary values to the parameter Pij. We consider the neutral confounder Pij = 
0.5, and then we can let u mimic the behavior of some important covariates. We choose 
variables that we assume to have an effect on the outcome, such as owner-occupied, income 
in the range of the two wealthiest groups, above-average energy expenditures per square 
meter, access to Espaces Info-Energie, and use of energy-saving bulbs. The latter two 
variables should influence the selection (i.e. the eligibility for the tax credit), because it seems 
that environmental sensitivity increased during the period.  
Second, we simulate u, which is considered as any other variable and is used to estimate the 
propensity score and the kernel-matching estimates.  
 
We present the results in table 3.8. The first four columns contain the probabilities Pij. For 
each value we give at u, the next two columns present, respectively, the outcome effect (i.e., 
effect of u on the untreated outcome, controlling for the observables x) and the selection effect 
(i.e., effect of u on eligibility for the tax credit, controlling for the observables x). The two last 
columns provide the tax credit impact and the standard error, controlling for the observable x 
and the unobservable u. Here, we comment on the sensitivity analysis of the results on 
renovation rate. We assume that u follows the same distribution as the variable “owner.” P11 
is 0.93—that is, 93% of households that are eligible for the tax credit and renovate their 
housing are owners. We impose that the same percentage of eligible households that 
undertake renovation have a positive cost–benefit investment. In this case, we observe that u 
has a positive effect on the probability to renovate, given that households are ineligible for the 
tax credit (the outcome effect is higher than 1), but u has almost no effect on the probability 
of being eligible (selection effect almost equal to 1). The effect of the tax credit on the 
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renovation rate, controlling for x and u, is close to the situation without a confounder (0.0084 
vs. 0.0086), and the effect is still significant. If we consider that u has the same distribution as 
the “energy-saving bulbs” variable, the outcome and selection effects are both higher than 1. 
Therefore, u has a positive effect on the probability to renovate, given that households are 
ineligible for the tax credit, and a positive effect on the probability of being eligible. In this 
case, the impact of a tax credit is significant but lower than the situation without a confounder 
of 0.003 points.  
Regarding renovation expenditures, the impact of the tax credit with a confounder remains 
significant and close to the initial situation. We obtain a larger difference when u mimics the 
distribution of the “energy-saving bulbs” variable. The selection effect is greater with this 
confounder. In this case, the effect of the tax credit increases by 0.011 points for estimations 
at constant prices and 0.008 points for estimations at current prices. All these simulations 
confirm that the measure has a significant and positive impact on renovation rate and 
renovation expenditures. 
 
Table 3.8. Sensitivity analysis—impact of the tax credit on renovation expenditures 
 Fraction u =1 by 
treatment/outcome 
Outcome 
effect 
Selection 
effect 
Tax 
credit 
impact 
SE 
P11 P10 P01 P00 
Renovation rate    
No confounder 0 0 0 0 - - 0.0086 0.0005*** 
Neutral confounder 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.999 0.998 0.0086 0.00002*** 
Confounder like:         
Owner 0.93 0.70 0.89 0.70 3.472 1.006 0.0084 0.00027*** 
Energy expenditure (>50%) 0.48 0.48 0.38 0.37 1.079 1.558 0.0079 0.0001*** 
Income (groups 5 and 6) 0.66 0.57 0.53 0.47 1.274 1.486 0.0070 0.0003*** 
Espaces Info-Energie 0.25 0.18 0.16 0.13 1.308 1.526 0.0075 0.0003*** 
Energy-saving bulbs 0.75 0.68 0.57 0.49 1.273 2.175 0.0056 0.0016*** 
Renovation expenditures    
   At current prices    
No confounder 0 0 0 0 - - 0.246 0.047*** 
Neutral confounder 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.002 1.004 0.246 0.002*** 
Confounder like:         
Owner 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95 2.113 1.796 0.243 0.004*** 
Energy expenditure (>50%) 0.49 0.48 0.38 0.36 1.138 1.642 0.241 0.008*** 
Income (groups 5 and 6) 0.72 0.64 0.58 0.54 1.178 1.761 0.240 0.009*** 
Espaces Info-Energie 0.26 0.24 0.15 0.19 0.746 1.640 0.253 0.007*** 
Energy-saving bulbs 0.74 0.74 0.54 0.57 0.892 2.317 0.254 0.013*** 
   At constant prices    
No confounder 0 0 0 0 - - 0.089 0.041**   
Neutral confounder 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.002 0.992 0.089 0.002*** 
Confounder like:         
Owner 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.95 2.449 1.788 0.085 0.004*** 
Energy expenditure (>50%) 0.49 0.48 0.37 0.37 1.046 1.649 0.088 0.008*** 
Income (groups 5 and 6) 0.72 0.64 0.57 0.55 1.117 1.755 0.085 0.009*** 
Espaces Info-Energie 0.26 0.23 0.15 0.19 0.781 1.626 0.095 0.007*** 
Energy-saving bulbs 0.73 0.75 0.53 0.58 0.844 2.304 0.100 0.012*** 
Note 1: We use a kernel estimator to estimate the impact of the tax credit. 
Note 2: ***significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%. 
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3.6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we evaluate the impact of the tax credit on renovation rate and renovation 
expenditures. We use French household-level databases on energy conservation from 2001 to 
2008. The matching method is appropriate to study the impact of this measure, ceteris 
paribus.  
The effectiveness of the tax credit is mixed. The measure has a significant and positive effect 
on renovation rate and renovation expenditures. However, the effect is low. The tax credit 
increases renovations by 0.86%, ceteris paribus, which is particularly low given the public 
cost of the measure. The impact on renovation expenditures is much higher, leading to a 
24.65% increase of expenditures at current prices. However, it does not mean that a tax credit 
leads to more energy-efficient investments. Building professionals capture a part of earnings 
from the tax credit through price increases. Moreover, the results suggest the presence of free 
riding. The introduction of the tax credit does not seem to encourage renovation for 
households that are not prone to renovate in the first place (i.e., low-income households, 
tenants, and households living in an apartment). 
It is important to rethink the way the tax credit is dispensed. First, free riding could be 
reduced by limiting access to the tax credit for households that would not renovate without 
the measure, for example, through an income ceiling. Second, it seems appropriate to increase 
the incentives to renovate for these same households, such as through an increase in the 
deduction rates. The current measure is not a sufficient incentive for these households.  
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3.7. Appendix 
 
 
Table 3.9. Presentation of the tax credit 
Beneficiaries of 
the tax credit 
Conditions to 
receive the measure 
Main equipment 
concerned 
Deduction 
rate 
Changes in the 
measure 
-Owners and 
tenants (fiscally 
domiciled in 
France) 
-Main housing 
 
-Energy-saving 
renovations 
-Renovation 
performed by a 
building professional 
-Heating systems 
-Insulation 
materials 
-Renewable 
energies 
investment 
From 10% 
to 50% 
depending 
on the kind 
of 
renovation 
2006: increase of 
the deduction rate 
for some 
renovations 
2009: decrease of 
the deduction rate 
 
 
 
 Figure 3.6. Distribution of propensity score—renovation rate 
 
 Figure 3.7. Distribution of propensity score—renovation expenditures 
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Figure 3.8. Comparison characteristics of the control group versus the treated group, before and after 
matching—renovate rate  
 
 
Figure 3.9. Comparison characteristics of the control group versus the treated group, before and after 
matching—renovation expenditures 
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Chapter 4.   
Environmental degradations, fuel scarcity and women 
participation to labor market: Evidence from Rural 
India
21 
 
 
Summary 
 
Environmental degradations can have adverse effects. Deforestation is for example 
responsible of 20% of global greenhouse gases emissions according to IPCC estimates and 
threatens biodiversity. However, literature on the impact of deforestation on individual is 
sparse. Our objective is to study how deforestation, increasing fuel scarcity, affects 
individuals. We focus on women, living in rural India. Using the 2004 Indian Human 
Development Survey, we show that fuel scarcity increases the probability for women to be 
involved in natural resource collection. Through this, it has a negative effect on the labor 
force participation, especially on family business and wage activities. We find that this effect 
is more pronounced for households living above poverty line. Indeed, the income constraint is 
lower for them.  
 
 
                                                
21
This paper has been written in collaboration with Ujjayant Chakravorty  
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4.1. Introduction: 
 
In its last report, the UNDP suggests that income advancement in developing countries can be 
jeopardized by inaction on climate change or on habitat destruction. In this context, 
understanding how deforestation affects population seems important in order to determine if it 
may hinder economic growth. This has been little studied, literature generally focusing on the 
reverse relation, i.e. the impact of development on environmental degradation. We seek to 
identify channels by which deforestation could impact national income studying the link 
between environmental degradation, natural resources scarcity and women’s access to labor 
market.  
In the past ten years, the average annual net loss of forest has reached 5.2 million hectares 
(FAO, 2010). Deforestation is first responsible for 20% of global greenhouse gases emissions 
according to IPCC estimates and threatens biodiversity. Second, more than 1.6 billion people 
rely to varying degrees on forests for their livelihoods (FAO, 2010). Forest and environmental 
resources (mainly fuelwood) represent an important part of rural households’ income 
(Cavendish, 2000; Kamanga et al. 2009). One cause of deforestation, beside the growth of the 
population and the natural resources overuse, is attributed to poverty. The Environmental 
Kuznets Curve postulates an inverted-U between per capita income and pressures on 
environment. Foremost, rising living standards increase environmental pressures (through the 
overuse of the resources) and later improve them. However empirical results vary: Koop and 
Tole (1999) using data for 76 developing countries between 1961 and 1992, or Nguyen Van 
et al. (2007) using data for 59 developing countries over 1972 and 1994 find little evidence 
for the existence of an environmental Kuznets curve for deforestation. Other studies find an 
inverted-U between per capita income and forest clearance principally in Latin America and 
Africa (Cropper et al., 1994; Godoy et al., 1997; Bhattarai et al., 2001).  
Literature on the impact of deforestation on individuals is sparse. Deforestation can affect 
individuals through the decrease of fuelwood availability. When facing greater scarcity of 
environmental goods rural households reduce their consumption of the goods and spend more 
time in their collection (Cooke, 1998a). Indeed, rural households in developing countries 
typically rely heavily on self-collected environmental products such as fuelwood. Natural 
resource collection is predominantly a women activity (Kumar et al., 1988; Cooke, 1998a, 
1998b; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2011) belonging to poorer as well as wealthier households. 
Baland et al. (2010) show that in rural Nepal poorer households collect significantly less 
firewood than wealthier households in the same village. This result contradicts the energy 
 
Chapter 4 – Environmental degradations and women participation to labor market 
 
 113 
ladder model, which predicts that higher incomes induce households to switch away from 
traditional fuel. But it seems that households, living in rural area in particular, often have few 
feasible alternatives to the use of environmental products and to the use of fuelwood (Legros, 
2009). Moreover, the relationship between income and fuel use is complex because social and 
cultural aspects are involved (Masera et al., 2000).   
Our objective is to study whether deforestation and thus fuel scarcity, have an impact on labor 
supply through natural resource collection. A few papers examine the relationship between 
fuelwood collection and labor market and the link between collection and women’s labor 
supply is not so clear. All these papers focus on Nepal because of the availability of data. 
Amacher et al. (1996) show that labor supply is related to the household’s choice to collect or 
purchase fuelwood. In their study, Nepal’s households living in tarai region and purchasing 
fuel are very responsive to an increase in fuelwood prices and labor opportunities. They can 
rapidly switch from purchasing fuelwood to using household time, originally dedicated for 
work, to replace purchased fuelwood with collected fuelwood. In contrast, collecting 
households do not react so quickly to a change in firewood price. Moreover, Kumar et al. 
(1988) show the negative impact of deforestation on women’s farm labor input. A 
deterioration in the access to forest wood, measured by the time spent collecting fuel, leads to 
less time for productive agricultural activities for women, and this is not compensated by 
men’s labor. However, authors do not take into account potential endogeneity of variables, 
therefore caution has to be taken in the interpretation of results. In contrast, Cooke (1998b) 
stresses that households allocate more time to collection activities when environmental 
products are more costly but finds no evidence that it leads women to spend less time 
farming.  
In the same way as it has been done for fuelwood collection, some studies focus on the water 
collection and show its impact on women’s activities. Ilahi and Grimard (2000) use 
simultaneous equations to model the choice of women living rural Pakistan between water 
collection, market-based activities and leisure. The distance to a water source has a positive 
impact on the rate of women involved in water collection and has a negative impact on the 
participation in income-generating activities, except for women with private water technology 
access who are more likely to spend time for leisure than on labor market. However, results 
diverge in other studies. Lokshin and Yemtsov (2005), using double differences method, 
show that rural water supply improvements in Georgia between 1998-2001 have a significant 
effect on health but not on labor supply. Also, Koolwal and Walle (2013), using across 
country analysis, find no evidence that improved access to water leads to greater off-farm 
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work for women. Unlike fuel, water has no substitute and is likely to be inelastic. Therefore, 
households’ behavior following scarcity of water or scarcity of natural resources (as 
fuelwood) can differ. However, these papers show that collection activities are not necessarily 
linked to labor market supply and can have an impact only on leisure.  
Women are not the only members in the household involved in environmental goods 
collection (fuel and water). This is also the case for children, and children’s school attendance 
is negatively affected by scarcity of natural resources and the increased hours of collection 
work that result (Ndiritu and Nyangena, 2010). To illustrate this, Nankhuni and Findeis 
(2004) stress that Children from the most environmentally degraded districts of central and 
southern Malawi are less likely to attend school. 
 
Household can adapt to fuel scarcity adjusting fuelwood consumption, using substitutes or 
collecting fuelwood. Also, participation to collection of natural resources can have an impact 
on the participation to other activities, as leisure or labor supply. Our objective is to 
understand these links, focusing on the impact of environmental goods collection on labor 
market participation and on the role played by deforestation on individuals’ choice. We focus 
on India. It is the tenth country in the world for its forest area with about 68 million hectares 
(FAO, 2010). Forest represents an important resource for people in India. 200 million peoples 
rely on forests for livelihood, according to Ministry of Environment and Forest. In term of 
fuel for example, 23 percent of population using fuelwood obtain wood from forest, and the 
total annual consumption of fuelwood for the country is estimated to be 216.42 million tons 
(Forest Survey of India report, 2011). However, an estimated 41% of India’s forest cover has 
been degraded to some degree in the past decades. Pressure on India’s forest comes from 
many sources, particularly the increase in the population from 390 million in 1950 to 1 billion 
in 2001 and the overutilization of resources. Forest is unevenly distributed in the territory: 
over a total of 35 states, only 6 states accounted for 50% of the forest area, whereas 8 other 
states accounted for less than 0.05% of the forest area. The national government is committed 
to conserving the forest and developing new forests. Under India’s Constitution, national and 
state governments share jurisdiction for forestry. The national government and several states 
have established a network of more than 500 protected areas to preserve the country’s 
biodiversity and natural habitats. The national forest policy sets the goal of bringing one-third 
of the country landmass under forest cover. This target is not reached today, but we can 
observe an increase in forest cover in several states these last years and the development of 
Joint Forest Management with the objective to develop a sustainable management of forest.  
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We go into details to understand which are the consequences of deforestation for women. 
More precisely, our objective is to study how fuelwood scarcity is involved in the relation 
between natural resource collection and the participation to labor market. Any measure to 
reduce deforestation in India has to be based on a clear understanding of household adaptation 
to fuelwood scarcity. We focus first on the impact of fuel scarcity on the decision to collect 
natural resources. We pay particular attention to the measure of fuel scarcity. It can indeed be 
endogenous and this issue is hardly addressed in the literature. Second, we focus on the 
impact of natural resource collection on labor market participation, distinguishing between the 
farm and wage-providing activities. Thus, we can observe the indirect impact of environment 
on labor market participation. We model environmental goods collection and working activity 
simultaneously. This allows taking into account the potential joint decision-making for the 
participation to both activities. We use the 2004 Indian Human Development Survey, which 
gives three-level information: households, individuals and village.  
We obtain that environmental degradations increase the probability for women to be involved 
in natural resource collection. Through this, they have a negative effect on the labor force 
participation. We find that this effect is more pronounced for households living above the 
poverty line. Indeed, the income constraint is lower for them.  
Section II presents the data and some statistics. Section III describes the empirical strategy 
and results are presented in section IV. Section V discuss the implication of results and 
conclude.  
 
 
4.2. Data 
 
We use the 2004-2005 Indian Human Development Survey to study the impact of 
deforestation on natural resource collection and labor market participation. This is a sectional 
and nationally representative database, which includes several levels of information: village, 
households and individuals. Households are interviewed in 2004 on their characteristics 
(household size, religion, land owned), on neighborhood (if there are conflicts in the village 
between people or if people get along) but also on individuals (age, education level, the 
working time in farm or other activities and the participation to natural resource collection). 
Information on poverty is available. A dichotomous variable indicates whether the household 
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is below the poverty line. It is computed by comparing the monthly consumption per capita 
from the survey with the official poverty line.
22
 At the village level information is provided 
on wages, fuel prices, isolation of the village (the distance from district headquarter, the 
access or not by road) and the number of people living in the village.   
We use other database to complete this survey. The 2004 Indian National Service Scheme 
survey provides some district level information about the labor market characteristics (as the 
employment and unemployment rates). Moreover, information on forest cover is not available 
on the survey. We use 1999 and 2005 Forest Survey of India reports. Forest Survey of India 
reports provide regular and periodic assessment of forest cover over the country. They give us 
information on forest and deforestation by state and by district for almost every two years. In 
these both reports, the evaluation of forest cover is based on 1997 and 2004 satellite 
imageries, with a mapping carried out at a scale of 1:50000 and the GIS (Geographic 
Information System) technology is used to analyze the data. The administrative unit below the 
state is the district. This last one is the lowest level of disaggregation for which forest 
information is available. Our database, describes households living in 377 different districts. 
In 2004, a district registers in average 1,100 km
2
 of forest cover in a total geographic area of 
5,800 km
2
.  
We consider only women from 15 to 65 years old and living in rural area, the poorer regions. 
After dropping observations with missing values and taking into account only observations 
available in the all the databases, we have information on 18,738 women. 
In 2004, forest cover in the country is estimated to be 20.6% of the total geographic area 
(Forest Survey of India, 2005). We note an important heterogeneity of forest cover between 
states and between districts (see map 4.1 in appendix). Even if the deforestation was 
important in the past decade (around 41% of forest cover has been degraded to some degree), 
the national forest policy of 1988 sets the goal of bringing one-third of the country landmass 
under forest cover. Recently, India has strengthened its commitment setting new objective: 
double the rate of restored forest cover by 2020, in order to sequester 6.35% of India’s annual 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 or removing 43 million tons CO2e each year (source: 
Natural Resources Defense Council). 
 
In our sample, a majority, or 53.3% of women participate to both activities: collect and labor 
market (table 4.1). 87.9% of women living in rural areas and aged from 15 to 65 years old are 
                                                
22
 This poverty line is based on 1970s calculations of income needed to support minimal calorie consumption and has been 
adjusted by price indexes since then. It depends on the state and the area (urban and rural). 
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involved in natural resource collection, and a large part participates to labor market. As well, 
women in the labor market are often involved in several economic activities (work in farm 
and also in family business or wage activity). It is not common for women to participate to 
the labor market without being involved in environmental goods collection; it concerns only 
5% of our sample.  
 
Table 4.1. Repartition of the sample between both activities studied 
 Labor force participation = 0 Labor force participation = 1 Total 
Collect = 0 6.8% 5.3% 12.1% 
Collect = 1 34.6% 53.3% 87.9% 
Total 41.4% 58.6% 100% 
Source: IHDS 2004 (final sample) 
 
Almost one-fifth of the sample lives in district which have been deforested between 2002 and 
2004. The participation to natural resource collection is higher in these districts. In district 
that lost forest cover, the percentage of women working in farm is higher than in other 
districts, but the percentage of women working in family business or wage activity is 
statistically lower (table 4.2).  
The use of firewood is extremely widespread with more than 96.8% of the sample using this 
fuel. However, substitutes exist: almost 90% of the sample use also kerosene and 70% also 
electricity. We observe that only a very small share of the sample (less than 10%) purchases 
firewood. The remainder collects it from the household’s own land or from its village.  
 
Table 4.2. Comparison of women living in district with and without deforestation 
 Districts with 
deforestation 
between 2002-2004 
Districts without 
deforestation 
between 2002-2004 
ttest 
Participation to natural resource 
collection  
 
95.2% 
 
86.3% 
 
*** 
Participation to labor market 60.9% 58.1% *** 
Participation to farm activities 45.1% 39.1% *** 
Participation to family business or 
wage activities 
 
28.4% 
 
32.5% 
 
*** 
Poverty 27.7% 26.0% ** 
Firewood use 96.5% 96.9% ns 
Firewood purchase 4.0% 10.5% *** 
Source: 2004-2005 IHDS (final sample) and 2005 Forest Survey of India report 
Note: *** difference significant at 1%, ns: difference non significant 
 
 
In this database, several variables can be used to explain the participation to labor market and 
the decision to collect natural resources. First, household characteristics, as the size and 
composition of the household are expected to affect the decision process (Cooke, 1998b). The 
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larger the number of persons in the household, the higher the consumption needs and this can 
generate an increase in the women’s labor supply and in the natural resource collection needs 
as well. By contrast, the presence of adults’ men in the family can be a substitute for women’s 
labor. Moreover, the number of children is expected to have a negative effect on the 
participation of women to different activities because the children’s care is generally women’s 
responsibility. We also take into account information on religion. The objective is to capture 
cultural aspects that affect for example the choice of fuel (Masera et al., 2000). Finally we 
include a variable linked with poverty. Following an income increase, households may decide 
to hire to modern fuel and therefore reduce its demand and collection of fuelwood, according 
to the energy ladder theory. By contrast, fuel consumption increases with income and this 
income effect can lead to more the natural resource collection (Baland et al., 2010). 
Second, variables on individual characteristics can also be taken into account to explain labor 
market participation and environmental goods collection: the age and the education. 
Education is expected to generate more labor supply. The labor force participation can be 
correlated to the aged because it can be a proxy for the professional experience.   
Third, this database allows controlling for geographic and community effects (Koolwal and 
van de Walle, 2013). We take into account several variables to control for labor opportunities, 
as the number of households in the village, the accessibility (a dummy variable if the village 
is accessible by road, and the distance from the district headquarter) and the presence of 
public programs to promote employment schemes (as Food for Work). We also add 
information on conflicts between people in the village, and at the district-level, the 
unemployment rate and the percentage of people working in the primary sector (i.e. in 
agricultural and mining activities). We statistically observe that agriculture and mining 
activities are the most widespread. 
 
 
4.3. Econometric specification 
 
Our objective is to study whether deforestation and thus fuel scarcity, have an impact on labor 
supply through natural resource collection. We aim therefore at testing whether the decision 
to collect natural resources have an effect on labor market participation. The natural resources 
collection is potentially endogenous. We have to take into account this to avoid a bias in the 
estimation. To tackle this problem, we use a bivariate probit model (Greene, 1998) because 
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the variable, which we suspect to be endogenous, as well as the explained variable are binary. 
We consider equations simultaneous model: 
�!!
∗
= �!�!! + �!
!
�! + �!    with  �!! = 1 if  �!!
∗
> 0 and  �!! = 0 otherwise
�
!!
∗
= �!
!
�! + �!� + �!       with  �!! = 1 if  �!!
∗
> 0 and  �!! = 0 otherwise
 
 
where:  
• �! and �! represent respectively the probability of participating to the labor market and to 
the natural resource collection of individual i.  
• �! and �! are vectors of exogeneous covariates that influence respectively �! and �!. They 
encompass individual characteristics (age and education), household (poverty, religion, 
household size) and village district ones (unemployment rate).  
• �  and  � are the error terms.  
The correlation coefficient of error terms �!" is different from zero if the participation to both 
activities is affected by the same unobserved characteristics. In other words, �!" ≠ 0 would 
mean that there exists a significant link between the labor market equation and that of natural 
resource collection. In this case, the simultaneous model is appropriate and provides unbiased 
estimators. By contrast, if �!" = 0 means that the two equations are independent and can be 
estimated separately. 
To be identified, the model requires that at least one instrumental variable according to 
Maddala (1983). This condition is discussed in the literature. However, it is a common 
practice to impose exclusion restrictions to improve identification (Jones, 2007). We include a 
variable � that (i) explains the participation to natural resource collection, and (ii) does not 
explain the participation to labor market. A good instrument would be the wood scarcity, but 
it cannot easily observable. We use some proxies, discussed in literature.  
Cooke (1998a) studies the impact of fuel scarcity on the time spent in collection activities and 
uses a shadow price for fuelwood as a relative economic cost of environmental products to a 
household. The shadow price is calculated by multiplying (i) the time needed for a household 
to collect 10 kg of fuelwood with (ii) the women’s wage rate. The author finds that this 
variable is endogenous. In this case and without correction the results are biased. Amacher  
et al. use the forest area in the district to explain the supply of collected fuelwood. However, 
they do not take into account the potential endogeneity of forest cover. Therefore, we choose 
two proxies for fuel scarcity. First, we take the forest cover in the district (in km
2
) in 1997, i.e. 
with a 7 years delayed compared with the year of the survey. The forest cover is an indicator 
of the resources stock and lagged variable is commonly used in the literature to tackle 
endogeneity issue. Second, firewood price is considered in the literature as an important 
 
Chapter 4 – Environmental degradations and women participation to labor market 
 
 120 
variable in the decision to collect or purchase the wood (Amacher et al., 1996). The consumer 
market price of firewood in the village (in rupees by kg) can be another proxy for fuel 
scarcity. As expected the market price is higher in districts that have few forest cover and a 
higher pressure on the environment (table 4.3). This variable is exogenous if individuals do 
not have market power. Given the large size of the villages (73% of villages in the sample 
have more than 1,000 inhabitants) it does not seem to be a strong assumption.  
 
Table 4.3. Fuelwood price and fuel scarcity 
 
Districts where: 
Fuelwood price 
(Rs / 10 kg) 
ttest Number of 
observations 
Forest cover < 100 km
2
 22.08 *** 6647 
Forest cover > 100 km
2
 and < 500 km
2
 16.92 * 6245 
Forest cover > 500 km
2
 and < 1500 km
2
 15.72 *** 5606 
Forest cover > 1500 km
2
  1.51 *** 7611 
Forest cover changes negatively between 2002 and 2004 19.61 *** 5074 
Forest cover does not change between 2002 and 2004 16.98 *** 15598 
Forest cover changes positively between 2002 and 2004 16.73 ** 5437 
Forest cover represents less than 5% of geographical area 27.59 *** 1926 
Forest cover represents more than 5% of geographical area 16.63 *** 24183 
Source: 2004-2005 IHDS (final sample) and 2005 Forest Survey of India report 
 
We estimate the impact of fuel scarcity on the probability to be involved in the natural 
resources collection, considering these two proxies. Moreover, lagged forest cover and 
firewood price can legitimately be excluded from the labor market equation.  
 
 
4.4. Results 
 
Table 4.4a and 4.4b present the results and the marginal effects (marginal effects 
computations as well as the estimated coefficients are presented in appendix). Results concern 
women aged from 15 to 65 years who live in rural areas. We estimate the labor market 
participation and the natural resource collection on the full sample. We then estimate the 
impact of natural resource collection on different economic activities separately: farm activity 
on the one hand and family business or other activities on the other hand. As poverty has a 
significant impact on the women decision to participate to both activities, we study the 
poverty constraint by estimating the model for households below and for those above the 
poverty line separately.  
Let us first focus on the full sample estimation (model 1a and model 1b). � is different from 
zero, that means that the errors terms from both equations �!  and �!  are significantly 
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correlated. Both equations are interdependent. The bivariate probit is then the appropriate 
model to avoid the bias. Moreover � > 0 and this implies that unobserved characteristics 
affect the probabilities of participating to natural resource collection and to labor market in 
the same direction. For the model identification, we introduce an instrument in the natural 
resource collection equation. The instrument is first the lagged forest cover and second, the 
firewood price. These variables have a significant and positive effect on the participation to 
natural resource collection. Results are similar regardless the measure of fuel scarcity we use. 
This ensures the robustness of results. We show that fuelwood price has a positive impact on 
the probability to be involved in collection activities and lagged forest cover has a negative 
effect. This means that the scarcer the environmental resources, the higher the probability to 
collect to natural resource. People exploit more quickly the resources when the scarcity 
increases. This confirms the results of Cooke (1998a). Therefore, deforestation has a positive 
impact on the decision to collect fuel, ceteris paribus. The involvement in natural resource 
collection reduces the women’s available time, and that in turn decreases the participation to 
labor market. Indeed, we obtain that the impact of the participation to natural resource 
collection on labor market supply is significant and negative. Collection decreases the 
probability of participating to labor market in the range of 0.26 (model 1a) and 0.19 (model 
1b) percentage points. Environmental degradations are a barrier to the access of women to the 
labor market.  
 
The impact of lagged forest cover (i.e. the instrument) is insignificant in the model 2a in 
which we focus on farm activities. It is not a good instrument in this case because agricultural 
activities are by nature related to forest cover. Indeed, the expansion of agricultural land is 
one of the main causes of deforestation. Results from this estimation should be therefore 
interpreted with caution because of the non-validity of the instrument.  
However, estimation using fuelwood price as proxy confirms that fuel scarcity has no indirect 
effect on farm labor participation (model 2b). In this regression � is different from zero. The 
choices to participate to farm activities or to natural resource collection are not related. This 
suggests that natural resource collection has no impact on the decision to participate to farm 
activity. With a different methodology, estimating a cross-sectional equation for household 
agricultural labor using a two stage least squares approach, Cooke (1998b) finds a similar 
result. The participation to natural resource collection has a significant and negative impact 
only on the participation to family business and to wage activities. 
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Moreover, results show that natural resource collection and labor market participation are not 
interdependent for households living below the poverty line (model 4a and model 4b): � is 
also not significant. What happens is that when the income constraint is too strong, the labor 
supply is independent from the participation to natural resource collection. This result is 
confirmed by other estimations. For instance, the probability for women to both work and 
collect fuel increases if the household is poor. The effect of natural resource collection on 
labor supply is significant only for women living above the poverty line. Moreover, for poor 
households, the larger forest area or the higher fuelwood price, the higher the probability to 
collect fuel. This is the only estimation showing a positive effect of lagged forest cover.  
 
Variables other than environmental degradations play a role in the choice of participating to 
the different activities. Concerning women’s characteristics, the age has a positive impact on 
the participation to economic activities. Results reveal a specificity of India concerning the 
effect of education. The higher the number of school years, the lower is the probability to 
participate to both labor market and to natural resource collection. Several studies find a 
negative effect of education on labor supply in India (see for example Bordia Das and Desai, 
2003). Authors explain it with cultural and structural factors. The first one indicates that 
women who come from families with a higher social status tend to be more educated. 
However, women’s withdrawal from labor force would be associated with improvements in 
the social status of the family. Structural factors refer to the lack of appropriate employment 
opportunities.  
We obtain that household characteristics have significant effect on the decision process. The 
presence of young children tends to increase the labor supply of women in farm activities. By 
contrast it decreases the participation to family business and wage activities. The presence of 
children can indeed have two opposite effects. On the one hand, children require time for care 
and thus reduces the time available for other activities. On the other hand, they increase 
consumption needs. The number of adults in the households decreases the probability to work 
or to collect fuel. The effect is even more pronounced with the presence of men adults. 
Moreover, the effect of religion is significant. It stresses the presence of cultural factors in the 
women’s choice to participate to labor market or to collect fuel. This is in the line of 
literature: Cultural factors play a role in the decision of using traditional or modern fuel 
(Masera et al., 2000) and in the female labor force participation (Whitehead, 2011). 
Job opportunities in the village have a significant impact. The employment program in the 
village increases the probability to participate to labor force but also on natural resource 
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collection. By contrast, unemployment rate and the fact that the village is accessible by road 
have a negative effect on the probability to participate to labor market. This means that 
women are sensitive to labor opportunities in their village, but not outside the village.  
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Table 4.4a. Results with lagged forest area proxy - coefficient estimates 
 
Full sample  
(model 1a) 
Full sample  
(model 2a) 
Full sample  
(model 3a) 
Poor households  
(model 4a) 
Non poor households 
(model 1a) 
 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Farm 
activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Family 
business and 
other activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Fuel collection -0.2624*** - 0.3058*** - -0.2986*** - 0.0832 - -0.3306*** - 
 
(0.242) 
 
(0.237) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.482) 
 
(0.0845) 
 
Lagged forest area (in log) - -0.0059*** - -0.0019 - -0.0059*** - 0.0044* - -0.0098*** 
  
(0.0102) 
 
(0.00880) 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0214) 
 
(0.00829) 
Individual characteristics 
          
Age of the individual 0.0478*** 0.0005 0.0356*** -0.0002 0.0325*** 0.00002 0.0503*** 0.0016 0.0465*** 0.0001 
 
(0.00641) (0.00446) (0.00429) (0.00422) (0.00448) (0.00418) (0.00843) (0.00966) (0.00514) (0.00471) 
Age
2
 -0.0006*** -0.00002 -0.0004*** -7.41e-06 -0.0005*** -9.98e-06 -0.0007*** -0.00002 -0.0006*** -0.00001 
 
(8.04e-05) (5.57e-05) (5.58e-05) (5.35e-05) (5.88e-05) (5.29e-05) (0.000107) (0.000119) (6.50e-05) (5.96e-05) 
Never attended school ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
School between 1-5 years -0.0489*** -0.0121 0.0149 -0.0184** -0.0657*** -0.0138* 0.0343 0.0064 -0.0547*** -0.0172* 
 
(0.0296) (0.0396) (0.0295) (0.0395) (0.0313) (0.0392) (0.0613) (0.0951) (0.0336) (0.0432) 
School between 6-10 years -0.1194*** -0.0240*** -0.0019 -0.0329*** -0.1473*** -0.0277*** -0.0535*** -0.0026 -0.1175*** -0.0314*** 
 
(0.0291) (0.0406) (0.0305) (0.0406) (0.0321) (0.0398) (0.0657) (0.114) (0.0320) (0.0421) 
School between 11-15 years -0.2283*** -0.0884*** -0.0800*** -0.0983*** -0.1799*** -0.0941*** -0.0694** -0.0227 -0.2347*** -0.1091*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0610) (0.0627) (0.0621) (0.0585) (0.0610) (0.186) (0.255) (0.0510) (0.0627) 
Household characteristics 
          
Nb of children aged 0-7 0.0018 0.0008 0.0187*** 0.0012 -0.0199*** 0.0004 0.0054 0.0052 -0.0001 -0.0017 
 
(0.0110) (0.0194) (0.0109) (0.0203) (0.0122) (0.0197) (0.0181) (0.0310) (0.0144) (0.0225) 
Nb of children aged 8-21 -0.0026 0.0001 0.0033 0.0005 -0.0111*** 0.0001 -0.0073* 0.0050 -0.0006 -0.0013 
 
(0.00837) (0.0159) (0.00794) (0.0163) (0.00916) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0268) (0.0103) (0.0170) 
Nb of men aged 21-65 -0.0400*** -0.0093** -0.0044 -0.0091** -0.0560*** -0.0084* -0.0271*** -0.0047 -0.0428*** -0.0128** 
 
(0.0152) (0.0239) (0.0157) (0.0245) (0.0173) (0.0245) (0.0307) (0.0568) (0.0174) (0.0261) 
Nb of women aged 21-65 -0.0216*** -0.0050 -0.0042 -0.0060 -0.0333*** -0.0052 -0.0562*** -0.0029 -0.0107 -0.0035 
 
(0.0193) (0.0311) (0.0193) (0.0317) (0.0207) (0.0315) (0.0366) (0.0771) (0.0226) (0.0344) 
Hindu ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
Muslim -0.1511*** -0.0357*** -0.1163*** -0.0367*** -0.0956*** -0.0363*** -0.0594*** -0.0521** -0.1425*** -0.0207 
 
(0.0456) (0.0683) (0.0528) (0.0688) (0.0511) (0.0686) (0.0991) (0.140) (0.0517) (0.0747) 
Other religion -0.0661*** -0.0485** -0.1031*** -0.0459** 0.0654 -0.0472** 0.0798 -0.0398 -0.0852*** -0.0626** 
 
(0.0720) (0.103) (0.0821) (0.105) (0.0728) (0.104) (0.159) (0.281) (0.0798) (0.110) 
Poor (=1 if HH is above 
poverty line) 
0.0273** 0.0550*** -0.0734*** 0.0553*** 0.1389*** 0.0574*** - - - - 
 
(0.0331) (0.0519) (0.0311) (0.0519) (0.0295) (0.0513) 
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Village 
          
Nb pers in the village:           
 
1000 inhbts or less ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  
1001 - 5000 inhbts 0.3111 *** -0.0365 0.2448*** -0.0054 0.0157 -0.0439 0.2278 -0.0288 0.2829*** -0.0332 
 (0.247) (0.378) (0.246) (0.372) (0.248) (0.367) (0.480) (1.026) (0.280) (0.433) 
More than 5000 inhbts 0.2157*** 0.1190** -0.0415 0.1287*** -0.1798*** 0.1108** 0.0935 0.0961** 0.2456*** 0.1495** 
 (0.262) (0.401) (0.281) (0.404) (0.267) (0.402) (0.523) (1.242) (0.297) (0.452) 
Employment program in the 
village 
0.0728*** 0.0530*** 0.0309** 0.0469*** 0.0409*** 0.0512*** 0.1459** 0.0283 0.0709*** 0.0612*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0536) (0.0405) (0.0546) (0.0384) (0.0539) (0.0833) (0.139) (0.0420) (0.0576) 
Accessibility by road -0.0939*** -0.0230 -0.0630*** -0.0256* -0.0418*** -0.0202 -0.0003** -0.0039 -0.1039*** -0.0299 
 (0.0551) (0.0918) (0.0552) (0.0926) (0.0539) (0.0938) (0.0987) (0.182) (0.0673) (0.104) 
Distance to HQ (in log) 0.0225*** 0.0025 0.0249*** -0.0028 0.0202*** 0.0015 0.0403*** 0.0056 0.0171** 0.0013 
 (0.0169) (0.0269) (0.0172) (0.0280) (0.0172) (0.0265) (0.0342) (0.0703) (0.0190) (0.0284) 
Conflict -0.0230*** -0.0151** 0.0003 -0.0123* -0.0190*** -0.0149** -0.0554 -0.0036 -0.0296*** -0.0211** 
 (0.0233) (0.0363) (0.0240) (0.0369) (0.0241) (0.0367) (0.0474) (0.0844) (0.0269) (0.0398) 
Daily women unskilled 
wage rate (in log) 
0.0925*** 0.0559*** 0.1107*** 0.0572*** -0.0940*** 0.0509*** 0.0687** -0.0011 0.0775 *** 0.0782*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0778) (0.0537) (0.0761) (0.0505) (0.0746) (0.0943) (0.208) (0.0563) (0.0910) 
Wage x 1001 - 5000 inhbts 
in the village 
-0.1291*** -0.0099 -0.1145*** -0.0173 -0.0035 -0.0076 -0.0683* 0.0063 -0.1282*** -0.0190 
 (0.0655) (0.101) (0.0660) (0.0990) (0.0665) (0.0977) (0.133) (0.280) (0.0734) (0.114) 
Wage x more than 5000 
inhbts in the village 
-0.0979*** -0.0815*** -0.0879** -0.0878*** 0.0801*** -0.0766*** -0.0258 -0.0859** -0.1048*** -0.1032*** 
 (0.0688) (0.104) (0.0781) (0.104) (0.0700) (0.104) (0.142) (0.322) (0.0760) (0.116) 
Unemployment rate in the 
district  
-0.0059*** -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0083*** -0.0010 -0.0111*** -0.0033* -0.0027 0.0018 
 (0.0062) (0.0091) (0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0139) (0.0157) (0.0074) (0.0107) 
% of people working in 
agricultural and mining 
activities  
0.0052*** 0.0007** 0.0033*** 0.0005 0.0055*** 0.0008** 0.0062*** 0.0002 0.0047*** 0.0007* 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Observations 18,738 18,738 18,738 4,924 13,814 
Log pseudolikelihood -17206.13 -17902.965 -16110.931 -3754.8686 -13329.578 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in all estimated regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the households level. Several 
women belong to the same household and clustering allows correcting for possible bias attributed to household size. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. Marginal Effects are estimated using Greene (1998) and Baslevent and El-Hamidi (2009) formulas.  
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Table 4.4b. Results with firewood price area proxy - coefficient estimates 
 
Full sample 
(model 1b) 
Full sample 
(model 2b) 
Full sample 
(model 3b) 
Poor households 
(model 4b) 
Non poor households 
(model 1b) 
 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Farm 
activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Family 
business and 
other activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Fuel collection -0.1898*** - 0.0635 - -0.1623*** - -0.1707 - -0.2652*** - 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.636) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.501) 
 
(0.185) 
 
Firewood price (in log) - 0.0490*** - 0.0433*** - 0.0440*** - 0.0208* - 0.0587*** 
  
(0.0472) 
 
(0.0614) 
 
(0.0477) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.0498) 
Individual characteristics 
          
Age of the individual 0.0478*** 0.00001 0.0356*** -0.0003 0.0325*** -0.0003 0.0494*** 0.0018 0.0467*** -0.0006 
 
(0.00511) (0.00428) (0.00395) (0.00422) (0.00442) (0.00419) (0.00894) (0.00981) (0.00614) (0.00476) 
Age
2
 -0.0006*** 0.00001 -0.0004*** -6.44e-06 -0.0005*** -6.88e-06 -0.0007*** -0.00002 -0.0006*** -6.67e-06 
 
(6.44e-05) (5.39e-05) (4.97e-05) (5.33e-05) (5.80e-05) (5.31e-05) (0.000115) (0.000120) (7.66e-05) (6.02e-05) 
Never attended school ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
School between 1-5 years -0.0487 *** -0.0146* 0.0773 -0.0165** -0.0657*** -0.0162** 0.0672 0.0081 -0.0549*** -0.0221** 
 
(0.0299) (0.0395) (0.0316) (0.0408) (0.0317) (0.0392) (0.0611) (0.0937) (0.0342) (0.0437) 
School between 6-10 years -0.1208*** -0.0287*** -0.0534 -0.0311*** -0.1487*** -0.0313*** -0.0193*** 0.0012 -0.1201*** -0.0393*** 
 
(0.0293) (0.0401) (0.0349) (0.0431) (0.0324) (0.0399) (0.0665) (0.113) (0.0325) (0.0429) 
School between 11-15 years -0.2290*** -0.0933*** -0.0477*** -0.0949*** -0.1775*** -0.0971*** -0.0386** -0.0197 -0.2389*** -0.1171*** 
 
(0.0502) (0.0613) (0.0765) (0.0654) (0.0605) (0.0617) (0.178) (0.260) (0.0520) (0.0639) 
Household characteristics 
          
Nb of children aged 0-7 0.0014 0.0020 0.0186*** 0.0017 -0.0200*** 0.0017 0.0052 0.0046 -0.0011 0.0005 
 
(0.0109) (0.0194) (0.0110) (0.0196) (0.0122) (0.0196) (0.0178) (0.0309) (0.0141) (0.0229) 
Nb of children aged 8-21 -0.0028 0.0011 0.0034 0.0011 -0.0112*** 0.0011 -0.0071 0.0042 -0.0010 0.0001 
 
(0.00824) (0.0157) (0.00821) (0.0158) (0.00914) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0267) (0.01000) (0.0175) 
Nb of men aged 21-65 -0.0401*** -0.0089** -0.0044 -0.0086* -0.0558*** -0.0083* -0.0267*** -0.0028 -0.0434*** -0.0117** 
 
(0.0150) (0.0243) (0.0166) (0.0245) (0.0174) (0.0247) (0.0300) (0.0579) (0.0173) (0.0268) 
Nb of women aged 21-65 -0.0212*** -0.0060 -0.0044 -0.0062 -0.0330*** -0.0062 -0.0551*** -0.0047 -0.0095 -0.0055 
 
(0.0191) (0.0313) (0.0198) (0.0318) (0.0208) (0.0316) (0.0364) (0.0759) (0.0223) (0.0352) 
Hindu ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
Muslim -0.1539*** -0.0425** -0.0625*** -0.0417*** -0.0958*** -0.0422*** -0.0265*** -0.0556*** -0.1493*** -0.0308* 
 
(0.0452) (0.0681) (0.0531) (0.0687) (0.0519) (0.0685) (0.0949) (0.137) (0.0524) (0.0751) 
Other religion -0.0626*** -0.0476** -0.0563*** -0.0462** 0.0265 -0.0468** 0.1094 -0.0285 -0.0833*** -0.0621** 
 
(0.0706) (0.103) (0.0865) (0.104) (0.0728) (0.104) (0.172) (0.279) (0.0783) (0.109) 
Poor (=1 if HH is above 
poverty line) 
0.0213** 0.0536*** 0.0250*** 0.0547*** 0.1367*** 0.0551*** - - - - 
 
(0.0317) (0.0518) (0.0446) (0.0515) (0.0299) (0.0513) 
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Village 
          
Nb pers in the village:  
          
1000 inhbts or less ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
1001 - 5000 inhbts 0.3269*** -0.0321 0.2826*** -0.0232 0.0246 -0.0340 0.2450 -0.0512 0.3099 *** -0.0282 
 
(0.244) (0.380) (0.247) (0.384) (0.252) (0.374) (0.481) (0.980) (0.287) (0.435) 
More than 5000 inhbts 0.2064*** 0.1255*** 0.1326 0.1271*** -0.1978*** 0.1220** 0.1658 0.0873* 0.2418*** 0.1584 *** 
 
(0.264) (0.408) (0.317) (0.418) (0.272) (0.410) (0.527) (1.160) (0.302) (0.456) 
Employment program in the 
village 
0.0709*** 0.0500*** 0.1340*** 0.0497*** 0.0384*** 0.0489*** 0.2030*** 0.0390** 0.0698*** 0.0536*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0533) (0.0454) (0.0542) (0.0387) (0.0539) (0.0840) (0.137) (0.0426) (0.0577) 
Accessibility by road -0.0944*** -0.0211 -0.0067*** -0.0237 -0.0400** -0.0208 -0.0284** -0.0041 -0.1053*** -0.0282 
 
(0.0557) (0.0929) (0.0564) (0.0940) (0.0550) (0.0945) (0.0966) (0.181) (0.0680) (0.107) 
Distance to HQ (in log) 0.0232*** 0.0012 0.0255*** 0.0001 0.0208*** 0.0003 0.0393*** 0.0085 0.0186*** -0.0012 
 
(0.0169) (0.0261) (0.0174) (0.0293) (0.0174) (0.0261) (0.0337) (0.0673) (0.0192) (0.0284) 
Conflict -0.0227*** -0.0108 0.0629 -0.0109 -0.0184*** -0.0107 -0.0845 -0.0058 -0.0301*** -0.0131 
 
(0.0233) (0.0362) (0.0251) (0.0365) (0.0243) (0.0365) (0.0469) (0.0828) (0.0269) (0.0401) 
Daily women unskilled 
wage rate (in log) 
0.0931*** 0.0564*** 0.1088*** 0.0559*** -0.0927*** 0.0538*** 0.0671** -0.0034 0.0809*** 0.0778*** 
 
(0.0498) (0.0788) (0.0589) (0.0790) (0.0518) (0.0770) (0.0947) (0.201) (0.0579) (0.0921) 
Wage x 1001 - 5000 inhbts 
in the village 
-0.1297*** -0.0109 -0.1110*** -0.0132 -0.0048 -0.0101 -0.0684 0.0115 -0.1313*** -0.0196 
 
(0.0650) (0.102) (0.0656) (0.102) (0.0676) (0.0999) (0.133) (0.269) (0.0751) (0.114) 
Wage x more than 5000 
inhbts in the village 
-0.0968*** -0.0862*** -0.0937*** -0.0876*** 0.0811*** -0.0839*** -0.0245 -0.0733** -0.1057*** -0.1085*** 
 
(0.0698) (0.106) (0.0944) (0.108) (0.0717) (0.106) (0.141) (0.302) (0.0780) (0.117) 
Unemployment rate in the 
district (in unit) 
-0.0060*** -0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0010 -0.0083 *** -0.0010 -0.0115*** -0.0034* -0.0025 0.0016 
 
(0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0065) (0.0096) (1.365) (1.537) (0.731) (1.113) 
% of people working in 
agricultural and mining 
activities (in unit) 
0.0052*** 0.0007** 0.0033*** 0.0006* 0.0055*** 0.0007** 0.0062*** 0.0006 0.0047*** 0.0007* 
 
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Observations 18,738 18,738 18,738 4,924 13,814 
Log pseudolikelihood -17182.805 -17883.883 -16094.995 -3755.0623 -13324.01 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in all estimated regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the households level. Several 
women belong to the same household and clustering allows correcting for possible bias attributed to household size. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 
10%. Marginal Effects are estimated using Greene (1998) and Baslevent and El-Hamidi (2009) formulas.  
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4.5. Conclusion 
 
Our objectives are to understand first the relationship between natural resource collection and 
labor market participation, and second the role of fuel scarcity on the decision process. We 
focus on women aged from 15 to 65 years old who live in rural India. Forest represents an 
important resource for people in India especially in terms of fuel. Deforestation increases fuel 
scarcity has therefore an impact on people. We use two measures of fuel scarcity: lagged 
forest cover and firewood price. We show with a bivariate probit that fuel scarcity increases 
the probability that women are involved in natural resource collection. Through natural 
resource collection, environmental degradations are a barrier for women to access the labor 
market. Indeed, it decreases the probability to participate to wage activity or to family 
business. By contrast, there is no evidence that it has an impact on agricultural activities. We 
also note that households living above poverty lines are more sensitive to fuel scarcity. 
Indeed, Households living below the poverty line are constrained by their income. In their 
case fuel collection has no effect on women’s choice to participate to labor market and lagged 
forest cover has a positive effect on the probability to collect wood.  
We can conclude that environmental degradations have adverse effects on people. Our results 
are in the line of the UNDP observations: even developing countries must engage in the 
protection of environment. It would be interesting to continue this project studying the impact 
of fuel scarcity on children school attendance.  
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4.6. Appendix 
 
4.6.1. Forest cover in India 
Map 4.1. Forest cover map of India 
 
Source: 2005 State of Forest Report 
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4.6.2. Marginal effects 
Despite the issue of endogeneity of �! in the equation of �!, the terms that enter the likelihood 
function for the recursive bivariate probit model are the same as those for the usual bivariate 
probit (Maddala, 1983). The probabilities for the model are given by: 
 
   Pr �! = 1,�! = 1 = Φ!(�! + �!′�!,�!′�!,�), 
   Pr �! = 0,�! = 1 = Φ! −�! − �!′�!,�!′�!,−� , 
   Pr �! = 1,�! = 0 = Φ! �!′�!,−�!′�!,−� , 
   Pr �! = 0,�! = 0 = Φ! −�!′�!,−�!′�!,� . 
 
where Φ! is the bivariate normal cumulative distribution function. We cannot interpret results 
on the basis of coefficient estimates. The vector of explanatory variables X appearing in the 
natural resource collection equation has an indirect effect (through the endogenous dummy 
�! ) on labor market participation, as well as a direct effect since they also appear in 
�! equation. Therefore, we compute the marginal effects at the sample means of variables, 
which provide the change in the probability following one unit increase in the explanatory 
variable. Greene (1998) proposes the definitions and formulas to calculate them in the case of 
� = 0, showing that the marginal effect of an explanatory variable is the sum of a direct 
and/or indirect effect depending on which equation(s) the variable is included in. In our case, 
the decisions to participate to the labor market and to collect natural resource are potentially 
interdependent. Therefore we can expect that � is different from zero, and computation of 
marginal effects may differ. Baslevent and El-Hamidi (2009) adapt formulas to obtain correct 
marginal effects.  
 
In the case of � ≠ 0, the marginal effect of a continuous explanatory variable x (representing 
for example the age of individuals), is given by: 
 
�� �! �!,�!, �!
��
= � �! + �!′�! Φ
(�!′�! − �(�! + �!′�!))
1 − �!
+ � �!′�! Φ
(−�!′�! + �(�!′�!))
1 − �!
.�!
+ � �!′�! Φ
((�! + �!′�!) − �(�!′�!))
1 − �!
− � −�!′�! Φ
(�!′�! − �(�!′�!))
1 − �!
.�! 
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where α! and β! are the coefficients of x in both equations, ϕ and Φ are respectively the 
univariate normal cumulative distribution and the density function. The first part of the 
expression corresponds to the direct effect and the second part to the indirect effect (Greene, 
1998).  
 
Considering now the case of a binary variable q (for example a variable poor=1 if the 
households is below the poverty line, =0 otherwise).  
 
� �! �!,�!, �!, � = 1 − � �! �!,�!, �!, � = 0
= Φ! �! + �!′�!,�!′�!, � + Φ! �!′�!,−�!′�!,−� |� = 1
− Φ! �! + �!′�!,�!′�!, � + Φ! �!′�!,−�!′�!,−� |� = 0  
 
 
In the case of � = 0, the marginal effect of a continuous explanatory variable x (representing 
for example the age of individuals), is given by: 
 
�� �! �!,�!, �!
��
= � �! + �!′�! Φ((�!′�!) + � �!′�! Φ(−�!′�!) .�!
+ � �!′�! Φ(�! + �!′�!) − � −�!′�! Φ(�!′�!) .�! 
 
 
For a binary variable q (for example a variable poor=1 if the households is below the poverty 
line, =0 otherwise), the marginal effect is given by: 
 
� �! �!,�!, �!, � = 1 − � �! �!,�!, �!, � = 0
= Φ(�!′�!)Φ �! + �!′�!) + Φ(−�!′�! Φ �!′�! |� = 1
− Φ(�!′�!)Φ �! + �!′�!) + Φ(−�!′�! Φ �!′�! |� = 0  
 
The calculation of the marginal effect of the binary variable y! does not depend of ρ and the 
marginal effect is: 
� �! �!,�!, �! = 1 − � �! �!,�!, �! = 0 =  Φ �! + �!′�! − Φ(�!′�!) 
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Finally, the marginal effects for the equation of �! are defined in terms of univariate normal 
probabilities since the expectation of �! only depend of �! and Z. 
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Table 4.5. Results with lagged forest area proxy - coefficient estimates 
 
Full sample  
(model 1a) 
Full sample  
(model 2a) 
Full sample  
(model 3a) 
Poor households  
(model 4a) 
Non poor households 
(model 1a) 
 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Farm 
activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Family 
business and 
other activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Fuel collection -0.910*** - 1.021*** - -0.949*** - 0.267 - -1.153*** - 
 
(0.242) 
 
(0.237) 
 
(0.170) 
 
(0.482) 
 
(0.0845) 
 
Lagged forest area km
2
 (log) - -0.0319*** - -0.0105 - -0.0319*** - 0.0384* - -0.0473*** 
  
(0.0102) 
 
(0.00880) 
 
(0.0102) 
 
(0.0214) 
 
(0.00829) 
Individual characteristics 
          
Age of the individual 0.135*** 0.00259 0.0993*** -0.00111 0.106*** 8.75e-05 0.166*** 0.0140 0.121*** 0.000604 
 
(0.00641) (0.00446) (0.00429) (0.00422) (0.00448) (0.00418) (0.00843) (0.00966) (0.00514) (0.00471) 
Age
2
 -0.00177*** -8.36e-05 -0.00122*** -4.05e-05 -0.00149*** -5.44e-05 -0.00221*** -0.000176 -0.00157*** -7.02e-05 
 
(8.04e-05) (5.57e-05) (5.58e-05) (5.35e-05) (5.88e-05) (5.29e-05) (0.000107) (0.000119) (6.50e-05) (5.96e-05) 
Never attended school ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
School between 1-5 years -0.149*** -0.0639 0.0432 -0.0966** -0.231*** -0.0727* -0.0976 0.0572 -0.166*** -0.0802* 
 
(0.0296) (0.0396) (0.0295) (0.0395) (0.0313) (0.0392) (0.0613) (0.0951) (0.0336) (0.0432) 
School between 6-10 years -0.358*** -0.125*** -0.00551 -0.170*** -0.527*** -0.144*** -0.372*** -0.0220 -0.351*** -0.145*** 
 
(0.0291) (0.0406) (0.0305) (0.0406) (0.0321) (0.0398) (0.0657) (0.114) (0.0320) (0.0421) 
School between 11-15 years -0.686*** -0.392*** -0.238*** -0.430*** -0.710*** -0.414*** -0.411** -0.172 -0.709*** -0.433*** 
 
(0.0491) (0.0610) (0.0627) (0.0621) (0.0585) (0.0610) (0.186) (0.255) (0.0510) (0.0627) 
Household characteristics 
          
Nb of children aged 0-7 0.00577 0.00425 0.0507*** 0.00654 -0.0647*** 0.00226 0.0165 0.0448 -0.00245 -0.00802 
 
(0.0110) (0.0194) (0.0109) (0.0203) (0.0122) (0.0197) (0.0181) (0.0310) (0.0144) (0.0225) 
Nb of children aged 8-21 -0.00712 0.000658 0.00869 0.00279 -0.0360*** 0.000501 -0.0257* 0.0430 -0.00322 -0.00620 
 
(0.00837) (0.0159) (0.00794) (0.0163) (0.00916) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0268) (0.0103) (0.0170) 
Nb of men aged 21-65 -0.123*** -0.0505** -0.00297 -0.0495** -0.190*** -0.0458* -0.0887*** -0.0408 -0.128*** -0.0616** 
 
(0.0152) (0.0239) (0.0157) (0.0245) (0.0173) (0.0245) (0.0307) (0.0568) (0.0174) (0.0261) 
Nb of women aged 21-65 -0.0661*** -0.0272 -0.00535 -0.0329 -0.113*** -0.0282 -0.186*** -0.0248 -0.0324 -0.0168 
 
(0.0193) (0.0311) (0.0193) (0.0317) (0.0207) (0.0315) (0.0366) (0.0771) (0.0226) (0.0344) 
Hindu ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
Muslim -0.453*** -0.177*** -0.350*** -0.182*** -0.346*** -0.180*** -0.366*** -0.356** -0.427*** -0.0952 
 
(0.0456) (0.0683) (0.0528) (0.0688) (0.0511) (0.0686) (0.0991) (0.140) (0.0517) (0.0747) 
Other religion -0.200*** -0.231** -0.311*** -0.221** 0.0616 -0.226** 0.0743 -0.279 -0.256*** -0.263** 
 
(0.0720) (0.103) (0.0821) (0.105) (0.0728) (0.104) (0.159) (0.281) (0.0798) (0.110) 
Poor (=1 if HH is above 
poverty line) 
0.0841** 0.329*** -0.216*** 0.333*** 0.453*** 0.346*** - - - - 
 
(0.0331) (0.0519) (0.0311) (0.0519) (0.0295) (0.0513) 
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Village 
          
Nb pers in the village:           
 
1000 inhbts or less ref  ref  ref  ref  ref  
1001 - 5000 inhbts 1.066*** -0.201 0.793*** -0.0297 0.0539 -0.244 0.646 -0.256 0.948*** -0.162 
 (0.247) (0.378) (0.246) (0.372) (0.248) (0.367) (0.480) (1.026) (0.280) (0.433) 
More than 5000 inhbts 0.770*** 0.981** -0.121 1.130*** -0.693*** 0.880** -0.174 2.594** 0.883*** 1.077** 
 (0.262) (0.401) (0.281) (0.404) (0.267) (0.402) (0.523) (1.242) (0.297) (0.452) 
Employment program in the 
village 
0.221*** 0.255*** 0.0905** 0.230*** 0.143*** 0.249*** 0.212** 0.214 0.214*** 0.264*** 
 (0.0382) (0.0536) (0.0405) (0.0546) (0.0384) (0.0539) (0.0833) (0.139) (0.0420) (0.0576) 
Accessibility by road -0.298*** -0.135 -0.182*** -0.152* -0.140*** -0.118 -0.225** -0.0349 -0.325*** -0.156 
 (0.0551) (0.0918) (0.0552) (0.0926) (0.0539) (0.0938) (0.0987) (0.182) (0.0673) (0.104) 
Distance to HQ (in log) 0.0662*** 0.0137 0.0720*** -0.0150 0.0673*** 0.00812 0.132*** 0.0487 0.0461** 0.00634 
 (0.0169) (0.0269) (0.0172) (0.0280) (0.0172) (0.0265) (0.0342) (0.0703) (0.0190) (0.0284) 
Conflict -0.0706*** -0.0817** 0.000939 -0.0667* -0.0650*** -0.0806** -0.0154 -0.0308 -0.0900*** -0.101** 
 (0.0233) (0.0363) (0.0240) (0.0369) (0.0241) (0.0367) (0.0474) (0.0844) (0.0269) (0.0398) 
Daily women unskilled 
wage rate (in log) 
0.319*** 0.303*** 0.249*** 0.312*** -0.264*** 0.277*** 0.228** -0.00932 0.305*** 0.376*** 
 (0.0490) (0.0778) (0.0537) (0.0761) (0.0505) (0.0746) (0.0943) (0.208) (0.0563) (0.0910) 
Wage x 1001 - 5000 inhbts 
in the village 
-0.375*** -0.0538 -0.301*** -0.0944 -0.0178 -0.0415 -0.228* 0.0545 -0.358*** -0.0917 
 (0.0655) (0.101) (0.0660) (0.0990) (0.0665) (0.0977) (0.133) (0.280) (0.0734) (0.114) 
Wage x more than 5000 
inhbts in the village 
-0.362*** -0.443*** -0.154** -0.479*** 0.198*** -0.417*** -0.0605 -0.742** -0.409*** -0.497*** 
 (0.0688) (0.104) (0.0781) (0.104) (0.0700) (0.104) (0.142) (0.322) (0.0760) (0.116) 
Unemployment rate in the 
district 
-0.0178*** -0.0058 -0.0007 -0.0068 -0.0278*** -0.0057 -0.0359*** -0 .0288* -0.0045 0.0086 
 (0.0062) (0.0091) (0.0063) (0.0097) (0.0065) (0.0095) (0.0139) (0.0157) (0.0074) (0.0107) 
% of people working in 
agricultural and mining 
activities 
0.0154*** 0.0040** 0.0087*** 0.0027 0.0185*** 0.0042** 0.0207*** 0.0015 0.0130*** 0.0035* 
 (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0038) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Constant -2.310*** 0.523 -4.023*** 0.628* -0.493* 0.668** -3.906*** 0.811 -1.624*** 0.539 
 
(0.379) (0.346) (0.258) (0.339) (0.278) (0.329) (0.587) (0.845) (0.282) (0.406) 
athrho 0.732*** (0.211) -0.433*** (0.162) 0.587*** (0.113) -0.0181 (0.223) 1.027*** (0.113) 
Observations 18,738 18,738 18,738 4,924 13,814 
Log pseudolikelihood -17206.13 -17902.965 -16110.931 -3754.8686 -13329.578 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in all estimated regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the households level. Several 
women belong to the same household and clustering allows correcting for possible bias attributed to household size. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant at 
10% 
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Table 4.6. Results with firewood price area proxy - coefficient estimates 
 
Full sample 
(model 1b) 
Full sample 
(model 2b) 
Full sample 
(model 3b) 
Poor households 
(model 4b) 
Non poor households 
(model 1b) 
 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Farm 
activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Family 
business and 
other activity 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Labor 
market 
participation 
Natural 
resource 
collection 
Fuel collection -0.627*** - 0.185 - -0.525*** - -0.631 - -0.881*** - 
 
(0.219) 
 
(0.636) 
 
(0.174) 
 
(0.501) 
 
(0.185) 
 
Firewood price (in log) - 0.268*** - 0.238*** - 0.242*** - 0.179* - 0.284*** 
  
(0.0472) 
 
(0.0614) 
 
(0.0477) 
 
(0.103) 
 
(0.0498) 
Individual characteristics 
          
Age of the individual 0.140*** 8.92e-05 0.102*** -0.00162 0.109*** -0.00142 0.164*** 0.0153 0.128*** -0.00285 
 
(0.00511) (0.00428) (0.00395) (0.00422) (0.00442) (0.00419) (0.00894) (0.00981) (0.00614) (0.00476) 
Age
2
 -0.00183*** -5.54e-05 -0.00126*** -3.53e-05 -0.00153*** -3.78e-05 -0.00218*** -0.000185 -0.00166*** -3.23e-05 
 
(6.44e-05) (5.39e-05) (4.97e-05) (5.33e-05) (5.80e-05) (5.31e-05) (0.000115) (0.000120) (7.66e-05) (6.02e-05) 
Never attended school ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
School between 1-5 years -0.148*** -0.0772* 0.0289 -0.0871** -0.231*** -0.0856** -0.0888 0.0729 -0.165*** -0.103** 
 
(0.0299) (0.0395) (0.0316) (0.0408) (0.0317) (0.0392) (0.0611) (0.0937) (0.0342) (0.0437) 
School between 6-10 years -0.360*** -0.149*** -0.0330 -0.161*** -0.531*** -0.163*** -0.365*** 0.0105 -0.356*** -0.181*** 
 
(0.0293) (0.0401) (0.0349) (0.0431) (0.0324) (0.0399) (0.0665) (0.113) (0.0325) (0.0429) 
School between 11-15 years -0.684*** -0.413*** -0.334*** -0.420*** -0.700*** -0.428*** -0.430** -0.151 -0.714*** -0.462*** 
 
(0.0502) (0.0613) (0.0765) (0.0654) (0.0605) (0.0617) (0.178) (0.260) (0.0520) (0.0639) 
Household characteristics 
          
Nb of children aged 0-7 0.00556 0.0110 0.0531*** 0.00914 -0.0664*** 0.00952 0.0200 0.0395 -0.00243 0.00262 
 
(0.0109) (0.0194) (0.0110) (0.0196) (0.0122) (0.0196) (0.0178) (0.0309) (0.0141) (0.0229) 
Nb of children aged 8-21 -0.00747 0.00618 0.00965 0.00622 -0.0371*** 0.00578 -0.0208 0.0361 -0.00276 0.000302 
 
(0.00824) (0.0157) (0.00821) (0.0158) (0.00914) (0.0158) (0.0155) (0.0267) (0.01000) (0.0175) 
Nb of men aged 21-65 -0.124*** -0.0485** -0.0112 -0.0473* -0.191*** -0.0456* -0.0901*** -0.0245 -0.131*** -0.0565** 
 
(0.0150) (0.0243) (0.0166) (0.0245) (0.0174) (0.0247) (0.0300) (0.0579) (0.0173) (0.0268) 
Nb of women aged 21-65 -0.0666*** -0.0329 -0.0115 -0.0341 -0.114*** -0.0341 -0.185*** -0.0409 -0.0316 -0.0268 
 
(0.0191) (0.0313) (0.0198) (0.0318) (0.0208) (0.0316) (0.0364) (0.0759) (0.0223) (0.0352) 
Hindu ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
Muslim -0.459*** -0.209*** -0.394*** -0.206*** -0.346*** -0.208*** -0.402*** -0.376*** -0.443*** -0.140* 
 
(0.0452) (0.0681) (0.0531) (0.0687) (0.0519) (0.0685) (0.0949) (0.137) (0.0524) (0.0751) 
Other religion -0.189*** -0.229** -0.376*** -0.223** 0.0891 -0.226** 0.0379 -0.210 -0.248*** -0.263** 
 
(0.0706) (0.103) (0.0865) (0.104) (0.0728) (0.104) (0.172) (0.279) (0.0783) (0.109) 
Poor (=1 if HH is above 
poverty line) 
0.0654** 0.323*** -0.174*** 0.331*** 0.444*** 0.334*** - - - - 
 
(0.0317) (0.0518) (0.0446) (0.0515) (0.0299) (0.0513) 
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Village 
          
Nb pers in the village:  
          
1000 inhbts or less ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
ref 
 
1001 - 5000 inhbts 1.128*** -0.178 0.786*** -0.129 0.0842 -0.190 0.605 -0.460 1.050*** -0.139 
 
(0.244) (0.380) (0.247) (0.384) (0.252) (0.374) (0.481) (0.980) (0.287) (0.435) 
More than 5000 inhbts 0.728*** 1.090*** 0.110 1.119*** -0.777*** 1.045** 0.0319 2.083* 0.864*** 1.200*** 
 
(0.264) (0.408) (0.317) (0.418) (0.272) (0.410) (0.527) (1.160) (0.302) (0.456) 
Employment program in the 
village 
0.214*** 0.244*** 0.128*** 0.244*** 0.133*** 0.240*** 0.237*** 0.282** 0.209*** 0.236*** 
 
(0.0385) (0.0533) (0.0454) (0.0542) (0.0387) (0.0539) (0.0840) (0.137) (0.0426) (0.0577) 
Accessibility by road -0.299*** -0.124 -0.206*** -0.141 -0.134** -0.122 -0.228** -0.0363 -0.328*** -0.148 
 
(0.0557) (0.0929) (0.0564) (0.0940) (0.0550) (0.0945) (0.0966) (0.181) (0.0680) (0.107) 
Distance to HQ (in log) 0.0690*** 0.00659 0.0731*** 0.000511 0.0699*** 0.00175 0.135*** 0.0731 0.0501*** -0.00572 
 
(0.0169) (0.0261) (0.0174) (0.0293) (0.0174) (0.0261) (0.0337) (0.0673) (0.0192) (0.0284) 
Conflict -0.0693*** -0.0589 -0.0105 -0.0594 -0.0628*** -0.0589 -0.0209 -0.0503 -0.0909*** -0.0633 
 
(0.0233) (0.0362) (0.0251) (0.0365) (0.0243) (0.0365) (0.0469) (0.0828) (0.0269) (0.0401) 
Daily women unskilled 
wage rate (in log) 
0.313*** 0.309*** 0.302*** 0.307*** -0.286*** 0.295*** 0.219** -0.0290 0.299*** 0.377*** 
 
(0.0498) (0.0788) (0.0589) (0.0790) (0.0518) (0.0770) (0.0947) (0.201) (0.0579) (0.0921) 
Wage x 1001 - 5000 inhbts 
in the village 
-0.388*** -0.0598 -0.315*** -0.0722 -0.0210 -0.0557 -0.219 0.0989 -0.381*** -0.0952 
 
(0.0650) (0.102) (0.0656) (0.102) (0.0676) (0.0999) (0.133) (0.269) (0.0751) (0.114) 
Wage x more than 5000 
inhbts in the village 
-0.344*** -0.472*** -0.253*** -0.481*** 0.232*** -0.461*** -0.127 -0.632** -0.398*** -0.526*** 
 
(0.0698) (0.106) (0.0944) (0.108) (0.0717) (0.106) (0.141) (0.302) (0.0780) (0.117) 
Unemployment rate in the 
district 
-0.0182*** -0.0053 -0.0025 -0.0053 -0.0284*** -0.0058 -0.0400*** -0.0290* -0.0054 0.0080 
 
(0.0062) (0.0093) (0.0065) (0.0097) (0.0065) (0.0096) (0.0137) (0.0154) (0.0073) (0.0111) 
% of people working in 
agricultural and mining 
activities 
0.0158*** 0.0039** 0.0094*** 0.0033* 0.0189*** 0.0038** 0.0207*** 0.0048 0.0137*** 0.0034* 
 
(0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0017) (0.0011) (0.0018) (0.0021) (0.0035) (0.0013) (0.0019) 
Constant -2.644*** 0.149 -3.474*** 0.285 -0.890*** 0.279 -3.033*** 0.709 -2.009*** 0.127 
 
(0.332) (0.354) (0.563) (0.358) (0.277) (0.339) (0.681) (0.841) (0.350) (0.418) 
athrho 0.517*** (0.150) 0.0532 (0.335) 0.327*** (0.0958) 0.451 (0.290) 0.732*** (0.163) 
Observations 18,738 18,738 18,738 4,924 13,814 
Log pseudolikelihood -17182.805 -17883.883 -16094.995 -3755.0623 -13324.01 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors in all estimated regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity and clustering at the households level. Several 
women belong to the same household and clustering allows correcting for possible bias attributed to household size. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *significant 
at 10% 
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Conclusion 
 
 
In the context of growing concerns for climate change, the objective of this dissertation has 
been to bring some insights on two environmental issues. The first one concerns the way 
households’ well-being is affected by environmental changes and the second one deals with 
the question of whether environmental policies are efficient enough to significantly decrease 
greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption. 
 
To tackle the latter issue, we have three contributions. We focused in a first chapter on the 
determinants of residential energy consumption in France. The residential sector is the 
primary energy user in the European Union or the United States; it accounts for 
approximately one-quarter of total energy consumption (Odyssee, 2013; International Energy 
Agency, 2013). Therefore, an in-depth understanding of households energy consumption is 
needed to design adequate energy policies and achieve a low-carbon society. The literature 
identifies several potential determinants but do not pay much attention to households’ 
characteristics, except for the income. Using an econometric model and INSEE data, we show 
that energy consumption is almost completely determined by the technical properties of a 
dwelling, the type of heating technology, and climate dummies. This implies that in the short 
run, without large investments in insulation and new types of energy-efficient appliances, 
changes in energy consumption will be weak.  
We evaluate the impact of environmental policies in the two following chapters using two 
levels of analysis, macroeconomic (in chapter 2) and microeconomic (in chapter 3). The 
challenge for environmental policies is to induce households to undertake energy saving 
renovations in their housing. This is the objective of current policies as (i) the tax credit,  
(ii) the 5.5% VAT, (iii) subsidies for households belonging to the first income quintile, and  
(iv) the zero rate bank loans. However, these measures are very expensive for the government 
(for instance, the public cost of the tax credit reaches €12 billions in 5 years). It seems 
therefore important to assess their effectiveness.  
 
In chapter 2, we evaluate the impact of French current policies at a national level, using a 
simulation model. We study their impact on energy consumption, greenhouse gases emissions 
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and on the number of renovations by 2050. All public policies exhibit some efficiency since 
they allow decreasing energy consumption and greenhouse gases emissions and they 
encourage households to renovate. Residential energy consumption per square meter would 
have been 28% higher in 2010 without any public policies, and greenhouse gases emissions 
would have been 55% higher. Their impact shows up until 2050. One of the most efficient 
public policies, given its impact on energy consumption and greenhouse gases emissions as 
well as its cost, seems to be the tax credit. In chapter 3, we analyze the effect of this measure 
on households’ behavior, paying a particular attention to the presence of free riding. This 
measure has essentially an impact on renovation expenditures (with a 24.65% rise if we 
consider current prices). However, it allows increasing the renovation rate only slightly (by 
0.89%) between 2005 and 2008. Out of these two chapters, we obtain that several effects tend 
to mitigate the impact of environmental measures.  
First, we observe the presence of free riding. We estimate that free riders represent more that 
40% of the households who renovate between 2011 and 2050 (in chapter 2). The effect is 
more important at the beginning of the period and it then fades over time. If we only consider 
the tax credit between 2005 and 2008, it encouraged 900,000 households to renovate ceteris 
paribus, whereas 4.2 millions benefited from this measure (according to chapter 3). It is 
consistent with a statistical analysis: less than 10% of households who benefit from the 
measure declare that they have undertaken a renovation that they did not consider before the 
introduction of the measure. Free riding on fiscal measure seems thus very important.  
Second, public policies are not sufficient to encourage low-income households and tenants to 
renovate. Even if energy consumption is only weakly responsive to an increase of income per 
consumption unit (in chapter 1, we find that income elasticity is 0.02 in houses and is not 
significant in flats), income plays an important role in the decision to renovate. It is mostly 
the households in the fourth and fifth income quintile who invest (as we can see in chapters 2 
and 3). Environmental public policy does not manage to induce poorer households 
investment. Moreover, we have shown in chapter 1 that buildings equipped with a collective 
heating (using either natural gas or oil) have significantly higher levels of consumption than 
those equipped with an individual heater (using either natural gas or electricity), ceteris 
paribus. However, in this type of housing, decisions to renovate are made by majority vote at 
owners’ meetings. The energy-saving measures have therefore a lower probability of being 
undertaken. In addition, environmental measures, as tax credit, principally encourage owners-
occupant to undertake renovations, and not tenants. A tenant has less incentive to make an 
energy efficiency investment because he does not stay long enough in the dwelling to secure a 
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return on the investment. Meanwhile, renovations increase the value of the dwelling for 
homeowners.  
Third, the market for energy-saving renovations is imperfectly competitive and this allows 
building professionals to capture part of the earnings from tax credit, through prices increase. 
We show in chapter 3 that the tax credit is followed by an increase in the renovation 
expenditures of 24.65%, but two-thirds of this rise is due to an increase of the prices. 
Finally, as we obtain in chapter 1, investment in glazing insulation may not impact energy 
consumption. Households can decide to opt for a higher thermal comfort following the 
investment. This rebound effect explains that the final impact of renovations on energy 
consumption and greenhouse gases emissions could be zero.  
 
These four effects reduce the impact of environmental policies. Consequently, current policies 
are not sufficient to achieve the objectives set by the Grenelle Act. Based on simulations in 
the chapter 2, we can propose several solutions to reach a 50 kWhep/m
2
 average energy 
consumption and divide by 4 greenhouse gases emissions by 2050 compared to 1990 level. 
We could consider significantly increasing the tax credit up to 54% (the current rates are 15% 
for double-glazing, 25% for roof and wall insulation and modernization of the heating system, 
and 40% for renewable energy adoption) or introduce new policies such as bonuses: a bonus 
of €2900 per renovation would then be required to reach the objective. Finally, a possible 
efficient policy mix to reach the objectives would be an income deduction rate of 45% for all 
renovations from 2011, a zero rate bank loan that can be combined with the income tax 
deduction over the whole period, a 5.5% VAT, a €1000 bonus for households belonging to 
first and second income quintiles and a €500 bonus for others households. 
However, such measures would represent a very high public cost. We therefore recommend 
introducing income ceilings to limit free riding and to encourage only households with low 
income. Moreover, public costs could be limited thanks to an additional tax on energy prices. 
Energy consumption is correlated with energy prices (in absolute values the price elasticity is 
about 0.46 in houses and 0.86 in flats). In addition, a sharp increase in prices would lead the 
household, all things being equal, to quickly invest in energy-saving renovations. If the 
energy prices trend remains as forecasted by IEA (i.e. an increase of 3.1% of electricity price, 
of 3.3% of fuel oil price and 3.6% of gas price), a 50 kWhpe/m
2
 average residential 
consumption will be reached in 2078. However, a tax on energy prices could affect primarily 
the poorest people and raise the issue of energy poverty, but note that taxes could be 
redistributed to reach equity objectives. Nonetheless, we can wonder about the suitability to 
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conduct environmental policy without international coordination. Indeed, it generates high 
costs without the guarantee to decrease environmental damage and climatic events. 
 
As we saw emerging countries are more exposed to climate disasters than developed ones. 
Therefore, the most important concern in emerging countries is to find a way to limit the 
consequences of climate change. In chapter 4 we explore how environment can affect people 
and how they adapt to environmental changes. More precisely, we try to understand the link 
between deforestation or fuel scarcity and the decision to collect natural resources or 
participate to labor market in India. Indian households are also sensitive to the evolution of 
the price of their main fuel, particularly those living above proverty line. In France, 
households adjust their consumption depending on the energy prices. In India, consequences 
are quite different. An increase in fuelwood price has an impact on women participation to the 
labor market. Prices reflect the scarcity of fuel. Higher prices encourage women to collect 
fuelwood themselves and that in turn reduce their probability to participate at wage activities. 
This means, deforestation through increase in the fuelwood scarcity affects households. This 
is in line with the UNPD report (2011): environmental degradations have adverse effects on 
people. It seems important to enhance measures to limit deforestation. It could be for example 
realized through an increase of protected forest area or Joint Forest Management. 
 
Given our results, several recommendations can be formulated. To sum up, in developed 
countries the most important concern is the implementation of adequate environmental 
policies to decrease significantly greenhouse gases emissions. To achieve the objectives set in 
France, current policies should be strengthening. First environmental measures should 
provide incentives to the installation of individual metering or the replacement of collective 
systems by individual heating systems. Indeed, it could be helpful (i) in decreasing energy 
consumption in collective housing and (ii) in inducing households to renovate or improve 
thermal quality of their housing. The incentive to renovate in dwelling with collective heating 
is weak because the energy saving is shared between all co-owners.  
Second, environmental policies should decrease the cost of energy-saving equipments for 
low-income households, introducing for example high bonuses with income ceiling. This 
would allows (i) decreasing significantly energy consumption because these households often 
live in less insulated dwellings and (ii) focusing only on households who need financial 
support to renovate in order to limit free riding.  
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Third, the impact of fiscal measure on renovation rate is low because of free riding and as we 
saw, financial incentives represent a high public cost. Therefore, to mitigate the negative 
effects related to these policies while minimizing public cost, a possible solution would be to 
harden the regulatory measures such as thermal regulations on new constructions. Moreover, 
it is more complicated to decrease the energy consumption following a renovation than 
directly build an energy-efficient housing. 
Finally, emerging countries have to limit environmental degradations because of the negative 
effects on population. Deforestation is one of the largest visible environmental degradations 
and in this context, a better forest management, through Joint Forest Management for 
example, is needed.  
 
 
Environmental issues raise a lot of questions. Even if we have tried to bring some insights it 
would be interesting to continue this research.  
We plan to study energy poverty in France. According to INSEE, around 13% of households 
are in an energy poverty situation. This corresponds to households that have to spend more 
than a tenth of their income to pay their energy bills, in order to heat their home at an 
acceptable level. Indeed, energy expenditures represent a higher part of the income of 
households belonging to the firsts income quintiles. At the same time, income is a constraint 
for energy saving investments. However, literature on energy poverty in developed countries 
is sparse. The contributions could be to identify (i) which households are in a situation of 
energy poverty in France and (ii) the main factors leading a household to energy poverty, in 
order to introduce adequate and efficient measures. Fight against energy poverty could 
increase the well-being of these households but could also have an impact on the level of 
residential energy consumption. Indeed, we can expect that households in energy poverty 
situation live in worst insulated dwelling, and use more polluting fuels but consume less 
energy. 
 
As we saw in the last chapter of this dissertation, the scarcity of a resource can have negative 
impacts on households, hampering the access of women to the labor market. This allows us to 
conclude that environmental degradations have adverse effects on people. Therefore 
households’ access to modern energy can have a positive impact on economic growth in 
emerging countries, as chapter 4 and some literature on access to electricity seems show. But 
it can also increase pollution that in turn affects households’ wealth. Future research could be 
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to analyze the impact of energy access on development at a macro level, also considering the 
pollution issue. The impact of pollution to study the link between growth and access to 
electricity is not often considered in the literature.  
 
To go further, an attention will be also paid to the impact of pollution regulations in India on 
households’ productivity. Literature focuses on the impact of pollution on health. Through 
health effect, pollution may enhance poverty and could make it more persistent (Sala-i-
Martin, 2005). Indeed, poor households cannot afford to improve their health. As a result, it is 
more difficult for them to increase their human capital and their economic productivity. Poor 
households may therefore enter a vicious circle, known as the poverty trap (Dasgupta and 
Ray, 1986, 1987). The rapid growth in India leads to pressure on the environment, and to a 
high acceleration of the pollution: the total greenhouse gas emissions increased by 113% 
between 1990 and 2010. However, an air regulation was adopted early in India with the 1981 
Air act, which provides prevention, control and abatement of air pollution. Thereafter, an 
action plan has been adopted to reduce pollution in critically polluted cities. Today, 17 cities 
are concerned with these measures. We could study whether environmental regulation is 
effective enough to improve the workforce productivity and to prevent people to enter the 
poverty trap. 
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Table 5. Summary 
 Main objectives Empirical 
approach 
Data Main results 
Chapter 
1 
Studies the determinants of residential energy 
consumption 
(1) Investigates the relative ability of 
household characteristics, technical 
properties of the dwelling, and 
climatic specificities to explain energy 
consumption per square meter 
(2) Identifies some of the main sources of 
energy conservation in the French 
housing sector 
(3) Proposes an estimation of the price 
elasticity and income elasticity of 
energy consumption per square meter 
Discrete-
continuous choice 
analysis 
 
- INSEE 2006 Enquête 
logement 
- Data on energy prices 
from the Ministère de 
l'économie, des 
finances et de 
l'industrie 
(1) Energy consumption is almost completely 
determined by technology and climate, while it is 
determined only slightly by the household itself 
(2) Strong effect of collective heating on energy 
consumption. 
Rebound effect for double-glazing in houses 
(3) Price elasticity in absolute value is equal to 0.46 in 
houses and 0.86 in flats. 
Income elasticity is low (0.02) in houses and not 
significant in flats. 
Chapter 
2 
Evaluates environmental policies at a 
national level 
(4) Estimates the French residential 
energy consumption and GHG 
emissions until 2050  
(5) Assesses the impact of environmental 
policies on energy consumption, GHG 
emissions and the number of 
renovations 
(6) Proposes different means to reach the 
objectives set out in the Grenelle Act 
Simulation model, 
with a bottom-up 
approach. We 
model:  
- Energy 
consumption 
and GHG 
emissions 
- The decision to 
invest in an 
energy saving 
renovation 
- The housing 
park 
- INSEE 2006 Enquête 
logement 
- Ministry of Ecology, 
Energy, Sustainable 
Development and the 
Sea, providing 
information on the 
number of housing 
and new constructions 
- Simulation software 
PROMODUL, used to 
estimate energy 
consumption and 
GHG emissions for 
each category of 
dwelling 
- International Energy 
Agency providing 
energy prices 
(4) With current environmental policies, energy 
consumption will be 91.67kWhpe/m
2
 in 2050 (vs. 
an objective of 50 kWhpe/m
2
) 
(5) Policies are effective, but not enough to reach 
Grenelle Act objectives. 
Free riding exists in 40.15% of the renovations 
undertaken between 2011 and 2050 
Tax credit is one of the most efficient policies. 
(6) To reach the objective, more ambitious policies 
are required. Proposition of policy mix: tax credit 
of 45% for all renovations from 2011, combined 
with a zero rate bank loan, a 5.5%VAT, a €1000 
bonus for 1st and 2nd income quintiles households 
and a €500 bonus for others. 
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Chapter 
3 
Evaluates the effect of the tax credit on 
households’ behavior 
(7) Determines if households are sensitive 
to this measure or if the tax credit 
provides funding for households that 
would have undertaken a renovation 
anyway (free riding) 
(8) Investigates whether the tax credit 
induces households to invest in more 
expensive and more energy-efficient 
renovations. 
Matching method ADEME-SOFRES 
Maîtrise de l’Energie 
surveys from 2001 and 
2008 
(7) A tax credit increases renovations by 0.86%, 
ceteris paribus. This represents 900 000 housing 
but 4.2 millions households received the tax credit 
between 2005-2008: presence of free riding. 
(8) The tax credit led to a 24.65% increase in 
expenditures (at current price). The impact is three 
times lower if we consider constant prices (8.9%): 
Building professionals capture a part of the 
earnings from the tax credit. 
Chapter 
4 
Studies the impact of environmental changes 
on agents, more precisely the impact of 
deforestation and fuel scarcity on women 
living in rural area 
(9) Examines whether deforestation and 
fuel scarcity have a direct impact on 
women’s decision to collect natural 
resources  
(10) Investigates whether it exists an 
indirect effect of fuel scarcity on 
women labor market participation 
through fuelwood collection activities 
Simultaneous 
equations model: 
bivariate probit 
model 
- 2004-2005 Indian 
Human Development 
Survey 
- 2004 Indian National 
Service Scheme 
- 1999 and 2005 Forest 
Survey of India 
reports 
(9) The scarcer environmental resources, the higher 
the probability to participate to natural resource 
collection 
(10) Fuelwood collection reduces the probability of 
participating to labor market: environmental 
degradations are a barrier to the access of women 
to the labor market.  
When the income constraint is too strong, the 
labor supply is independent of the participation to 
natural resource collection. 
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Résumé  
 
 
La consommation d’énergie et les émissions de gaz à effet de serre sont au cœur des 
préoccupations, suite aux observations de plus en plus alarmantes sur le changement 
climatique. Le GIEC (Groupe d’experts Intergouvernemental sur l’Evolution du 
Climat) qui s’est réunit en septembre dernier à Stockholm pour présenter ses résultats, 
confirment et durcit ses précédentes conclusions : le réchauffement climatique 
s’accélère. La température de la terre et des océans a augmenté de 0,85°C en moyenne 
depuis 1880 et le GIEC prévoit une hausse des températures de 0,3°C à 4,8°C d’ici 
2100, en fonction de différents scénarios. Une telle augmentation aurait des effets non 
négligeables sur le nombre et l’intensité des évènements climatiques. Par exemple, 
l’année 2012 fait partie des 10 années les plus chaudes et plusieurs évènements 
climatiques extrêmes ont pu être recensés, tels que la fonte de la banquise qui a atteint 
des records, l’ouragan Sandy aux Etats-Unis ou encore les fortes pluies au nord de 
l’Europe et à l’est de l’Australie.  
 
Premièrement, les désastres naturels causent un nombre important de pertes humaines 
(environ 8800 personnes en 2012). Deuxièmement, les dommages liés aux 
évènements climatiques représentent un coût économique important. Les évènements 
climatiques de 2012 représentent une perte économique de 200 milliards de dollars 
(AON Benfield, 2013). La moitié de ces pertes économiques est liée à l’ouragan 
Sandy, qui a causé les dommages les plus coûteux de l’année 2012, et à la sécheresse 
recensée aux Etats-Unis. Troisièmement, les effets du changement climatique ne sont 
pas tous observables aujourd’hui. Le niveau des océans va continuer à augmenter 
avec la hausse des températures, et cela amplifiera la fréquence et l’intensité des 
évènements telles que les inondations ou les tempêtes. Comme nous pouvons 
observer sur la carte 1, les pays émergents sont les plus exposés aux désastres 
climatiques. Le rapport du PNUD (Programme des Nations Unies pour le 
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Développement) sur le développement humain de 2011 souligne que les dégradations 
environnementales ou la destruction des habitats peuvent compromettre le 
développement et augmenter la pauvreté dans les pays émergents. Dans ce rapport, 
l’impact des évènements climatiques sur l’IDH (Indice de Développement Humain) 
est estimé, en considérant plusieurs scénarios. Le scénario « défi écologique » prend 
en compte les effets néfastes du réchauffement climatique sur la production agricole, 
l’accès à l’eau potable et la pollution. Le scénario « catastrophe climatique » 
considère la déforestation et la dégradation des terres, la destruction dramatique de la 
biodiversité et l’accélération des évènements météorologiques extrêmes. Les 
simulations suggèrent que l’IDH mondial serait 8% plus faible en 2050 dans le 
scénario « défi écologique » par rapport au scénario de référence, et même 12% plus 
faible pour les régions d’Asie du sud. Le scénario « catastrophe climatique » prédit un 
IDH mondial de 15% inférieur à celui du scénario de référence. Cela est lié à 
plusieurs mécanismes, par exemple la sécheresse en Afrique et l’élévation du niveau 
des océans vers les pays à faible altitude comme le Bangladesh pourrait mener à une 
augmentation du prix mondial des denrées alimentaires entre 30% et 50%, affectant 
en premier lieu les pays les plus pauvres.  
 
Considérant ces conséquences dramatiques, il semble important de s’intéresser aux 
causes de ces évènements. Même si le climat s’explique en partie par des fluctuations 
naturelles, le dernier rapport du GIEC (2013) confirme l’impact des activités 
humaines sur le réchauffement climatique (avec un niveau de confiance de 95%). De 
plus, un groupe de 18 chercheurs a récemment étudié les causes de 12 évènements 
d’une intensité climatique exceptionnelle qui se sont produits en 2012. Ils soulignent 
le fait que les activités humaines ont un impact sur certains phénomènes 
météorologiques et climatiques extrêmes (Peterson et al. 2013). Par exemple, ils 
affirment que le changement climatique causé par l’homme a joué un rôle important 
dans la vague de chaleur à l’est des Etats-Unis au printemps 2012. De la même 
manière, ils montrent que l’étendue particulièrement faible de la banquise Arctique 
durant l’été 2012, ne peut pas être expliquée uniquement par la variabilité naturelle du 
climat. L’activité humaine augmente la concentration de gaz à effet de serre dans 
l’atmosphère, principalement en raison de la combustion des énergies fossiles et de la 
déforestation (American Meteorological Society, 2012). En 2010, les émissions de 
gaz à effet de serre totales ont atteint 47 milliards de tonnes équivalent C02, ce qui 
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représentait un augmentation 32,3% par rapport à 1990 (source: CAIT, World 
Resources Institute’s climate data explorer). 
 
Les dommages environnementaux ont des conséquences irréversibles et soulèvent la 
question de la responsabilité envers les pays les plus touchés et envers les générations 
futures. Ces préoccupations ne sont pas récentes. Le rapport Brundtland (Commission 
mondiale sur l’environnement et le développement, 1987) s’est accompagné d’une 
prise de conscience mondiale sur les défis du réchauffement climatique. Un an après,  
le GIEC a été créé pour évaluer l’ampleur des changements climatiques ainsi que les 
risques. Leurs constats alarmants soulignent la nécessité d’adopter une stratégie 
d’intervention internationale, et a conduit au protocole de Kyoto en 1997. Pour la 
première fois, plusieurs pays développés se sont engagés à diminuer les émissions de 
plusieurs gaz à effet de serre de 5,2% en moyenne d’ici 2012 comparativement à leur 
niveau de 1990. Cependant, les plus grands émetteurs de gaz à effet de serre n’ont pas 
ratifié le traité. Les Etats-Unis, dont les émissions représentaient près d’un cinquième 
des émissions mondiales de CO2 en 2008 (source: United States Environmental 
Protection Agency) se sont retirés du protocole de Kyoto. Ils ont justifié leur décision 
par le fait que les pays émergents n’étaient pas impliqués dans le protocole alors que 
leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre augmentent de façon importante, avec leur 
développement économique. En effet, en 2008, presque 30% des émissions de CO2 
mondiales provenaient de la Chine et de l’Inde (source: United States Environmental 
Protection Agency). Cependant, l’Union Européenne s’est engagée à réduire ses 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre de 8% d’ici 2012, puis s’est fixée de nouveaux 
objectifs, à savoir, réduire ses émissions de 20% d’ici 2020 par rapport à 1990. Pour 
atteindre ces objectifs, plusieurs politiques ont été introduites ces dernières années en 
France et dans d’autres pays Européens.  
Cependant, les défis environnementaux pour les pays émergents méritent d’être 
explorés. Ils doivent trouver un moyen d’atténuer les effets négatifs du réchauffement 
climatique ou de s’adapter aux changements environnementaux. Même si ces pays 
sont les plus vulnérables au changement climatique et que les projections ne sont pas 
très optimistes, les conséquences pour les populations restent mal connues et la mise 
en place de politiques environnementales peut être coûteuse et peut aussi retarder leur 
développement économique. 
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Ces observations nous montrent la nécessité de s’interroger sur l’efficacité des 
politiques environnementales dans les pays développés et aussi sur les impacts 
économiques du changement climatique pour les pays émergents. Premièrement, les 
faits stylisés et les exemples présentés ci-dessus montrent qu’il est important de lutter 
contre le réchauffement climatique. Néanmoins, les politiques publiques ne sont 
efficaces que si les individus sont sensibles à ces mesures et elles représentent un coût 
public élevé. Des politiques environnementales ont été introduites ces dix dernières 
années et peu d’études ont cherché à examiner leurs effets. Deuxièmement, l’impact 
des dégradations environnementales sur la population vivant dans les pays émergents 
va devenir une préoccupation croissante et les conséquences économiques doivent 
être étudiées. Dans cette thèse, nous explorons ces questions, en utilisant des données 
sur la France et sur l’Inde.  
 
 
1. L’efficacité des politiques environnementales dans les pays 
développés : Le cas de la France 
 
Les enjeux 
La France s’est engagée par les accords internationaux à diminuer ses émissions de 
gaz à effet de serre de 20% d’ici 2020 et à les diviser par 4 d’ici 2050 par rapport au 
niveau de 1990. Cela a conduit au Grenelle de l’environnement, qui a fixé des 
objectifs plus spécifiques comme réduire la consommation d’énergie dans le secteur 
du bâtiment de 38% et d’étendre l’utilisation des énergies renouvelables pour qu’elles 
représentent 23% de la consommation d’énergie finale en 2020. Le Grenelle de 
l’environnement s’intéresse particulièrement au secteur du bâtiment puisqu’il est tout 
d’abord le premier consommateur d’énergie en France (figure 1 p.4). Même si ce 
secteur n’est pas le plus grand émetteur de gaz à effet de serre, l’augmentation (de 
13%) de ses émissions est la plus importante entre 1990 et 2010, alors que les secteurs 
de l’industrie et de l’agriculture ont réussit à réduire leurs émissions (figure 2 p.4). 
Deuxièmement, le secteur du bâtiment représente un potentiel d’économie d’énergie 
important, notamment grâce aux améliorations en termes d’isolation ou d’efficacité 
énergétique des équipements (Commission Européenne, Energy Efficiency Plan 
2011). Cependant, des efforts importants sont nécessaires pour atteindre les objectifs. 
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En 2010, la consommation d’énergie du secteur résidentiel-tertiaire était de 68 
millions de tonnes équivalent pétrole et nous nous sommes engagés à atteindre un 
niveau de 41,88 millions en 2020. De plus, les énergies renouvelables représentaient 
seulement 6% de la consommation d’énergie en 2010 (figure 3 p.5). 
 
Le secteur résidentiel 
Les déterminants de la consommation énergétique  
Nous nous intéressons au secteur résidentiel, qui compte pour les deux-tiers de la 
consommation d’énergie du secteur du bâtiment et approximativement un quart de la 
consommation énergétique française (Odyssee, 2013). La croissance de la population, 
qui a entrainé une augmentation du nombre et de la taille des logements et une hausse 
du taux d’équipement des ménages, a tendance à accroitre les besoins énergétiques. 
Le nombre de logements a augmenté de plus d’un million entre 2006 et 2010. Les 
nouvelles constructions sont associées à une consommation d’énergie plus faible 
grâce à l’amélioration de l’isolation. Cependant, le taux de renouvellement du parc de 
logement est inférieur à 1% par an (DGEMP, 2007), et cela n’est pas suffisant pour 
réduire de façon significative la demande d’énergie.  
Par conséquent, il est essentiel d’identifier les principaux déterminants de la 
consommation d’énergie résidentielle afin de mettre en place des politiques adéquates 
et efficaces. Cela est l’objectif du premier chapitre de cette thèse. La littérature 
identifie plusieurs facteurs mais ne porte pas beaucoup d’intérêt aux caractéristiques 
des ménages, mis à part au revenu. Ainsi, nous souhaitons (1) étudier la capacité des 
caractéristiques sociodémographiques des ménages, des caractéristiques techniques 
du bâti, et des spécificités climatiques de la zone d’habitation, à expliquer la 
consommation d’énergie par mètre carré, (2) identifier les sources d’économie 
d’énergie principales du secteur résidentiel français, et (3) proposer une estimation 
des élasticités prix et revenu de la consommation d’énergie par mètre carré, ce qui n’a 
pas encore été fait avec des données françaises. Nous mobilisons une approche 
empirique et nous avons recours aux données de l’enquête logement de l’INSEE 
(2006). Ces données nous renseignent sur les caractéristiques des ménages, des 
logements et sur les énergies utilisées. L’énergie fournit de l’utilité indirectement à 
travers l’utilisation d’appareils électroménagers. Par conséquent, la consommation 
d’énergie doit être étudiée conditionnellement au stock d’équipements. Nous utilisons 
un modèle de choix discret et continu. Nous estimons dans un premier temps le choix 
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du système de chauffage, puis dans un second temps la consommation d’énergie 
conditionnelle au premier choix. Les résultats montrent que la quantité d’énergie 
consommée par mètre carré est presque entièrement déterminée par les 
caractéristiques techniques du logement et par le climat. L’impact des variables 
sociodémographiques est particulièrement faible. A court terme, sans investissement 
important en matière de rénovations énergétiques ou d’adoption d’investissements 
économiseurs d’énergie, la réduction de la consommation d’énergie sera faible. Le 
défi pour les politiques publiques est donc d’inciter les ménages à entreprendre des 
rénovations énergétiques dans leur logement. Nous pouvons également noter que le 
chauffage collectif entraine une consommation d’énergie significativement plus 
importante que le chauffage individuel, ceteris paribus. Les politiques 
environnementales devraient encourager les ménages à installer des compteurs 
individuels ou à remplacer ce mode de chauffage par des systèmes individuels. Par 
contre, l’isolation du vitrage dans les maisons entraine un effet rebond. Cela signifie 
que les ménages préfèrent augmenter leur consommation d’énergie suite à 
l’installation de double vitrage (pour par exemple augmenter leur confort grâce à une 
température intérieure plus élevée). Par conséquent, ce type de rénovation ne permet 
pas de diminuer la consommation d’énergie et les émissions de gaz à effet de serre du 
secteur résidentiel. De plus, l’élasticité-prix estimée est, en valeur absolue, de 0,46 
pour les ménages vivant dans des maisons individuelles et de 0,86 pour ceux vivant 
dans des appartements collectifs. En ce qui concerne l’élasticité-revenu, celle-ci est 
particulièrement faible. Elle est de 0,02 pour les ménages vivant dans des maisons et 
elle est non-significative pour ceux vivant dans des appartements. Les ménages sont 
donc sensibles à des variations de prix de l’énergie, mais pas à des variations de 
revenu.  
 
L’adoption d’équipements économiseurs d’énergie, le paradoxe énergétique et 
l’intervention des politiques publiques 
Compte tenu des résultats trouvés dans le premier chapitre, il semble important de 
comprendre le comportement des ménages face à l’adoption d’équipements 
économiseurs d’énergie. Si nous considérons uniquement les rénovations visant à 
l’amélioration de l’efficacité énergétique des logements, 8,8% des résidences ont été 
rénovées en 2010, ce qui représente une baisse par rapport à 2006 (Source: OPEN, 
2011). Le nombre de rénovations énergétiques est encore insuffisant pour avoir un 
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impact significatif sur la consommation d’énergie du parc de logements. Cela peut 
être expliqué par le paradoxe énergétique : les ménages choisissent de ne pas investir 
dans des équipements performants, alors que cela se traduirait par des économies 
d’énergie importantes. La littérature identifie plusieurs barrières aux investissements 
économiseurs d’énergie. 
 
• Les défaillances de marché 
 
Les défaillances de marché sont des barrières à ces investissements. Cela fait 
référence au manque d’information, à la saturation de l’offre sur le marché des 
rénovations énergétiques et aux incitations divergentes (Golove et Eto, 1996; Brown, 
2001; Boulanger, 2007).  
Premièrement, les agents sont mal informés au sujet des technologies existantes, des 
opportunités et de la rentabilité des investissements. L’information peut être difficile 
et coûteuse à obtenir. C’est par exemple le cas en ce qui concerne les économies 
d’énergie suite à une rénovation (Beillan et al. 2011; Francfort, 2009). En effet, les 
agents et les logements sont hétérogènes, par conséquent le retour sur investissement 
est spécifique à l’investisseur. La rentabilité des équipements économiseurs d’énergie 
dépend par exemple de la qualité du logement : les gains d’énergie devraient être plus 
élevés dans un logement ancien et énergétiquement inefficace (Hasset et Metcalf, 
1993).  
Deuxièmement, les rénovations pour l’amélioration énergétique des logements 
nécessitent des connaissances particulières, et les professionnels peuvent ne pas être 
en mesure de répondre à la demande. Nous observons en effet une saturation de 
l’offre sur le marché de la rénovation énergétique en France (Moussaoui, 2008).  
Troisièmement, il existe des incitations divergentes entre les propriétaires et les 
locataires, résultant de la manière dont les dépenses énergétiques sont payées. Les 
ménages qui ne paient pas directement pour leur chauffage mais qui ont ces coûts 
inclus dans le montant de leur location ou le montant des charges collectives vont 
avoir tendance à opter pour un confort thermique plus élevé et donc une 
consommation d’énergie plus importante. C’est le cas en France pour les ménages 
vivant dans des immeubles collectifs avec un chauffage collectif, pour lesquels la 
consommation d’énergie peut être assimilée à un bien public car tous les habitants 
partagent la facture énergétique de l’ensemble de l’immeuble. Dans ces situations, les 
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habitants ont peut d’incitation à utiliser l’énergie de façon efficace et sont moins 
enclins à adopter des équipements économes en énergie (Maruejols et Young, 2011; 
Levinson et Niemann, 2004). De plus, les logements occupés par des propriétaires ont 
un meilleur niveau d’isolation (Gillingham et al., 2011). En effet, lorsque le logement 
est loué, les propriétaires sont moins incités à entreprendre des rénovations parce que 
ce sont les locataires qui bénéficient des économies d’énergie réalisées suite à 
l’investissement.  
 
Pour dépasser ces défaillances de marché, notamment le manque d’information, 
plusieurs mesures ont été mises en place. Les Espaces Info-Energie ont été créés en 
2001 pour informer les ménages. Ce sont des endroits où les ménages peuvent trouver 
toute l’information dont ils ont besoin concernant la consommation d’énergie, les 
énergies renouvelables ou encore les rénovations énergétiques. Il en existe 
aujourd’hui 250 en France. De plus, les équipements électroménagers se voient 
attribuer des étiquettes énergie allant de A+ pour les équipements les plus performants 
à C pour les plus grands consommateurs d’énergie (depuis 1999, les appareils 
électroménagers appartenant à l’étiquette énergie la plus énergivore ne sont plus 
autorisés à la vente). Ces étiquettes énergie sont l’équivalent des « Power Smart » au 
Canada, des « Energy Star » au Etats-Unis ou encore des « E2000 » en Suisse. Ces 
labels énergétiques sont obligatoires pour les réfrigérateurs et les congélateurs depuis 
1995 dans toute l’Union Européenne, et ils ont depuis été étendus à d’autres types 
d’appareils, puis aux logements mis en vente et en location.  
 
• Les barrières économiques 
 
Il existe également des barrières économiques telles que la contrainte de liquidité et 
l’accès au crédit (Boulanger, 2007). Par exemple, les ménages à faibles revenus n’ont 
pas de garantie et les établissements de crédit sont réticents à leur accorder des prêts. 
Ils font face à une contrainte de liquidité pour les investissements dans les 
technologies économes en énergie alors que leurs dépenses énergétiques représentent 
souvent une large part de leur budget, estimée à 15-20% en France par Cayla et al. 
(2011). 
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Pour ces raisons, plusieurs mesures financières ont été introduites. En 2009, un prêt à 
taux zéro peut être utilisé pour financer une série de rénovations énergétiques. Des 
subventions sont aussi disponibles pour les ménages (comme par exemple les 
subventions de l’ANAH ou celles provenant des régions) afin de réduire le coût de 
ces investissements et de les rendre plus abordables. De plus, un crédit d’impôt a 
l’objectif, depuis 2005, d’encourager les ménages (propriétaires ou locataires) 
d’entreprendre des rénovations énergétiques (isolation ou changement du système de 
chauffage) et/ou d’adopter des énergies renouvelables dans leur résidence principale. 
De la même manière, la TVA à taux réduit de 5,5% pour les rénovations énergétiques 
(à la place de 19,6%) a pour objectif de diminuer le coût de l’investissement.  
 
• Incertitude, irréversibilité et taux d’actualisation élevés 
 
A l’inverse, Hassett et Metcalf (1993) expliquent que le soi-disant paradoxe 
énergétique est en réalité une réponse optimale à l’incertitude sur le retour sur 
l’investissement (i.e. les économies d’énergie faisant suite à la rénovation) et à 
l’irréversibilité de l’investissement (comme l’isolation par exemple). En effet, 
l’incertitude sur les prix de l’énergie mène à une incertitude sur les économies 
d’énergie qui seront réalisées suite à l’investissement. Les agents économiques 
doivent prévoir les prix futurs de l’énergie pour évaluer la rentabilité de 
l’investissement. De plus, une fois que l’investissement est réalisé, il ne peut pas être 
annulé ou vendu si les prix de l’énergie chutent et si l’investissement devient non 
rentable. Par conséquent, il est prudent pour un agent d’attendre afin d’obtenir de 
l’information sur l’évolution des prix. 
Compte tenu de l’incertitude et de l’irréversibilité, les agents utilisent des taux 
d’actualisation implicites élevés pour les investissements économiseurs d’énergie, i.e. 
la valeur actualisée des économies d’énergie futures est faible. La littérature qui 
estime les taux d’actualisation implicites utilisés pour les investissements 
économiseurs d’énergie montre qu’ils dépassent largement le taux d’actualisation 
maximum utilisé pour d’autres types d’investissements ayant un rendement et un 
risque similaire (Sanstad et al., 1995), par un facteur 4 d’après Hasset et Metcalf 
(1993). Cela signifie que les agents exigent un rendement largement supérieur pour 
les investissements dans les équipements économiseurs d’énergie que pour les autres 
types d’investissements.  
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En termes de politiques publiques, ces conclusions soulignent le fait que fournir 
davantage d’information au sujet des gains énergétiques n’est pas suffisant pour 
motiver l’investissement. Hasset et Metcalf (1993) montrent également que 
l’augmentation des gains liés à l’investissement est susceptible d’avoir qu’un faible 
effet. Ils simulent l’impact d’un crédit d’impôt de 15% pour les équipements 
économiseurs d’énergie et ils trouvent que l’effet d’une telle politique est atténué par 
l’incertitude. Compte tenu de ces observations, il semble que les normes pourraient 
être efficaces pour diminuer la consommation d’énergie parce qu’elles n’influencent 
pas la perception des agents sur les économies d’énergie futures liées à 
l’investissement. Des réglementations thermiques ont été mises en place en 1974 pour 
les nouvelles constructions et en 2008 pour les rénovations.  
 
Efficacité des politiques publiques vs. green paradox, effet d’aubaine et effet 
rebond  
Le paradoxe énergétique conduit à un sous-investissement dans les équipements 
économiseurs d’énergie. L’intervention des politiques publiques est donc nécessaire 
pour encourager les ménages à rénover, car elle peut atténuer quelques barrières à 
l’investissement et aider les agents à entreprendre des rénovations énergétiques, afin 
de diminuer significativement la consommation d’énergie et les émissions de gaz à 
effet de serre. Récemment, plusieurs mesures ont été mises en place en France, (1) des 
mesures informatives, avec par exemple la présence de l’étiquette énergétique sur les 
appareils électroménagers pour informer les consommateurs sur l’efficacité 
énergétique des équipements, ou des campagnes d’information afin d’accroître la 
sensibilité des ménages face aux économies d’énergie, (2) des mesures financières 
pour encourager les ménages à adopter des énergies renouvelables ou améliorer la 
qualité du logement comme le prêt à taux zéro, les subventions, le crédit d’impôt ou la 
TVA à taux réduit, (3) et des mesures réglementaires, telles que les réglementations 
thermiques sur les nouvelles constructions ou les rénovations, ou la nécessité 
d’indiquer la qualité énergétique du logement au moment de la vente ou la mise en 
location. 
L’une des mesures les plus populaires est le crédit d’impôt. Grâce à cette politique les 
dépenses engendrées par les rénovations énergétiques sont en partie déduites de 
l’impôt sur le revenu. Entre 2005 et 2008, 4,2 millions de français ont reçu le crédit 
d’impôt (Clerc et Mauroux, 2010) et cela représente un coût significatif : le coût 
Résumé 
 
 155 
public a atteint 7,8 milliards d’euros sur cette période et 4,2 milliards d’euros en 2009 
et 2010. Cependant, plusieurs comportements peuvent atténuer l’effet des politiques 
environnementales.  
 
• Effet d’aubaine et effet de contagion 
 
Les mesures financières doivent être mises en place avec prudence, en raison d’un 
potentiel effet d’aubaine. L’effet d’aubaine inclus les ménages qui obtiennent par 
exemple une subvention pour entreprendre une rénovation qu’ils auraient tout de 
même réalisée en l’absence de politiques publiques. La littérature récente estime 
l’ampleur de l’effet d’aubaine entre 50 et 92%. Grösche et Vance (2009) utilisent des 
données transversales issues d’une enquête sur la consommation d’énergie 
résidentielle en Allemagne en 2005 pour évaluer cet effet. Ils définissent l’effet 
d’aubaine comme une situation dans laquelle le consentement à payer des ménages 
pour une rénovation énergétique dépasse leur coût sans aucune action politique. Ils 
montrent qu’un tel effet survient dans 50% des cas. Dans une étude originale, Grösche 
et al. (2009) simulent l’effet des subventions sur la décision de rénover. Ils trouvent 
que si chaque ménage éligible agit de façon rationnelle et donc demande la 
subvention, alors l’effet d’aubaine représenterait 92% des dépenses liées au 
programme. Malm (1996) examine l’impact des subventions sur l’achat d’équipement 
de chauffage et estime que l’effet d’aubaine s’élève à 89%. 
Cependant, des effets de contagion peuvent atténuer voire compenser l’effet 
d’aubaine (Eto et al., 1995; Rosenow et Galvin, 2013). De tels effets correspondent à 
des technologies supplémentaires installées à la suite d’un programme, mais qui 
n’étaient pas couvertes par le programme. Peu d’études se concentrent sur ce point, 
mais une évaluation récente montre que ces effets peuvent être non négligeables  
(NYSERDA, 2012). 
• Effet rebond 
 
Les politiques présentées précédemment ont pour objectif d’encourager les ménages à 
rénover. Cependant, l’adoption d’investissements économiseurs d’énergie n’est pas 
nécessairement suivie d’une réduction de la consommation d’énergie. Il apparaît que 
l’investissement dans une nouvelle technologie telle que l’amélioration de l’isolation 
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peut entraîner un changement dans le comportement des ménages (par exemple, une 
hausse de la température intérieure), ce qui peut annuler, au moins partiellement, les 
effets bénéfiques de l’adoption de l’équipement. Cet effet est appelé l’effet rebond 
(voir le International Risk Governance Council, 2013). Une explication possible est 
que les personnes ont tendance à consommer davantage d’énergie quand celle-ci est 
moins coûteuse. Par conséquent, l’effet rebond réduit ou annule l’impact des 
politiques environnementales sur la consommation d’énergie et les émissions de gaz à 
effet de serre. Dans une vaste enquête, Greening et al. (2000) trouvent qu’une 
augmentation de 100% de l’efficacité énergétique mène à un effet rebond estimé de 
l’ordre de 0 à 50% dans le résidentiel. De plus, Alberini et al. (2013b) étudient la 
consommation d’énergie dans une région du Maryland et montrent que plus les 
subventions obtenues pour l’adoption d’équipements économes en énergie sont 
importantes, plus les économies d’électricité sont faibles, et ce résultat peut être 
expliqué par un effet rebond.  
De plus, l’effet rebond peut avoir un impact indirect (Schipper et Grubb, 2000). 
Quand l’énergie est moins coûteuse, les ménages ont un pouvoir d’achat plus 
important et peuvent augmenter la demande pour d’autres biens qui nécessitent de 
l’énergie lors de la production ou de l’utilisation. Druckman et al. (2010) simulent 
l’effet d’un ensemble de mesures visant à réduire les émissions de CO2 au Royaume-
Uni, à l’aide de différents scénarios. Ils estiment que l’effet rebond indirect représente 
en moyenne 34% de la réduction des émissions de gaz à effet de serre attendue (cela 
signifie que seulement les deux tiers de la baisse espérée des émissions sont 
susceptibles d’être atteints). Dans le meilleur des scénarios, l’effet peut baisser à 12% 
mais dans le scénario extrême, les émissions augmentent au lieu de diminuer.  
En prenant un large éventail d’indicateurs macroéconomiques, il est possible 
d’identifier l’effet rebond au niveau de l’économie. Gillingham et al. (2013) prennent 
l’exemple des normes sur les véhicules aux Etats-Unis pour expliquer cet effet 
rebond. Celles-ci entrainent une baisse du prix du pétrole au niveau mondial, causant 
alors une augmentation de la demande de pétrole dans les autres pays. L’estimation de 
cet effet rebond varie considérablement entre les pays, en fonction du modèle utilisé 
(un modèle d’équilibre général, ou macroéconomique) et des variables prises en 
compte. Cependant, les études trouvent généralement que cet effet d’aubaine est 
supérieur à 37% (Sorrell, 2007; International Risk Governance Council, 2013). Par 
exemple, Barker et al. (2007) étudient l’effet rebond lié aux politiques 
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environnementales au Royaume-Unis, entre 2000 et 2010 et montrent qu’il n’est pas 
assez grand pour empêcher une diminution significative de la consommation 
d’énergie et des émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Ils estiment simultanément l’effet 
indirect et l’effet au niveau de l’économie en utilisant un modèle macroéconomique et 
ils obtiennent un effet rebond de 11% environ en moyenne à travers tous les secteurs 
de l’économie, c’est-à-dire que la réduction de la demande d’énergie est 11% plus 
faible que ce qui était attendu. L’effet rebond direct s’élève lui à 15%, ce qui mène à 
un effet rebond total de 26% de la réduction attendue de la demande d’énergie.  
 
• Green paradox 
 
Les politiques environnementales pourraient devenir inefficaces à cause de l’existence 
du green paradox (Sinn, 2008). Au lieu de diminuer les émissions de gaz à effet de 
serre, les politiques qui ont pour objectif de diminuer la demande d’énergies fossiles 
(comme la taxe carbone ou les subventions sur les énergies renouvelables) pourraient 
augmenter la pollution et accélérer le changement climatique, au moins sur le court 
terme. En utilisant un modèle de Hoteling, Sinn (2008) montre que l’introduction 
d’une taxe carbone qui augmente avec le temps peut en effet avoir des effets négatifs 
(il est à noter que le green paradox n’a jamais lieu quand on se situe sur le sentier 
optimal). Puisque la taxe augmentera le prix des énergies fossiles dans le temps, les 
producteurs ont intérêt à extraire et à vendre la ressource immédiatement. Une telle 
politique augmente alors les dommages environnementaux. Van der Ploeg et 
Withagen (2010) montrent que le green paradox se produit quand il s’agit d’énergie 
relativement coûteuse mais propre (comme l’énergie solaire ou éolienne). Si le 
gouvernement introduit des subventions sur l’énergie solaire et éolienne cela 
entrainera une surconsommation du pétrole et du gaz, soit une diminution plus rapide 
de ces énergies. Dans ce cas, le green paradox est confirmé et il provoque des effets 
négatifs sur le changement climatique. A l’inverse, il n’y a pas de preuve sur 
l’existence d’un tel paradoxe dans le cas d’une énergie propre, peu coûteuse comparé 
aux dommages marginaux du réchauffement climatique (comme l’énergie nucléaire). 
Dans ce cas, il est plus intéressant de laisser le combustible fossile inexploité et ainsi  
de limiter les émissions de CO2. Grafton et al. (2010) trouvent que les subventions 
sur les biocarburants pourraient menées au green paradox. Cela dépend de plusieurs 
variables telles que les élasticités de la demande et de l’offre, les changements 
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attendus de la mesure, les changements technologiques concernant l’extraction et le 
coût de l’extraction. Il semblerait que le green paradox puisse arriver quand une 
politique climatique est annoncée en avance mais que la date de mise en place est 
incertaine. En effet, entre les deux dates (l’annonce et la mise en place), l’utilisation 
d’énergies fossiles et donc les émissions de gaz à effet de serre augmentent (Smulders 
et al. 2010).  
 
Compte tenu de ces effets qui peuvent amoindrir l’efficacité des politiques 
environnementales, nous pouvons nous demander si les politiques françaises sont 
suffisamment efficaces pour atteindre les objectifs ambitieux fixés par le Grenelle de 
l’environnement. Ce travail doctoral vise à fournir des éclairages sur ces questions. 
Nous évaluons tout d’abord ces mesures au niveau national en utilisant un modèle de 
simulation (chapitre 2) et deuxièmement, nous nous intéressons plus particulièrement 
à une politique, le crédit d’impôt, et nous étudions son effet sur le comportement des 
ménages en utilisant une approche économétrique.  
Dans le chapitre 2, nous testons l’impact de politiques existantes (le crédit d’impôt, le 
prêt à taux zéro, la subvention de l’ANAH et la TVA à taux réduit) et d’une politique 
envisageable (les bonus). Nous combinons plusieurs approches trouvées dans la 
littérature et nous modélisons la consommation d’énergie (en prenant en compte 3 
usages : le chauffage et l’eau chaude, l’éclairage et les appareils électroménagers), 
résultant de la dynamique du stock de logement et des décisions d’investissement 
dans des équipements économiseurs d’énergie. Cette étude a trois principaux apports : 
(1) nous fournissons une estimation de la consommation d’énergie résidentielle et des 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre en France jusqu’en 2050, (2) nous évaluons l’impact 
de politiques environnementales comparé à leur coût public et (3) nous proposons 
différentes manières d’atteindre les objectifs fixés par le Grenelle de l’environnement. 
Les résultats montrent que les politiques actuelles sont efficaces dans le sens ou elles 
ont permis de diminuer la consommation et les émissions de gaz à effet de serre sur 
les dernières années. La consommation d’énergie du secteur résidentiel aurait été 28% 
plus élevée en 2010 sans l’introduction des politiques environnementales, et les 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre 55% plus importantes. Le crédit d’impôt semble être 
une des mesures les plus efficaces. Cependant, les politiques existantes ne sont pas 
suffisantes pour atteindre les objectifs en 2050. Des dépenses publiques 
supplémentaires sont nécessaires pour cela.  
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Nous avons vu que le crédit d’impôt semblait être une des politiques les plus 
efficaces, mais que cette mesure représente un coût public important. Dans le chapitre 
3, nous examinons les impacts du crédit d’impôt sur le taux de rénovation et sur les 
dépenses de rénovation. Notre objectif est double. Premièrement nous cherchons à 
déterminer si les ménages sont sensibles à cette mesure ou si le crédit d’impôt fournit 
simplement des financements supplémentaires à des ménages qui auraient entrepris 
des travaux de rénovation sans la mise en place de cette mesure (c’est à dire s’il existe 
un effet d’aubaine). Deuxièmement, nous nous intéressons aux dépenses de 
rénovation et nous regardons si la politique encourage les ménages à entreprendre des 
rénovations énergétiques plus coûteuses et plus efficaces. Pour ce faire, nous utilisons 
des méthodes de matching et des données de ménages issues de l’enquête maîtrise de 
l’énergie de l’ADEME et de la SOFRES, de 2001 à 2008, qui regroupent des 
informations sur les rénovations énergétiques. Nous trouvons que le crédit d’impôt a 
un impact significatif et positif sur le taux de rénovation et sur les dépenses. Cette 
mesure a essentiellement un impact sur les dépenses de rénovation : elle permet une 
augmentation des dépenses de 24,65% si nous considérons des prix courant. 
Cependant, l’effet sur le nombre de rénovations est très faible, en particulier si nous le 
comparons au coût public de la politique. Le crédit d’impôt entraine une 
augmentation des rénovations de 0,89% entre 2005 et 2008. Les résultats suggèrent la 
présence d’un effet d’aubaine. En effet, 4,2 millions de ménages ont bénéficié du 
crédit d’impôt sur cette période mais cette mesure a incité seulement 900 000 
ménages à rénover. De plus, les professionnels du bâtiment semblent capter une part 
des gains liés au crédit d’impôt à travers une augmentation des prix. Ces deux effets 
amoindrissent l’impact de la mesure.  
 
 
2. L’impact économique des dégradations environnementales pour 
les pays émergents : Le cas de l’Inde 
 
Les enjeux 
Dans les pays émergents, la préoccupation la plus importante n’est pas la mise en 
place de politiques environnementales adéquates pour diminuer les émissions de gaz à 
effet de serre, mais l’enjeu est de trouver un moyen de limiter les conséquences du 
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changement climatique. En effet, les pays émergents sont les plus vulnérables face au 
réchauffement de la planète, comme nous pouvons le voir sur la carte 1 (p.17). Cette 
carte montre le « climate change vulnerability index » (Maplecroft, 2013). Cet index 
évalue l’exposition aux catastrophes naturelles, à l’élévation du niveau de la mer, 
ainsi que la dépendance des populations aux ressources naturelles et à l’agriculture. Il 
considère également la capacité d’adaptation des gouvernements et des infrastructures 
à contrer le changement climatique. Nous pouvons observer les pays avec un risque 
extrême en rouge sur la carte, et les pays avec un risque élevé en jaune. L’Inde fait 
partie des pays qui supporte un risque extrême.  
Les pays émergents sont les plus exposés aux dégradations environnementales et aux 
évènements climatiques causés par l’activité humaine. Cependant, les émissions de 
gaz à effet de serre ont augmenté rapidement dans ces pays ces dernières années et il 
est fortement possible que cette tendance continue dans le futur. En effet, l’Inde fait 
partie des plus gros émetteurs de dioxyde de carbone après la Chine, les Etats-Unis, 
l’Union Européenne et la Russie. Ses émissions totales ont augmenté de 113% entre 
1990 et 2010 (ou de 3,9% par an en moyenne sur la période). Pour comparaison, les 
émissions de l’Union Européenne ont diminué de 10% sur l’ensemble de la période et 
celles des Etats-Unis ont augmenté d’environ 9% (source : CAIT). De plus, l’Inde est 
le quatrième plus gros consommateur d’énergie dans le monde, après les Etats-Unis, 
la Chine et la Russie. La consommation d’énergie primaire a plus que doublé entre 
1990 et 2010 même si la consommation d’énergie par tête reste plus faible que celle 
des pays développés (selon l’U.S. Energy Information Administration). Deux 
éléments peuvent expliquer cette forte hausse. Premièrement, la croissance 
économique en Inde a été très élevée, atteignant presque 7% par an entre 2000 et 
2010. Deuxièmement, la croissance de la population est particulièrement importante, 
avec une augmentation de 40% entre 1990 et 2010. Les pressions sur l’environnement 
sont donc fortes et nous pouvons penser qu’elles deviendront plus importantes encore 
avec la croissance économique soutenue et l’augmentation de la population dans le 
futur.  
 
L’impact des dégradations environnementales sur la population 
Comme nous l’avons vu précédemment, les dégradations environnementales peuvent 
avoir un impact sur l’IDH et sur le revenu (PNUD, 2011) mais elles peuvent 
également avoir des conséquences économiques pour les populations. La littérature 
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sur le sujet n’est pas très étendue. Elle s’intéresse notamment aux effets négatifs de la 
pollution de l’air, sur la santé par exemple, mais elle s’intéresse moins aux effets de la 
déforestation sur les agents économiques. Cependant, la déforestation et l’accès 
restreint aux ressources naturelles pourraient affecter les ménages. En effet, les 
ressources naturelles représentent une part non négligeable du revenu des ménages 
ruraux (Cavendish, 2000; Kamanga et al. 2009). Par exemple, en Inde, 200 millions 
de personnes sont dépendantes des forêts comme moyens de subsistance (source: 
Indian Ministry of Environment and Forest). Les individus vivant dans les zones 
rurales dépendent fortement du bois : plus de 80% des ménages ruraux utilisent de la 
biomasse traditionnelle comme source principale de combustible pour la cuisson, 
contre seulement 22% des ménages urbains (source : 2011 India census). La 
déforestation est en même temps une des plus grandes dégradations 
environnementales visibles. L’Inde est le dixième pays dans le monde en terme de 
couverture forestière, avec environ 68 millions d’hectares de forêts (source : Global 
Forest Resource Assessment, 2010), mais environ 41% de la couverture forestière a 
été dégradée au cours des dernières décennies. L’accroissement de la population, la 
sur-utilisation des ressources et le besoin de terres sont les principales causes de la 
déforestation. Et les conséquences peuvent être dramatique : la déforestation est 
responsable de 20% des émissions de gaz à effet de serre mondiale (source : GIEC) et 
la déforestation tropicale en Asie, Afrique et Amérique du Sud contribue en grande 
partie à ces émissions.   
La pollution et les changements environnementaux peuvent aussi avoir un impact sur 
l’accès des individus au marché du travail. Peu d’études s’intéressent à cette relation 
alors que l’accès au marché du travail est directement lié à des questions de pauvreté 
et d’inégalités, notamment en termes de différences hommes et femmes. Sala-i-Martin 
(2005) montre que la pollution, à travers ses impacts sur la santé, a des effets négatifs 
sur le capital humain et la productivité. En effet, les ménages pauvres n’ont pas les 
moyens d’améliorer leur santé. Par conséquent, il est plus difficile pour eux 
d’augmenter leur capital humain et leur productivité économique. Dans ce cas, la 
pollution peut exacerber la pauvreté et la rendre plus persistante. Les ménages les plus 
pauvres entre donc dans un cercle vicieux, connu sous le nom de trappe à pauvreté 
(Dasgupta et Ray, 1986, 1987). Concernant les dégradations environnementales 
comme la déforestation, le lien avec la participation au marché du travail est mal 
connu. Kumar et al. (1988) montrent que la détérioration de l’accès au bois, mesurée 
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par le temps passé à ramasser du combustible, conduit les femmes à consacrer moins 
de temps aux activités agricoles productives. Cependant, les auteurs ne prennent pas 
en compte le potentiel problème d’endogénéité des variables, donc l’interprétation des 
résultats doit être réalisée avec précaution. A l’inverse, Cooke (1998b) souligne qu’au 
Népal les ménages allouent plus de temps à des activités de collecte quand les 
produits environnementaux sont plus coûteux, mais ne trouve cependant aucune 
relation entre la collecte et le temps que les femmes consacrent à l’agriculture.  
 
Dans ce travail doctoral, nous nous concentrons sur ce dernier point et essayons 
d’apporter quelques éclairages sur la manière dont l’environnement peut affecter les 
agents et comment ils s’adaptent à la déforestation. C’est l’objectif du dernier chapitre 
(chapitre 4). La déforestation, en augmentant la rareté du bois pourrait avoir un 
impact sur les agents. Dans les pays émergents, les ménages ruraux dépendent 
généralement fortement des produits environnementaux collectés tels que le bois. Les 
femmes sont les plus concernées par la collecte de ressources naturelles. Nous 
cherchons à voir si la déforestation et la pénurie de combustible ont à la fois un 
impact direct sur la décision de collecter des ressources naturelles et un effet indirect 
sur la participation au marché du travail à travers les activités de collecte. Nous 
utilisons un probit bivarié pour estimer simultanément la décision de collecter du bois 
et la probabilité de participer au marché du travail. Les données sont issues de 
l’Indian Human Development Survey de 2004. Nous montrons que la rareté du 
combustible augmente la probabilité que les femmes soient impliquées dans la 
collecte de combustible. À travers cela, elle a un effet négatif sur la participation au 
marché du travail, particulièrement en ce qui concerne les activités salariales. Nous 
trouvons que cet effet est plus prononcé pour les ménages vivant au-dessus du seuil 
de pauvreté et cela s’explique par le fait que la contrainte de revenu est plus faible 
pour eux.  
 
Cette thèse se compose donc de quatre chapitres. Nous étudions tout d’abord les 
déterminants de la consommation d’énergie en France (chapitre 1) et ensuite nous 
évaluons l’impact des politiques environnementales au niveau national (chapitre 2) et 
sur le comportement des ménages (chapitre 3). Finalement, nous étudions l’impact de 
la déforestation sur l’accès des femmes au marché du travail en Inde (chapitre 4). 
Nous espérons que ce travail doctoral apporte quelques éclairages nouveaux sur la 
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manière dont la pollution et les dégradations environnementales affectent les 
économies contemporaines grâce à notre recherche sur (1) l’évaluation des politiques 
publiques dans les pays développés et sur (2) l’évaluation de l’impact des 
dégradations environnementales dans les pays émergents. La partie suivante 
synthétise les principaux résultats et apports de cette thèse.  
 
 
3.  Principaux apports de ce travail doctoral 
Nous avons mis en évidence plusieurs éléments susceptibles de diminuer l’impact des 
politiques environnementales. Premièrement, nous observons la présence d’un effet 
d’aubaine. Il représente plus de 40% des ménages qui rénovent entre 2011 et 2050 si 
nous prenons en compte toutes les politiques environnementales (chapitre 2). Cet effet 
est plus important en début de période puis il s’estompe au fil du temps. Si nous 
considérons uniquement le crédit d’impôt entre 2005 et 2008 l’effet d’aubaine atteint 
79% (chapitre 3). En effet, sur cette période le crédit d’impôt a encouragé 900 000 
ménages à rénover, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, alors que 4,2 millions de 
ménages ont bénéficié de cette mesure. L’effet d’aubaine semble donc être 
particulièrement important pour les mesures fiscales.  
Deuxièmement, les politiques publiques ne sont pas suffisantes pour encourager les 
ménages à faible revenu ainsi que les locataires à rénover. Même si la consommation 
d’énergie réagit faiblement à une augmentation du revenu par unité de 
consommation (dans le chapitre 1, nous trouvons une élasticité-revenu de 0,02 pour 
les ménages vivant dans des maisons et non significative pour ceux vivant dans des 
appartements), le revenu joue un rôle important dans la décision de rénover. Ce sont 
principalement les ménages appartenant aux quatrième et cinquième quintiles de 
revenus qui investissent (comme nous le voyons dans le chapitre 2 et 3). Les 
politiques publiques ne parviennent pas à inciter les ménages à faibles revenus à 
rénover. De plus, nous avons montré dans le chapitre 1 que les appartements équipés 
d’un chauffage collectif (utilisant du gaz naturel ou du fuel) consomment 
significativement plus d’énergie que ceux équipés d’un chauffage individuel (utilisant 
du gaz naturel ou de l’électricité) toutes choses égales par ailleurs. Cependant, dans ce 
type de logement, la décision de rénover est prise à la majorité des copropriétaires. 
Les équipements économiseurs d’énergie ont donc une probabilité plus faible d’être 
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adoptés. De plus, les politiques environnementales, telles que le crédit d’impôt, incite 
principalement les propriétaires occupants à rénover, et n’a pas de réel impact sur les 
locataires. Un locataire a moins d’incitation à réaliser des investissements 
économiseurs d’énergie puisqu’il ne reste pas assez longtemps dans son logement 
pour s’assurer des retours sur investissement. Alors qu’à l’inverse, les rénovations 
augmentent la valeur du logement pour les propriétaires. 
Troisièmement, le marché des rénovations énergétiques est imparfaitement compétitif 
et cela permet aux professionnels du bâtiment de capter une partie des bénéfices du 
crédit d’impôt, à travers une augmentation des prix. Nous montrons dans le chapitre 3 
que le crédit d’impôt a entrainé une augmentation des dépenses de rénovation de 
24,65% mais les deux-tiers de cette augmentation sont liés à une augmentation des 
prix.  
Pour finir, nous constatons dans le chapitre 1, que les investissements dans l’isolation 
du vitrage peuvent ne pas avoir d’impact sur la consommation d’énergie. Les 
ménages peuvent décider d’opter pour un plus haut niveau de confort et donc une 
température intérieure plus élevée suite à l’investissement. Cet effet rebond signifie 
que l’impact des rénovations sur les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et la 
consommation d’énergie pourrait être nul.  
 
Ces quatre effets réduisent donc l’impact des politiques environnementales. Par 
conséquent, les politiques actuelles ne sont pas suffisantes pour atteindre les objectifs 
fixés par le Grenelle de l’environnement. Grâce aux simulations réalisées dans le 
chapitre 2, nous sommes en mesure de proposer des solutions pour atteindre une 
consommation moyenne de 50 kWhep/m
2 et diviser par 4 les émissions de gaz à effet 
de serre d’ici 2050, par rapport à leur niveau de 1990. Nous pourrions envisager 
d’augmenter significativement les taux de crédit d’impôt jusqu’à 54% (les taux 
actuels sont de 15% pour le double-vitrage, 25% pour l’isolation du toit et des murs et 
la modernisation du système de chauffage, et 40% pour l’adoption d’énergies 
renouvelables) ou d’introduire de nouvelles politiques telles que les bonus : un bonus 
de 2900 € par rénovation pourrait permettre d’atteindre les objectifs. Finalement, une 
combinaison de plusieurs politiques pourrait également être efficace : il serait possible 
d’atteindre les objectifs en 2050 avec un taux de crédit d’impôt de 45% pour toutes 
les rénovations dès 2011, combiné à un prêt à taux zéro, une TVA à 5,5%, un bonus 
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de 1000€ pour les ménages appartenant aux premier et second quintiles de revenus et 
un bonus de 500€ pour les autres ménages.  
Cependant, de telles mesures représentent un coût public élevé. C’est pourquoi nous 
recommandons d’introduire un plafond de revenu pour limiter l’effet d’aubaine et 
ainsi cibler uniquement les ménages à faibles revenus. De plus, le coût public pourrait 
être limité grâce à la mise en place de taxes supplémentaires sur les prix de l’énergie. 
La consommation d’énergie est corrélée aux prix des énergies (en valeur absolue, 
l’élasticité-prix est de 0,46 pour les maisons et de 0,86 pour les appartements). De 
plus, une forte augmentation des prix inciterait les ménages à investir rapidement dans 
des rénovations énergétiques, toutes choses égales par ailleurs. Si l’évolution des prix 
de l’énergie reste telle qu’elle est prévue par l’Agence Internationale de l’Energie 
(c’est à dire une hausse annuelle des prix de 3,1% pour l’électricité, de 3,3% pour le 
fuel et de 3,6% pour le gaz), nous pourrions atteindre une consommation moyenne du 
parc de logements résidentiels de 50 kWhep/m
2 en 2078. Cependant, une taxe sur les 
prix de l’énergie affecterait principalement les personnes les plus pauvres et 
soulèverait la question de la précarité énergétique, mais une taxe peut également être 
redistribuée pour atteindre un objectif d’équité. Finalement, nous pouvons nous 
questionner sur la pertinence de mener une politique environnementale sans une 
coordination internationale. En effet, cela génère des coûts importants sans la garantie 
de diminuer les dommages environnementaux et les évènements climatiques.  
 
Comme nous l’avons vu, les pays émergents sont plus exposés aux catastrophes 
climatiques que les pays développés. Donc, leur principale préoccupation est de 
trouver un moyen de limiter les conséquences du changement climatique. Dans le 
chapitre 4, nous étudions la manière dont l’environnement peut affecter les agents et 
comment ils s’adaptent aux changements environnementaux. Plus précisément, nous 
essayons de comprendre le lien entre la déforestation ou la rareté du bois et la 
décision de collecter des ressources naturelles ou de participer au marché du travail. 
En Inde, les ménages sont également sensibles à l’évolution du prix des combustibles, 
en particulier ceux vivant au-dessus du seuil de pauvreté. En France, les ménages 
ajustent leur consommation d’énergie en fonction des prix. En Inde, les effets sont 
quelques peu différents. Une augmentation du prix du bois a un impact sur la 
participation des femmes au marché du travail. Les prix reflètent la rareté de la 
ressource. Des prix plus élevés incitent les femmes à collecter du bois elles-mêmes et 
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cela réduit leurs probabilités de participer à des activités salariales. Cela signifie que 
la déforestation, en augmentant la rareté du bois, affecte les ménages. Ces résultats 
sont dans la lignée du rapport sur le développement humain du PNUD (2011) : les 
dégradations environnementales ont des effets néfastes sur les ménages. Il semble 
donc important d’améliorer les politiques qui visent à limiter la déforestation. Cela 
pourrait par exemple être réalisé à travers la protection des zones forestières ou par le 
biais des Joint Forest Management. 
 
Etant donné nos résultats, plusieurs recommandations peuvent être formulées. Pour 
résumer, dans les pays développés la préoccupation la plus importante est la mise en 
place de politiques environnementales adéquates pour diminuer significativement les 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre. Pour atteindre cet objectif en France, les politiques 
actuelles doivent être renforcées. Premièrement les politiques environnementales 
devraient inciter les ménages vivant en appartement à remplacer les systèmes de 
chauffages collectifs par des chauffages individuels ou à installer des compteurs 
individuels. En effet, cela permettrait (i) de diminuer la consommation d’énergie dans 
les logements collectifs et (ii) d’inciter les ménages à rénover ou améliorer la qualité 
thermique de leur logement. L’incitation à rénover est faible pour un ménage vivant 
dans un appartement équipé d’un chauffage collectif puisque les économies d’énergie 
sont partagées entre tous les copropriétaires.  
Deuxièmement, les politiques environnementales devraient diminuer le coût des 
équipements économiseurs d’énergie pour les ménages à faibles revenus, en 
introduisant par exemple des bonus importants, réservés à ces ménages par le biais de 
plafonds de revenus. Cela permettrait (i) de diminuer significativement la 
consommation d’énergie puisque ces ménages vivent souvent dans les logements les 
moins bien isolés et (ii) de s’intéresser seulement aux ménages qui ont besoin d’aide 
financière pour rénover dans le but de limiter l’effet d’aubaine. 
Troisièmement, l’impact des mesures fiscales sur le nombre de rénovations est faible 
à cause de l’effet d’aubaine et, comme nous l’avons vu, les incitations financières 
représentent un coût public important. Donc, pour atténuer les effets négatifs liés à ces 
politiques tout en minimisant le coût public, une des possibilités serait de durcir les 
mesures réglementaires telles que les réglementations thermiques sur les nouvelles 
constructions. De plus, il est plus compliqué de diminuer la consommation d’énergie 
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grâce aux rénovations plutôt que directement construire un bâtiment basse 
consommation. 
Finalement, les pays émergents doivent limiter les dégradations environnementales 
compte tenu de l’effet négatif sur les population. La déforestation est la plus grande 
dégradation environnementale visible et, dans ce contexte, une meilleure gestion des 
forêts, à travers par exemple les Joint Forest Management, est nécessaire. 
 
Les questions environnementales soulèvent plusieurs questions. Même si nous avons 
essayé d’amener quelques éclairages, il serait intéressant de continuer ces recherches.  
 
 
4.  Perspectives  
Suite à ce travail doctoral, nous prévoyons de nous intéresser aux questions de 
précarité énergétique en France. Selon l’INSEE, environ 13% des ménages sont dans 
une situation de précarité énergétique. Cela correspond à des ménages qui consacrent 
plus d’un dixième de leur revenu à des dépenses énergétiques, afin de chauffer leur 
logement à un niveau acceptable. En effet, les dépenses énergétiques représentent une 
part élevée du revenu des ménages appartenant aux premiers quintiles de revenus. 
Dans le même temps, le revenu peut limiter les investissements économiseurs 
d’énergie. Cependant, peu d’études s’intéressent à la précarité énergétique dans les 
pays développés. Nos contributions pourraient être d’identifier les principaux facteurs 
menant un ménage à la précarité énergétique, dans le but de mettre en place des 
mesures adéquates et efficaces pour lutter contre ce phénomène. De telles politiques 
pourraient augmenter le bien être de ces ménages et pourraient également avoir un 
impact sur la consommation d’énergie du secteur résidentiel. En effet, nous nous 
attendons à ce que les ménages qui sont en situation de précarité énergétique vivent 
dans les logements les moins bien isolés et émettent plus de gaz à effet de serre.  
 
Comme nous l’avons vu dans le dernier chapitre de cette thèse, la rareté des 
ressources naturelles telles que le bois, peut avoir des effets négatifs sur les ménages, 
en entravant l’accès des femmes au marché du travail. Par conséquent, l’accès des 
ménages à des combustibles modernes pourrait avoir un impact positif sur la 
croissance économique dans les pays émergents, comme le chapitre 4 et la littérature 
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sur l’accès à l’électricité semble le montrer. Mais cela pourrait également augmenter 
la pollution, qui à son tour affecterait le bien être des ménages. Nous pourrions dans 
des travaux futurs, analyser l’impact de l’accès aux énergies modernes sur le 
développement à un niveau macroéconomique, en considérant également les effets 
liés à la pollution.  
 
Pour aller plus loin, pour pouvons également nous intéresser à l’impact des 
réglementations limitant la pollution en Inde sur la productivité des ménages. La 
littérature s’intéresse à l’impact de la pollution sur la santé. A travers cet effet, la 
pollution peut accroitre la pauvreté et la rendre plus persistante (Sala-i-Martin, 2005). 
En effet, les ménages pauvres n’ont pas les moyens d’améliorer leur santé. Par 
conséquent, cela est plus difficile pour eux d’augmenter leur capital humain et leur 
productivité économique. Les ménages pauvres peuvent donc entrer dans un cercle 
vicieux connu sous le nom de trappe à pauvreté (Dasgupta et Ray, 1986, 1987). La 
croissance rapide en Inde a créé des pressions sur l’environnement et a accéléré la 
pollution : les émissions de gaz à effet de serre ont augmenté de 113% entre 1990 et 
2010. Cependant, des réglementations sur la pollution de l’air ont été adoptées dès 
1981. Des actions ont été mises en place pour réduire la pollution dans les villes très 
polluées et 17 villes sont aujourd’hui concernées par ces mesures. Nous pourrions 
étudier l’impact de ces réglementations afin de voir si elles sont suffisamment 
efficaces pour améliorer la productivité des travailleurs et empêcher les ménages 
d’entrer dans la trappe à pauvreté.  
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Tableau - Résumé 
 Objectifs Approche Données Résultats 
Chapitre 
1 
Etudier les déterminants de la 
consommation d’énergie résidentielle: 
(11) Analyser le poids relatif des 
caractéristiques des ménages, du 
bâti et des spécificités climatiques 
pour expliquer la consommation 
d’énergie par mètre carré 
(12) Identifier les sources principales 
d’économie d’énergie dans le 
secteur résidentiel français 
(13) Proposer une estimation des 
élasticités prix et revenu de la 
consommation d’énergie par 
mètre carré 
Modèle à choix 
discret et 
continu 
- INSEE Enquête logement 
de 2006 
- Données sur les prix de 
l’énergie issues du 
Ministère de l'économie, 
des finances et de 
l'industrie 
(11) La consommation d’énergie est presque 
entièrement déterminée par les caractéristiques 
techniques du bâti et le climat, alors que les 
caractéristiques des ménages ont un impact très faible 
sur le niveau de la consommation d’énergie. 
(12) Le chauffage collectif augmente la consommation 
de façon importante ceteris paribus 
Nous constatons la présence d’un effet rebond sur le 
double-vitrage dans les maisons. 
(13) L’élasticité-prix est égale en valeur absolue à 0,46 
pour les ménages vivant dans des maisons et 0,86 
pour ceux vivant dans des appartements 
L’élasticité-revenu est faible (0,02) pour les ménages 
vivant dans des maisons et non significative pour 
ceux vivant dans des appartements. 
Chapitre 
2 
Evaluer les politiques 
environnementales au niveau national 
(14) Estimer la consommation 
d’énergie et les émissions de gaz 
à effet de serre du secteur 
résidentiel en France jusqu’en 
2050 
(15) Evaluer l’impact des politiques 
environnementales sur la 
consommation d’énergie, les 
émissions de gaz à effet de serre 
et le nombre de rénovations 
(16) Proposer des solutions pour 
atteindre les objectifs fixés par le 
Grenelle de l’environnement 
Modèle de 
simulation, avec 
une approche 
bottom-up. 
Nous 
modélisons : 
- La 
consommation 
d’énergie est 
les émissions 
de GES 
- La décision 
d’investir dans 
des 
rénovations 
énergétiques 
- Le parc de 
logement  
- INSEE Enquête logement 
2006 
- Ministère de l’écologie, de 
l’énergie, du 
développement durable et 
de la mer, pour des 
informations sur le nombre 
de logements et de 
nouvelles constructions  
- Logiciel de simulation 
PROMODUL, utilisé pour 
estimer la consommation 
d’énergie et les émissions 
de GES pour chaque 
catégorie de logements 
- L’Agence Internationale de 
l’Energie pour les prix de 
l’énergie 
(14) Avec les politiques actuelles, la consommation 
d’énergie moyenne sera de 91,67 kWhep/m
2
 en 2050 
(l’objectif étant de 50 kWhep/m
2
). 
(15) Les politiques sont efficaces mais pas assez pour 
atteindre les objectifs du Grenelle de l’environnement 
L’effet d’aubaine représente 40,15% des rénovations 
entreprises entre 2011 et 2050. 
Le crédit d’impôt est une des politiques les plus 
efficaces. 
(16) Pour atteindre les objectifs, il est nécessaire de 
mettre en place des politiques plus ambitieuses. Une 
combinaison de plusieurs politiques peut être 
envisagée : un crédit d’impôt de 45% pour toutes les 
rénovations dès 2011, combiné avec un prêt à taux 
zéro, une TVA à taux réduit de 5,5%, un bonus de 
1000€ pour les ménages appartenant au 1
er
 et 2
ème
 
quintiles de revenus et un bonus de 500€ pour les 
autres. 
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Chapitre 
3 
Evaluer l’effet du crédit d’impôt sur le 
comportement des ménages 
(17) Déterminer si les ménages sont 
sensibles à cette politique ou si le 
crédit d’impôt fournit un 
financement aux ménages qui 
auraient tout de même rénové 
sans politique (effet d’aubaine)  
(18) Analyser l’impact de cette mesure 
sur le montant des rénovations 
pour voir si le crédit d’impôt 
permet aux ménages d’investir 
dans des rénovations énergétiques 
plus coûteuses mais plus efficaces 
Méthode 
d’appariement 
ADEME-SOFRES enquête 
Maîtrise de l’Energie de 
2001 à 2008 
(17) Le crédit d’impôt permet d’augmenter le nombre 
de rénovations de 0,86%, ceteris paribus. Cela 
représente 900 000 rénovations, mais 4,2 millions de 
ménages ont reçu le crédit d’impôt entre 2005-2008 : 
présence d’un effet d’aubaine. 
(18) Le crédit d’impôt a permis d’augmenter les 
dépenses de rénovation (à prix courant) de 24,65%. 
L’effet est 3 fois plus faible si nous considérons des 
prix constants (8,9%) : Les professionnels du 
bâtiment captent une partie des gains du crédit 
d’impôt. 
Chapitre 
4 
Etudier l’impact des changements 
environnementaux sur les agents, plus 
précisément l’impact de la déforestation 
et de la rareté du bois sur les femmes 
vivant en zones rurales : 
(19) Etudier l’impact de la 
déforestation et de la rareté de 
bois sur la décision des femmes 
de collecter cette ressource 
(20) Chercher à savoir s’il existe un 
effet indirect de la pénurie de bois 
sur la participation des femmes au 
marché du travail, à travers la 
collecte de ressources naturelles 
Modèle 
d’équations 
simultanées : 
probit bivarié 
 
 
- Indian Human 
Development Survey 2004-
2005 
- Indian National Service 
Scheme 2004 
- Forest Survey of India 
reports 1999 et 2005 
(19) Plus la ressource est rare, plus la probabilité que 
les femmes participent à la collecte de ressources 
naturelles est importante. 
(20) La collecte de bois diminue la probabilité de 
participer au marché du travail : les dégradations 
environnementales sont une barrière à l’accès des 
femmes au marché du travail.  
Quand la contrainte de revenu est trop forte, l’offre de 
travail est indépendante de la probabilité de collecter 
des ressources naturelles. 
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 Abstract: 
 
In the context of growing concerns for climate change, the objective of this 
dissertation is to bring some insights on two environmental issues. The first one 
deals with the question of whether environmental policies are efficient enough to 
significantly decrease greenhouse gases emissions and energy consumption and 
the second one concerns the way households’ well-being is affected by 
environmental changes.  
France committed to reduce greenhouse gases emissions and energy consumption 
in residential sector. In a first time, we study the determinants of residential energy 
consumption in France. An in-depth understanding of energy consumption is 
needed to design adequate energy policies and achieve a low-carbon society. We 
show that to improve buildings' energy efficiency, the challenge is to induce 
households to undertake renovations and to adopt energy-saving equipments. This 
is the objective of public policies, such as tax credit or subsidies. We evaluate in a 
second time the impact of these measures, using a simulation model. The results 
show that while current policies are effective, they are not sufficient to reach the 
objectives. Finally, we focus on the impact of the tax credit on households’ 
behavior. The impact of the measure on renovation rate is very low compared to its 
cost and this is partially due to free riding. Emerging countries are more exposed 
to climate disasters than developed ones. Therefore, the most important concern in 
emerging countries is to find a way to limit the consequences of climate change. In 
this context, our objective is to understand how deforestation, that increases fuel 
scarcity, affects population. We focus on women, living in rural India. We show 
that fuel scarcity increases the probability for women to be involved in natural 
resource collection. Through this, it has a negative effect on the labor force 
participation, especially on family business and wage activities. 
 
Keywords: Public policies evaluation, environment, energy 
 
 
 
Résumé:  
Le changement climatique est devenu une préoccupation majeure. L’objectif de 
cette thèse est d’apporter quelques éclairages sur les questions environnementales 
actuelles. Premièrement, nous nous interrogeons sur l’efficacité des politiques 
environnementales. Deuxièmement, nous nous intéressons à la manière dont le 
bien être des ménages peut être affecté par les dégradations environnementales. 
La France s’est engagée à réduire les émissions de gaz à effet de serre et la 
consommation d’énergie dans le secteur résidentiel. Nous étudions dans un 
premier chapitre les déterminants de la consommation d’énergie résidentielle, afin 
d’identifier les politiques les plus efficaces pour améliorer l’efficacité énergétique 
dans ce secteur. Nous montrons que l’enjeu est d’inciter les ménages à 
entreprendre des travaux de rénovation. C’est l’objectif de politiques telles que le 
crédit d’impôt développement durable ou les subventions. Dans un second 
chapitre, nous évaluons l’impact de ces mesures à l’aide d’un modèle de 
simulation. Les résultats montrent que si les politiques actuelles sont efficaces, 
elles ne sont pas suffisantes pour atteindre les objectifs fixés. Enfin, nous nous 
concentrons dans un troisième chapitre sur l’impact du crédit d’impôt sur le 
comportement des ménages. Cette mesure incite peu les ménages à réaliser des 
rénovations, et ceci s’explique en partie par un effet d’aubaine. Les pays 
émergents sont les plus exposés aux catastrophes climatiques. Nous cherchons à 
voir dans un quatrième chapitre comment les dégradations environnementales 
affectent les ménages. La déforestation augmente la rareté des ressources 
naturelles telles que le bois. Cela accroît la probabilité que les femmes soient 
impliquées dans la collecte des ressources naturelles et par ce biais, diminue leur 
participation au marché du travail.  
 
Mots-clés: Evaluation des politiques publiques, environnement, énergie  
